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ABSTRACT
MONEY, OUTPUT AND REAL WAGES IN A NEW KEYNESIAN FRAMEWORK 
WITH HETEROGENEOUS LABOR AND MONOPSONISTIC FIRMS
by
Robert J. Martel 
University of New Hampshire, December, 1998
Representative agent models do not match up well with 
three stylized facts of the business cycle: a money-output 
connection, countercyclical markups, and acyclical real wages. 
This thesis investigates whether a New Keynesian model which 
departs from the representative agent assumptions and models 
heterogeneity and imperfect competition in the labor market is 
more consistent with these stylized facts.
One possible explanation of countercyclical markups and 
acyclical real wages is that labor markets are monopsonistic 
and monopsony power is weaker during expansions than in 
recessions, This would require that the elasticity of labor 
supply be procyclical. This is not possible if worker 
preferences are homothetic.
An aggregate labor supply function for heterogeneous 
labor is constructed. Labor is indivisible, and workers are 
heterogeneous with respect to their nonlabor income endowments 
and preferences for risk. Nonlabor income is assumed to be 
distributed Lognormally. Workers' optimizing choices in a 
take-it-or-leave it job market are determined by a reservation
xiv
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wage function which relates reservation wages to nonlabor 
income. Aggregate labor supply is a composite function of 
the Lognormal distribution of nonlabor income and the reserva­
tion wage function.
The parameters of the aggregate labor supply function are 
affected by changes in the aggregate price level and the 
interest rate. An increase in the money supply increases 
aggregate labor supply. If workers have increasing relative 
risk aversion, an increase in money also increases the 
elasticity of labor supply. The magnitude of this increase 
depends upon the magnitudes of the interest- and wealth- 
elasticities of the aggregate money demand function.
If firms are monopsonistic, the elasticity of the 
aggregate labor supply function will be procyclical with 
respect to monetary policy, and markups will be countercyc­
lical. A calibrated version of the model indicates that the 
real wage would be weakly countercyclical, acyclical, or 
weakly procyclical, depending on the short-term elasticities 
of the price level and the interest rate with respect to 
changes in M2. The model implies a wealth-effects trans­
mission channel from monetary policy to aggregate labor 
supply, employment and output, restoring a traditional 
Keynesian theme of a monetary theory of production.
xv
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CHAPTER I
REAL WAGES, MARKUPS, AMD THE MONEY-OUTPUT CONNECTION
1.1 Introduction
Macroeconomic models can be classified according to how 
well their predictions match up with two well-established 
stylized facts of the business cycle:[Fischer, (1988)]
(1) changes in the nominal money stock are positively 
correlated with changes in real output;
(2) the aggregate real wage is acyclical or weakly 
procyclical.
Each stylized fact has had its own history of debate and 
has been the subject of an extensive body of empirical and 
theoretical research. While most economists would probably 
agree that these two statements have been descriptive of most 
U. S. business cycles, when it comes to providing theoretical 
explanations the contemporary literature breaks down into two 
competing schools of thought: the New Keynesian (NK) and the 
Real Business Cycle (RBC) theories1.
In the U. S. the published debates have been largely confined to these two 
mainstream schools of thought. This is not to discount, by their exclusion here, 
the theoretical contributions of other schools of thought such as the Post- 
Keynesian, Non-Walrasian and Post-Walrasian, which have had greater acceptance 
abroad.
1
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2In this chapter I examine representative models of both 
schools and show that neither school has had much success in 
explaining both stylized facts in a single model. The 
principal conclusion of this chapter is that, within the 
conventional paradigms of macroeconomic theory, it has been 
difficult to construct a model in which changes in money and 
output are positively correlated and the aggregate real wage 
is acyclical or weakly procyclical.
These two stylized facts represent nontrivial character­
istics of national economies. The first one offers a rational­
ization of the Keynesian Phillips curve and leads to the 
inference that cyclical fluctuations are influenced by 
monetary policy. However, it is also consistent with the RBC 
view that money is neutral but responds to changes in real 
output. The second stylized fact implies that labor produc­
tivity and labor's share of national income are procyclical, 
which is hard to reconcile with the Keynesian assumption of a 
stable short-run aggregate production function with fixed 
capital and decreasing returns to labor. (Sargent and Wallace, 
1974; Canzoneri, 1977; Hall, 1991)) The RBC explanation is 
that the aggregate production function is unstable and subject 
to cyclical shocks to labor productivity. Thus, the two main 
schools of thought in macroeconomics offer contrasting 
explanations of how cyclical shocks are propagated in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3aggregate labor market. It will be demonstrated in this 
chapter that neither school gets it quite right, i. e., 
neither explanation is consistent with both stylized facts.
This inconsistency appears to involve the core arguments 
of the New Keynesian-RBC debate, and begs an explanation. The 
source of the difficulty may reside in a common premise of the 
two schools rather than their differences. What is common to 
both RBC and New Keynesian models, and to macroeconomics 
generally, is the method by which the atomistic choice- 
theoretic behavior specified for individual agents is attrib­
uted one-for-one to their corresponding aggregates —  the 
assumption of a representative agent. One of the main 
arguments of this chapter, and of this entire thesis, is that 
the discrepancy between macro models and the stylized facts 
about real wage behavior and the non-neutrality of money is 
due to the restrictive assumptions inherent in the repre­
sentative agent method of aggregation, which preclude certain 
relationships at the macro level.
It is well known that representative agent aggregation 
is valid for consumers if and only if their preferences are 
quasi-homothetic [Lewbel 1989, Kirman 1992, Martel 1996], and 
for firms if and only if their production functions are 
identical and linearly homogeneous [Sargent (1987)]. These 
assumptions restrict the marginal responses of all agents on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4the same side of a market to be identical and independent of 
scale, i. e., to be homogeneous. Heterogeneity of marginal 
responses is excluded by assumption. This exclusion may be 
problematic when applied to the aggregate labor market, since 
there is ample evidence in the literature that labor is 
heterogeneous and that heterogeneity often matters for labor 
market outcomes2. [Ehrenberg (1971), Coleman (1984), Kydland 
(1984), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), Keane, Moffitt and Runkle 
(1986).] The evidence is more than circumstantial. The 
review of the extant literature in this chapter suggests that 
heterogeneity in the labor market may be an important factor 
in the real-wage anomaly.
It is a contention of this chapter that part of the 
difficulty in constructing macro models that match up with 
these two stylized facts is that the behavior that is observed 
empirically is precluded theoretically by the representative 
method of aggregation. This proposition is the focal point 
for the overall research agenda of this thesis, which is to 
demonstrate that, by moving away from a representative agent 
framework and employing a more general method of aggregation, 
it is possible to fit both stylized facts concerning money and 
real wages within an otherwise '* Keynesian” setup.
There also was the Cantabrigian debate over the homogeneity of capital and 
the existence of an aggregate production function, which will not be resurrected 
here. Solow (1957>, Ackley (1961), Kuh (1966) and Fisher (1969) also expressed 
about the existence of a meaningful aggregate production function.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5In this chapter I present evidence in favor of this main 
proposition, discuss some of the methodological issues and 
problems that need to be addressed in the research, and pose 
some questions and working hypotheses which will be explored 
in the thesis. The chapters which follow will explore ways of 
modeling aggregate behavior in the labor market when those 
restrictive assumptions are relaxed and heterogeneity is 
modeled explicitly. A concluding section provides a guide to 
the contents of Chapters II through V.
1.2 The Real Wage Anomaly
One of the more intriguing puzzles in macroeconomics is 
why movements in the aggregate real wage are small relative to 
fluctuations in employment and output over the business cycle. 
Figure 1-1 shows the historical relationship between the 
aggregate real wage and output (both variables detrended and 
in logs) . The real wage appears to have been procyclical 
during the 1970's, but outside of that time period it is not 
possible to discern a persistent relationship from the graph. 
Table 1-1 shows estimated elasticities of the aggregate real 
wage with respect to output and employment for the period 
1949-1993. Only two of the elasticities are significantly 
different from zero, and those have low values3.
3The elasticities in Table 1-1 are the results of replications by- Abraham 
and Haltiwanger (1995) of several previous studies.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 1-1. Aggregate Real Wage Vs. Industrial Output, 1949-1994 







Figure 1-2. M2 Annual Growth Rate Vs. the Business Cycle 
(Federal Reserve Board)
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7TABLE 1-1
CYCLICAL ELASTICITY OF THE AGGREGATE REAL WAGE 































From Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995), Table 3. Estimation by OLS on
logarithmic data. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Statistically significant at 5%; others are not significant.
AHE: Average Hourly Earnings. PPI: Producers' Price Index.
IPI: Industrial Production Index. HEI: Hourly Earnings Index.
Data for HEI are 1949-1988.
TABLE 1-2
CYCLICAL ELASTICITIES OF DISAGGREGATED REAL WAGES








Stockman (1983) 1967-80 -1.31 -.96(ns) ---
Coleman (1984) 1968-79 -1.53
Mather (1987) -1.07
Solon & Barsky 
(1989)
1967-84 -1.26 -.78 + .48
Solon, Barsky 
& Parker(1994)
1967-87 -1.16 -.57 + .59
From Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995), Table 5. Cyclical variable is the 
unemployment rate. GDP deflator used by all investigators.
(ns) * not significant; all others are significant at 5% or lower.
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8One can infer from Figure 1-1 and Table 1-1 that there is 
no set pattern to the behavior of the aggregate real wage; its 
elasticity was weakly procyclical in the 1970's, weakly 
countercyclical at other times, seldom significantly different 
from zero, and when estimated over two or more decades the 
elasticities essentially cancel out. From the data in Table 
1-1, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the aggregate real 
wage is acyclical with respect to employment4.
There is some evidence that real wages in the U. S. are 
more procyclical at lower levels of aggregation (Bils, 1985). 
Several investigators have found real wages estimated from 
individual wage data to be procyclical. These findings are 
summarized in Table 1-2. The BLS measures of aggregate wages 
are not adjusted for changes in composition of the workforce, 
and thus have a composition bias. The bias is countercyclical 
because low-wage workers are disproportionally represented in 
layoffs during recessions and in hires during expansions; thus 
their wages and hours are weighted accordingly in computing 
the economy-wide average wage. Solon, Barsky and Parker 
(1994) estimated a composition bias of +0.59 in the elasticity 
of the real wage with respect to unemployment during the
4The choice of a cyclical indicator depends on what hypothesis one is is 
interested in testing. Since the real product wage is determined in the labor 
market, the natural indicator would seem to be employment or the unemployment 
rate. In Table 1-1 the difference between the elasticities with respect to the 
IPI and employment during 1970-93 can be attributed to the fact that industrial 
output was more cyclical than total employment during that period. Other problems 
of measurement are discussed in Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1967-87 period5. (Table 1-2, row 5).
9
This finding suggests that real wages were more procyc­
lical during that period (and presumably the entire 1949-1993 
period) them would be inferred from the data in Table 1-1. It 
should be noted that, however measured, real wages were 
unusually procyclical during the 1970's, which was a period of 
stagflation with historically high inflation and supply-side 
productivity shocks. The direction and magnitude of composi­
tion bias in other time periods is unknown.
The preponderance of the evidence is that the aggregate 
real wage is neither countercyclical nor strongly procyclical 
(i.e. elasticity approaching +1) . Depending on the time period 
examined, the source of fluctuations, and the statistical 
methods employed, observed aggregate real wages are either 
acyclical or weakly procyclical6. The issue of composition 
bias serves as a reminder that the national labor "market" is 
quite heterogeneous, with distributions of human capital, 
skills, productivity and tastes for work which may engender
5tTsing Okun' s 3:1 rule to convert changes in the unemployment rate to 
changes in GDP, the estimated adjustment for composition bias in Table 1-1 would 
be 3{.59)» +.177 for the IPI elasticity in the period 1970-93, resulting in an 
adjusted procyclical elasticity of (.186 + .177) = +.363., which is moderately 
procyclical. This adjustment is not applicable to other time periods or cyclical 
measures in Table 1-1 due to lack of comparability.
6Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) provide a contemporary review and analysis 
of the extensive empirical literature on real wage behavior. They conclude that 
after adjusting for composition bias the aggregate real wage is procyclical, but 
they do not commit to magnitudes or time periods.
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non-homogeneous marginal responses leading to fallacies of 
composition. One of the major arguments of this chapter and 
thesis is that modeling such heterogeneous responses of the 
labor market is an important avenue to a theoretical explan­
ation of the money-output connection and acyclical real wages.
1.2 Countercyclical Markups
A prof it-maximizing monopolistic firm will set its 
product price above marginal cost, which creates a markup:
,.(»•) . f - c 7 [?(*•)] .. 1 (X. 1)
P* r\(Pm)
Here P* is the monopolist's optimum price, q(P*) the corres­
ponding optimum quantity to produce and sell, C'(q(P*) is 
marginal cost, and r| (P*) is the elasticity of product demand, 
the inverse of which is Abba Lerner's index of monopoly power. 
There is ample evidence that many U. S. industries are 
imperfectly competitive and, more significantly, that price 
markups in those industries are countercyclical (Bils, 1987, 
1989; Hall, 1988; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991). Equation 1.1
shows that if a firm's markup is countercyclical then its
monopoly power is also countercyclical (i.e. is weaker in 
expansions and stronger in recessions) . Equivalently, the
elasticity of industry demand, q(P*) , in an imperfectly
competitive industry, must be procyclical.
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Figure 1-3 (a) and (b) show the cyclical behavior of
markups over aggregate marginal cost in U. S. manufacturing 
industries, as calculated by Bils (Panel (a)) and Rotemberg 
and Woodford (Panel (b)). The divergence of markups from the 
level of employment is evident in the 1973-75 and 1981-83 
recessions and in the expansion of the mid-1980's. Bils 
estimated the elasticity of markups with respect to aggregate 
production employment to be -0.333, highly significant, and 
persistent in sign across two-digit industries.
As with the real-wage anomaly, the hypothesis that demand 
elasticities are procyclical is problematic for the repre­
sentative agent method of aggregation, which is employed 
almost universally in macroeconomics. An industry demand 
schedule is an aggregation of individual consumer demand 
schedules. The representative agent method of aggregation 
requires the underlying assumption of identical, homothetic 
consumer preferences, which in turn implies that the elastici­
ty of consumer demand is invariant with respect to changes in 
scale (income or wealth). In this case, the representative 
consumer's demand curve shifts iso-elastically with a constant 
markup in response to changes in aggregate income. The 
evidence of strongly countercyclical markups contradicts a 
representative agent model, and suggests that it may be 
productive to depart somewhat from the representative agent 
assumptions and model heterogeneity in the economy.
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The real wage and markup anomalies cure closely related. 
Keynes (1939), in responding to evidence offered by Dunlop 
(1938) that real wages in England were not countercyclical as 
implied by the General Theory, offered an explanation in terms 
of offsetting countercyclical markups in imperfectly competi­
tive industries, an idea which he attributed to Kalecki 
(1938). However, it is evident from the previous discussion 
that Keynes' explanation is also inconsistent with represen­
tative agent aggregation. An explanation of acyclical or 
procyclical real wage behavior in terms of cyclical elastici­
ties of supply or demand is problematic within a represen­
tative consumer framework.
New Keynesian models rationalize sticky prices by 
assuming that imperfectly competitive firms have weak incent­
ives to change prices when there is a change in demand. The 
weak incentive may be attributed to menu costs (Mankiw, 1985) 
or non-optimizing behavior (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985) . Most 
of these models, including the two just cited, assume constant 
marginal cost. The effect of a change in demand on the 
markup will depend on the firm's price-setting behavior in 
relation to its marginal cost. If marginal cost is constant 
and menu costs are small, a profit-maximizing firm will 
maintain its price and the markup in Equation 1.1 will be 
constant, contrary to what is generally observed.
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On the other hand, if marginal cost is increasing and the 
firm maintains its price, the markup will be countercyclical, 
which is observed but is also inconsistent with representative 
agent aggregation over consumers. It appears that the 
implications of the New Keynesian imperfect competition models 
need to be reconciled with the empirical evidence on markups. 
Again, it may be fruitful to move away from the representative 
agent framework in order to accomplish this.
1.4 The Monev-Output Connection
One of the more important stylized facts of macroeconom­
ics is that lagged changes in real GDP over the business cycle 
are positively correlated with changes in the nominal money 
supply. The empirical evidence in support of this proposition 
is quite strong7. Figure 1-2 shows that every post-1950 
recession in the U. S. has been preceded by a significant 
decline in the rate of growth of M2, followed by a sharp 
reversal of that trend during recessions and an increase in 
the growth rate during subsequent expansions. (The 1990-91 
recession was an exception.) Although visually impressive, 
such a graph is hardly proof that a positive correlation 
exists over time.
7
The empirical evidence on the money-output connection is discussed 
greater detail in Chapter II.
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The landmark study of money by Friedman and Schwarz 
(1963) concluded that changes in money cause changes in 
economic activity. More recent econometric studies employing 
bivariate and multivariate causality tests (Sims, 1972; 
Mishkin, 1983) also found that changes in money Granger-cause 
output®. The positive correlation is not in question; howev­
er, the direction of causality is an issue which separates the 
two schools of business-cycle theory —  Keynesians and Real 
Business Cycle (RBC) advocates —  who have agreed to disagree 
on the issue of the neutrality of money9.
The non-neutrality of money implies the existence of 
significant non-homogenous demand or supply responses some­
where in the economy. In a Keynesian setup these are general­
ly assumed to be caused by nominal rigidities in prices or 
wages, and much of the New Keynesian research agenda has been 
directed at establishing choice-theoretic microfoundations for 
such rigidities. These have generally taken the form of
fi
Recent surveys of the empirical evidence on the money-output connection 
are Bernanke (1986), Romer and Romer (1989), Blanchard (1990) and B. Friedman 
(1995). Although some studies have not found a causal relationship, most 
conclude that the rate of money growth is a causal factor in real output 
fluctuations at business-cycle frequencies. Causation is implied when the 
innovation in money is exogenous to changes in output.
Q
A third interpretation of the evidence, associated with the Post-Keynesian 
school, is that money is endogenous to the real economy, and that the positive 
correlation between money and output is due to the procyclical demand for and 
supply of credit. This interpretation places the central bank in a more or less 
accommodative rather than a proactive posture. Brunner and Meltzer (1993, pp. 
55-58) critique this interpretation and reject it on empirical grounds. 
Nevertheless, the credit channel hypothesis is very much alive. (See Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995) for a recent review.)
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frictions or "menu” adjustment costs which cause prices or 
wages to be sticky. But the incorporation of sticky prices 
or wages in a model of imperfect competition also affects the 
cyclical behavior of markups and the real wage in response to 
external shocks. This becomes evident when the markup is 
expressed as:
where I is labor, F£ is its marginal product, W is the money 
wage, P is the product price, and ti is the elasticity of 
product demand. Equation 1.2 can be rearranged thusly:
With fixed technology and diminishing returns to labor in the 
conventional short-run production function, F£ is countercyc­
lical. If nominal wages are sticky and prices are flexible, 
the real wage will be countercyclical if markups are constant 
(including the special case of zero, i.e., perfect competi­
tion10) . This is the Traditional Keynesian result which 
nevertheless is counter factual. Keynes's conjecture to Dunlop 
was that m(£) might be countercyclical enough to offset the 
influence of F£ and cause W/P to be constant or even pro­
cyclical. Thus, if the goods market is imperfectly competi­
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tive the cyclical behavior of the real wage will depend on the 
cyclical behavior of markups and the elasticity of F£.
Conversely, if prices are sticky and wages are flexible, 
then, (a) markups will be constant and the real wage will be 
countercyclical if marginal cost is constant, or (b) markups 
will be countercyclical and the real wage will be strongly 
procyclical if marginal cost is increasing and the elasticity 
of labor supply is low. (Romer 1996, pp. 218-219). This 
outcome is closer to the stylized facts, but the real wage may 
be too strongly procyclical. Also, the assumption that prices 
are stickier than wages may not be realistic.
If both wages and prices are sticky, we have the case of 
generalized disequilibrium in which the out-of-equilibrium 
adjustment path of the real wage in response to demand shocks 
is generally ambiguous, although under certain conditions it 
could be procyclical (Barro and Grossman, 1976, pp. 95-98.)
Thus, the responses of markups and the aggregate real 
wage to an external shock also depend critically on how 
nominal and real rigidities are specified in a model. The 
behavior of markups and the real wage implied by the New 
Keynesian models of imperfect competition are virtually 
predetermined by the stickiness assumptions, and are not 
entirely consistent with the empirical record.
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1.5 Survey of Representative Macroeconomic Models
This section presents some evidence in support of the 
proposition that most macroeconomic models find it difficult 
to explain the actual behavior of real wages and the non­
neutrality of money. The various schools of macroeconomic 
theory are classified along these two dimensions, and then the 
implications of representative models of each class are summ­
arized11.
Figure 1-4 classifies the main schools of macroeconomic 
theory according to the neutrality of money and the predicted 
cyclical behavior of the real wage. The Classical and Real 
Business Cycle models preserve the classical dichotomy between 
nominal and real variables, and therefore make no causal 
connection between money and output. Traditional Keynesian 
and Post-Keynesian models can explain involuntary unemployment 
but predict a countercyclical real wage. Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) point out that Keynesian models understate, 
and RBC models overstate, the degree of positive correlation 
between real wages and employment.
11It would be impossible to be all-inclusive in this survey, and therefore 
I have selected models which have been judged to be canonically representative 
of their class- based on their citations and inclusion in compendia. It is 
possible that counter-examples in the literature have been overlooked.
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Figure 1-3. Classification of Macroeconomic Models
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Both the Disequilibrium and New Keynesian classes of 
models are capable, under certain conditions, of exhibiting 
rigid or procyclical real wages. However, their implications 
are not quite in accord with the acyclical real wage behavior 
shown in Table 1-1. The specifics are discussed below.
1.5.1 Traditional Kevnesian and Post-Kevnesian Models
Traditional Keynesian models based on The General Theory 
are summarized in Table 1-3. Keynes' model in The General 
Theory (1936) had a causal role for money but implied a 
countercyclical real wage. To clarify ideas, it may be useful 
to describe in modern terms why this was so.
Keynes accepted the classical theory of a competitive 
labor market in which the real wage is equal to the marginal 
product of labor. With capital and technology fixed in the 
short run, the marginal product of labor declines with 
increasing employment, so that:
... with a given organization, equipment and technique, real 
wages and the volume of output (and hence of employment) are 
uniquely correlated, so that, in general, an increase in 
employment can only occur to the accompaniment of a decline in 
the rate of real wages.
[Keynes, 1936,Chap. 2, p. 17]
In the short-period framework of The General Theory Keynes 
implicitly ruled out shocks to technology or the productivity
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of labor, implying that firms would always be on their (stat­
ionary) labor demand curves.
This situation is shown in Panel (a) of Figure 1-5. 
Keynes posited that nominal wages would be rigid downward, so 
that if prices fell in a recession the real wage would be 
above the market-clearing level. Employment and output would 
be constrained by effective demand, and there would be invol­
untary unemployment. The real wage would move countercyc- 
lically along the labor demand curve in response to changes in 
effective demand, e.g. , as between point A and point B in 
Figure 1-5(a)12.
Dunlop (1938) and Tarshis (1938) confronted Keynes with 
data purporting to show that real and money wages in England 
were positively correlated; under the assumption that money 
wages are procyclical, one could infer that the real wage is 
also procyclical, not countercyclical as Keynes had im­
plied13. Interestingly, Keynes' reply included, among other 
considerations, the conjecture that the degree of imperfect
12Not all interpreters of Keynes would agree with this exegesis, e. g. 
Davidson (1994), Chap. 11. A more extreme Post-Keynesian view is that neither 
the demand for or supply of labor depend upon the real wage, e. g., Applebaum 
(1979 >, Eichner (1985). The diversity of Post-Keynesian visions of the labor 
market makes it difficult to include them in the scope of this thesis.
13Tarshis (1939) subsequently recanted his conclusions from the data in his 
1938 paper, concluding in the end that the data implied a countercyclical real 
wage. Coleman (1984) pointed out that Dunlop and Tarshis have often been mis­
quoted, and set8 the record straight.






~  r 6
Fig. 1-A (b)
New Keynesian Labor 
Market with Efficiency 
Wag^s
Fig. 1-A (c)
Real Business Cycle 
Labor MarketCOI
£,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
competition, reflected in markups of price over marginal cost, 
varied countercyclically so as to offset the downward influ­
ence of the labor demand curve, a deus ex nachina he attribut­
ed to Kalecki. This idea was never incorporated into the 
Traditional Keynesian legacy. The countercyclical real wage 
of the General Theory was carried over in the Hicks-Hansen 
interpretation of Keynesian economics. Thus, Trad­
itional Keynesian models became subject to the criticism that 
they were counter factual with respect to the behavior of the 
aggregate real wage, and ignored the supply side of the 
economy.
Post-Keynesian models are a different genotype of the 
General Theory and to a great extent are not comparable with 
any of the other classes. There are many variations, but most 
have in common the non-neutrality of money, imperfect competi­
tion in the goods market, and markup pricing that is deter­
mined by the anticipated internal financing needs of firms 
rather than short-term profit maximization. (Eichner (1973, 
1985, 1991), Chick (1983), Post-Keynesians appear to lack a 
consensus on how the labor market functions, or whether a 
conventional market model is even relevant (Applebaum 1979; 
Eichner 1985, Chap. 5; 1991, Chap. 1) They are classified 
here with the Traditional Keynesians, but are considered 
beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be discussed 
further.
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Disequilibrium interpretations of Keynes [e. g., Patinkin 
(1965. Chap. XIII)), Leijonhufvud (1968, 1981), Clower (1965) 
Barro and Grossman (1971, 1976) ] assumed wage-price rigidities 
which prevent one or more markets from clearing, rationalizing 
both involuntary unemployment and a money-output connection. 
The behavior of the real wage in response to aggregate demand 
shocks depends on specific assumptions regarding its out-of- 
equilibrium adjustment path, and in general is ambiguous. 
Barro and Grossman (1976, p. 95-99) argued that the out-of- 
equilibrium adjustment behavior of the real wage is likely to 
be less countercyclical than in a market-clearing model, and 
can be procyclical. Although the Barro-Grossman disequilib­
rium model is pas de rigrueur in America, much of the New 
Keynesian research program is devoted to developing choice- 
theoretic foundations for the wage and price rigidities that 
were merely assumed in that model.
1.5.3 New Kevnesian Models
Some representative New Keynesian models are listed in 
Table 1-4. These are partial equilibrium micro models of the 
labor or goods market which were developed to provide choice- 
theoretic microfoundations for nominal and real rigidities 
that previously had been assumed. The implications of these
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models are extrapolated to the macro level by invoking the 
representative agent assumption.
The earlier sticky-wage models [Fischer (1977); Taylor 
(1980) ] also implied and predicted a countercyclical real 
wage. Baily (1974) presented a highly stylized model of risk- 
sharing in an industry in which the optimum strategy for all 
firms was to maintain a rigid real wage14. More recent models 
have attempted to rationalize sticky prices based on imperfect 
competition and menu costs or other externalities in the goods 
market. A money-output connection follows from the presence 
of nominal rigidities, but most of these models assume rather 
them predict a rigid real wage (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen 
(1985). Thus, New Keynesian models tend to treat the real 
wage as a free parameter, to be specified to fit the circum­
stances. It appears that the assumption of rigid nominal 
wages, which engendered criticism of Traditional Keynesian and 
Disequilibrium models, has been supplanted in many New 
Keynesian models by the assumption of a rigid real wage.
14Baily'8 model and a related 1975 paper are discussed in Appendix C, 
where it is shown that the model provides a rationale for the assumption of 
monopsony power in the aggregate labor market. Also, implicit contract models 
are not discussed here. According to Rosen (1985):
Contract theory neither resolves nor illuminates questions 
of Keynesian unemployment based on nominal wage and price 
rigidities, money illusion and non-market clearing. Explan­
ations for ' sticky' wages and prices that impede efficient labor 
utilization must be sought in other quarters.
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The 1990 paper by Ball and Romer appears to have all of 
the necessary ingredients, but instead of deriving implica­
tions for the real wage, the authors calibrated their model so 
that it would be acyclical, in keeping with the empirical re­
cord15. Many New Keynesian models arrive at a rigid real wage 
by fixing either W or P and assuming a constant ratio W/P, 
which implies that markups are exactly as countercyclical as 
the marginal product of labor, a rather special case. (See 
Equation 1.3.) Thus, for the New Keynesian class of models, 
money is non-neutral but the theoretical underpinnings of 
acyclical real wages are, for the most part, not fully worked 
out.
1.5.4 Efficiency Wage Models
A similar pattern is evident in the Efficiency Wage 
models listed in Table 1-5, a subcategory of the New Keynesian 
literature. The efficiency wage hypothesis specifies that 
the productivity of workers depends positively on their real 
wages, and is embodied in an effort function e(w) which 
supplants the labor supply curve. Given their product prices, 
firms set the nominal wage to minimize labor cost per effi­
ciency unit of labor, which occurs where the real-wage elast­
icity of e(w) is unity. Firms are on their labor demand
15Ball and Romer were using their model to argue that both nominal and real 
rigidities are important for the non-neutrality of money, and in that exercise 
the real wage was a free parameter that had to be pinned down.
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curves at a real wage that is higher than that which will 
clear the labor market and thus there is involuntary unemploy­
ment. This is shown in Panel (b) of Figure 1-5, where the 
equilibrium real wage is determined initially at point A, the 
intersection of the efficiency wage locus e(w) with the labor 
demand curve. The efficiency real wage wQ is higher them the 
market-clearing wage wc, and involuntary unemployment is 
represented by the distance AD.
It turns out that the implications of efficiency wages 
for the cyclical behavior of the real wage are model-depend­
ent. One of the problems in this literature is that these are 
partial equilibrium micro models, and the assumed sources of 
cyclical fluctuations in the labor market are not always 
clearly specified.
In the simple efficiency wage model in which the effic­
iency wage locus is a function of only the real wage, the 
labor supply curve plays no role in determining employment or 
the real wage; it merely determines the amount of involuntary 
employment. In this case, factors which shift the labor 
supply curve will not affect the efficiency wage or employ­
ment. Because of this, technology shocks are the only source 
of cyclical fluctuations in simple efficiency wage models, and 
these will produce a procyclical real wage. (For a positive 
shock this is shown as movement from point A to point B in
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Figure 1-5, Panel (b) .) According to this theory, the 
cyclical elasticity of the real wage would be close to the 
elasticity of the effort function e(w), which is +1 at the 
optimum efficiency wage. This is comparable to what RBC 
models imply, and based on the evidence in Table 1-1, is 
counterfactual.
In the Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model, the unemployment 
rate is a shift variable for the effort function. e(w,U). 
which is interpreted as a shirking constraint on workers.
An outward shift of the labor supply curve due to, for 
example, a monetary shock will increase involuntary unemploy­
ment. The higher unemployment rate decreases the chances that 
a worker who is fired for shirking will be rehired quickly, 
and therefore decreases the expected payoff from shirking at 
the current wage. Thus, an increase in the unemployment rate 
allows firms to lower their wages optimally without increasing 
shirking. This results in a downward shift of the efficiency 
wage locus (i. e., the shirking constraint) , which follows the 
labor supply curve. In the absence of a technology shock the 
result will be a lower optimum efficiency wage and increased 
employment, i. e., a countercyclical real wage.
Shocks to technology in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model will 
shift both the labor demand curve and the shirking constraint 
but in opposite directions because the change in unemployment
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will have a negative feedback effect on the propensity to 
shirk. In this case, the effect of unemployment on the 
shirking constraint will reinforce the direction of movement 
of the real wage and partially offset the effect on employ­
ment and output16. Thus, with unemployment as a shift 
variable in the efficiency wage locus, shocks to technology 
will produce a strongly procyclical real wage, as Shapiro and 
Stiglitz claimed. However, if cyclical shocks shift both the 
labor demand and labor supply curves in the same direction, 
the movement of the real wage is ambiguous.
In efficiency wage models, firms set wages unilaterally 
according to an uncontested profit-maximizing rule which is 
independent of labor supply. Workers are willing wage-takers 
because the efficiency wage offer is higher than their 
reservation wage and there is involuntary unemployment. It 
would seem that in order to be able to set the wage unilater­
ally and thereby create involuntary unemployment, firms must 
have some degree of monopsony power in the labor market17. 
This point is reinforced by the fact that the labor market 
does not clear at the efficiency wage (there is excess
16The possible outcomes are the same as when supply and demand curves move 
in opposite directions.
17Except for a brief discussion by Weiss (1990) in the context of a 
nutrition model, the relationship between efficiency wages and monopsony power 
has not been explored in the literature. Also, the capacity of firms to "set" the 
real wage requires that they have significant market power over both product 
prices and wages. This is seldom made explicit in the efficiency wage 
literature.
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notional supply) and there are unemployed workers who would be 
willing to work for less but, like the Outsiders of Lindbeck 
and Snower (1988), lack the bargaining power to bid down the 
wage and gain employment. This suggests that a monopsony 
model of the aggregate labor market in which the degree of 
monopsony power to set the wage varies over the business cycle 
might be a useful way to describe the labor market18. This 
Kalecki-Keynes idea redux is developed more completely in 
Chapter IV of this thesis.
While most efficiency wage models assume that workers 
are identical and have the same effort function, the adverse 
selection models of Guasch and Weiss (1980) and Weiss (1990) 
assume that workers are heterogeneous in productivity, but 
firms can only imperfectly screen for and monitor the produc­
tivity of individuals. If workers' reservation wages are 
highly correlated with their productivity, then offering 
higher wages is one way of attracting and retaining more 
productive workers19. This is a fairly common practice for 
employers in primary, high-skill labor markets (Reynolds 
(1970), Rees (1973), Lang and Leonard (1987). Thus, paying
* The monopsony wage clears the market below the competitive equilibrium 
wage, whereas the efficiency wage is a non-market-clearing wage above the 
competitive equilibrium wage, Monopsonistic firms might pay more than the 
monopsony wage to retain productive workers, but possibly less than the 
efficiency wage, the difference being determined by the cost of monitoring.
A critical screening parameter in hiring is an applicant's wage history, 
or "salary requirements" i. e, their reservation wage. Reservation wages that 
are too high or too low may be equally valid reasons for rejection. Thus, a 
revealed reservation wage sends a signal about worker quality.
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higher wage differentials may be a simple and direct way for 
firms to deal with the problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard when workers vary in quality (Weiss, 1990)20. One 
implication of the adverse selection models is that worker 
heterogeneity can be a cause of unemployment and layoffs in 
primary markets. Heterogeneity in the workforce may also be 
a factor contributing to anomalous real wage behavior.
Efficiency wage models have gained acceptance in the 
Keynesian camp because they offer choice-theoretic microfound­
ations for a rigid non-market-clearing wage, and thus for 
involuntary unemployment. But therein lies their limitation, 
for these are partial equilibrium models of a firm's choices 
in its markets, not general equilibrium macro models. Micro 
behavior is imputed to the economy as a whole by assuming a 
representative agent on each side of every market. As stated 
previously, representative agent aggregation is valid only 
when the marginal responses of individual agents are homo­
geneous. If efficiency wages are a means of sorting out 
heterogeneous workers in local labor markets that do not 
clear, it is not obvious that representative agent aggregation 
is appropriate. An open question then, for the New Keynesian 
literature,is the question of whether the real wage and markup
20There are other ways, such as Okun’s Toll (1981), probation periods, 
piecework, tenure systems, and requiring workers to post performance bonds. All 
of these are problematical, as discussed in Weiss (1990).
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anomalies are due in part to inconsistent aggregation of 
heterogeneous labor.
Efficiency wage models appear to be an implicit acknowl­
edgment that labor markets tend to be imperfectly competitive, 
that workers are heterogeneous, and that problems of asymmet­
ric information and adverse selection abound in the employment 
relationship. These kinds of market imperfections are dealt 
with more explicitly in the implicit contract and job search 
literature, which has largely been supplanted by the efficien­
cy wage construct. Because efficiency wages impart only real 
rigidity, money is neutral in the absence of nominal rigidi­
ties. This is evident in Table 1-3, where money is neutral in 
all of the models except for Akerlof and Yellen (1985) , which 
also incorporated imperfect competition and menu costs.
It is understood that for changes in money to have a 
persistent effect on employment and output, there must also be 
a source of persistent real rigidity in the system. (Blanchard 
and Fischer, 1989). Efficiency wage constructions provide 
microfoundations for real wage rigidity in a partial equilib­
rium setting. However, the behavior of the efficiency real 
wage in a general equilibrium setting depends on the particu­
lar efficiency wage model employed, and in general is ambigu-
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ous21 [(Blanchard (1986), Ball and Romer (1990)]. Efficiency 
vage constructions provide a rationale for involuntary 
unemployment, but as yet do not provide much insight into the 
behavior of the aggregate real wage in a general equilibrium 
framework. Thus, in their present state of development, they 
do not have clear-cut implications for the behavior of the 
aggregate real wage (Romer, 1996, p.458).
1.5.5 Real Business Cvcle Models
Table 1-6 lists some of the RBC models that have been 
cited frequently in the literature. None of these standard 
RBC models contain money. They are general equilibrium models 
with continuous market clearing, in the Classical tradition. 
For the most part, business cycle fluctuations are assumed to 
be caused by random exogenous shocks to productivity —  real 
as opposed to monetary driving forces. This is equivalent to 
shifting the labor demand curve against a stationary labor 
supply curve in equilibrium, as shown in Panel (c) of 
Figure 1-5. Since the elasticity of the aggregate labor 
supply curve is assumed to be small, these models predict a 
strongly procyclical real wage, with an elasticity of the real 
wage with respect to employment of nearly +1, which is
21A search of the literature did not yield a general equilibrium macro 
model which incorporates efficiency wages in the labor market.
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TABLE 1-6
REPRESENTATIVE REAL BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS
SOURCE OF
MODEL SHOCKS BEHAVIOR OF W/P
Kydland & Total factor Strongly Procyclical
Prescott (1982) productivity S’yO] =* +1.4
p(o,n) == + .90
Long & Stochastic Strongly Procyclical
Plosser (1983) productivity p(o,n) = +.97
Prescott (1986) Labor Strongly Procyclicalj
Productivity p(o,n) = +.95
Hansen (1985) Labor
Productivity Strongly Procyclical
(Indivisible labor) p(u,n) = + .87
King, Plosser Labor Strongly Procyclical
& Rebelo (1988) Productivity p(w,n) = +.90
Eichenbaum, Hansen Labor Strongly Procyclical






















-1 < ry[o] < 0
Procyclical 
p(o,n) = +.49 
to +.76
Procyclical 
p(o>,n) = +.575 
to +.81
Countercyclical 
^[e] = -.70 
on impact
♦Temporary and permanent changes in government purchases have different 
long-term real wage elasticities; for temporary purchases the elasticity 
converges to -.25, and for permanent purchases the long-run elasticity 
is +1.0.
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counterfactual. (Compare the elasticities in Table 1-6 with 
those in Table 1-1). Since RBC models provide no role for 
money in the business cycle, they deny a causal (but not 
necessarily a statistical) relationship between money and 
output. The observed money-output correlation is explained as 
central bank accommodation to real output fluctuations, an 
interpretation of the data which is controversial. Thus, the 
standard RBC models do not offer a comfortable fit to the two 
stylized facts22.
Some investigators have modified the standard Kydland- 
Prescott RBC model by incorporating government spending, 
wealth effects, and even sticky wages and monetary shocks 
(Rogerson and Wright, 1988). The addition of government 
spending shocks reduces the procyclicality of the real wage. 
The implications of the Rogerson and Wright model are almost 
Keynesian, except there is no involuntary employment. However, 
none of these modified RBC models fit our two criteria as well 
as the New Keynesian models of Table 1-4 (Particularly Ball 
and Romer (1990)) . They are equilibrium models in which there 
is no involuntary unemployment. Gali (1996) has criticized 
these multi-shock RBC models and presented evidence that a New 
Keynesian model with imperfect competition, sticky prices and 
efficiency wages (e.g., as in Ball and Romer, 1990) is more
22RBC models have been criticized on other technical grounds which are not 
relevant to the present discussion. (See Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985), 
HcCallum (1988), Mankiw (1989).
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consistent with the observed low correlation between labor 
productivity and employment.
Although the RBC class of models is interesting, they 
will not be considered further in this thesis. Instead, the 
thesis will focus on the Keynesian view of the business cycle, 
with the objective of discovering what is necessary in order 
to reconcile this class of models with the actual behavior of 
real wages, markups, and the money-output connection.
1.5.6 Summary and Conclusions
Traditional Keynesian, New Keynesian and RBC models have 
difficulty explaining the empirical behavior of the aggregate 
real wage. The findings and some of their implications are 
summarized in Table 1-7. It is evident that, in the cases of 
imperfect competition, counterfactuality extends to the markup 
and the implied elasticity of aggregate demand. No class of 
models considered here is problem-free. The various assump­
tions about flexible or sticky nominal wages, prices, real 
wages, imperfect competition, markups and the neutrality of 
money have produced a rich and informative body of literature, 
which nevertheless falls short of explaining both stylized 
facts introduced at the beginning of this chapter. Since the 
macroeconomic implications of these models also depend on the
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TABLE 1-7







Markup of Demand 
u n
Traditional Nominal Counter­ None* 00
Keynesian Wages cyclical*
Goods Strongly Counter­ Pro-
Keynesian Prices Procyclical* cyclical Cyclical**
Efficiency Real Wage Rigid(?) *
Wage and Strongly Counter­ Pro-
Goods Procyclical* cyclical Cyclical**
Prices Counter­
cyclical*
Dis- Nominal Rigid* None* 00
Equilibrium Wages and or
Goods Procyclical* Constant* 00
Prices
Real Strongly
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representative agent method of aggregation, it may be neces­
sary to depart from that framework in order to explain the 
behavior of markups and real wages23.
We have arrived at the principal working hypothesis of 
this thesis, which is that both the real wage anomaly and the 
markup anomaly are caused by sources of agent heterogeneity in 
the economy which are not being captured by representative 
agent models. The principal research objective of this thesis 
is to determine if, by moving away from the representative 
agent framework, modeling heterogeneity explicitly and employ­
ing a more general method of aggregation, it is possible to 
explain both the real wage anomaly and the markup anomaly 
within an otherwise standard Keynesian setup where money 
causes output.
1.6 What Lies Ahead
The approach that will evolve over the remaining chapters 
will be to develop an alternative labor-market model based on 
imperfect competition and heterogeneous workers in the labor 
market. This investigation is in the tradition of the New 
Keynesian literature, in that it will explore the implications 
of imperfect competition for the money-output connection and 
the behavior of the real wage. It differs in that it will
2 3 This was advocated previously by Coleman (1984) and Heckman (1984).
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examine the implications of monopsony power of firms in the 
labor market, and it departs from the representative agent 
method of aggregating individual labor supply. Neither of 
these approaches have been prominent in the macroeconomic 
literature.
In Chapter II, I develop and analyze a static 
equilibrium model in which prices and wages are perfectly 
flexible but a causal relationship between money and output 
exists due to a wealth effect in aggregate labor supply. 
Thus, I show that if wealth is a significant determinant of 
aggregate labor supply, neither wage nor price rigidity is 
necessary to have a money-output connection. The model is a 
useful tool for analyzing the behavior of the real wage over 
a monetary-induced business cycle without the confounding 
effects of wage and price rigidities. If such rigidities are 
present, they will tend to reinforce the effects on output and 
the real wage implied by the model.
In Chapter III of this thesis I show that the combination 
of monopsony power with homogeneous workers in the labor 
market does not, in of itself, improve upon the situation 
described in this chapter. I also prove that countercyclical 
markups and acyclical real wages cannot be explained in terms 
of cyclical elasticities of product demand or labor supply 
within a representative agent framework. This poses a poten-
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fcial problem for macroeconomics, because without the repre­
sentative agent assumption, Walrasian microfoundations do not 
carry over to the behavior of aggregates in a straightforward 
or systematic way.
Chapter IV presents the development of an aggregate 
labor supply function for heterogeneous workers who are 
employed by monopsonistic firms. If workers have nonhomo- 
thetic preferences with increasing relative risk aversion, 
then the elasticity of this aggregate labor supply function 
will be strongly procyclical in response to monetary policy 
actions. This a sufficient condition for markups to be 
countercyclical and a necessary condition for the real wage to 
be acyclical or procyclical. The analysis in Chapter IV is 
confined to the aggregate labor market and leads to partial 
equilibrium conclusions.
Chapter V reports the comparative static results of 
imbedding the aggregate labor supply function of Chapter IV in 
the general equilibrium model of Chapter II. This final step 
is important because, as in the case of efficiency wage 
theory, partial equilibrium arguments can be misleading for 
macroeconomics. In this extended general equilibrium model, 
the implied behavior of the real wage is ambiguous, because it 
depends on magnitudes of certain key elasticities in the 
model.. A. partial equilibrium analysis indicates that the real
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wage will be weakly countercyclical, acyclical, or weakly 
procyclical depending on the magnitudes of certain monetary 
elasticities. Chapter V concludes with some observations 
regarding the methodology employed and areas warranting 
further research.
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CHAPTER II
A CONNECTION BETWEEN MONEY AND OUTPUT 
VIA WEALTH EFFECTS IN A FLEXIBLE-PRICE MODEL
2.1 Introduction and Overview
This chapter presents a f lexible-price macroeconomic 
model in which employment and real output are affected by 
changes in outside money when real wealth is included as an 
argument of the excess demand functions for goods, money and 
labor. A one-time exchange of bonds for money reduces the 
real value of government bond holdings, producing a reverse 
wealth effect in all three markets. The money multipliers for 
employment and output are unambiguous ly positive in the 
absence of Ricardian equivalence. The important conclusion of 
this chapter is that, when wealth effects are consistently 
specified, neither Keynesian rigidities nor reverse causation 
arguments are necessary for explaining the we11-documented 
positive correlation between lagged changes in the monetary 
base and output. This conclusion holds as long as there is 
not perfect Ricardian equivalence.
Like Traditional Keynesian models (defined in Chapter I) , 
the real wage in the model of this chapter is unambiguously 
countercyclical, and thus the model is also subject to 
criticism for that reason. However, unlike Traditional
44
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Keynesian models, wages and prices in this model are perfectly 
flexible, all markets clear, and yet money is not neutral with 
respect to employment and output. Thus, the model demon­
strates that it is not necessary to have rigid or sticky wages 
or prices in order for changes in money to produce changes in 
employment and output. The model is Keynesian in the sense 
that changes in the quantity of real money affect employment 
and output through a wealth effect on labor supply. As such, 
the model provides a "Keynesian" laboratory in which the 
cyclical behavior of the real wage and markups can be explored 
without the restrictive assumptions of sticky wages and/or 
prices. This exploration is carried out in Chapters III 
through V of this thesis.
2.2 The Correlation Between Money and Output
One of the more important stylized facts of macroeconom­
ics is that changes in real GDP over the business cycle are 
positively correlated with lagged changes in the nominal money 
supply. The statistical evidence in support of this fact is 
overwhelming. Except for the brief 1990 recession, every 
other official recession since 1945 has been preceded by a 
decline in the rate of growth in the money stock, and cyclical 
expansions have been either preceded by or roughly coincident 
with increases in the rate of money growth. Almost all 
econometric studies of this relationship since 1970, employing
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a variety of models and estimation techniques, have confirmed 
to some degree the original findings and conclusions of 
Friedman and Schwarz (1963) that there is a significant 
positive correlation between money and real output in the 
short run.
Friedman and Schwarz identified a number of "turning 
points" at which a change in the rate of growth of Ml was 
followed by a statistically and economically significant 
change in the growth rate of GDP. They concluded from this 
that changes in money can "cause" changes in output1. Ander­
son and Jordan (1968) estimated significantly positive coef­
ficients for a regression of quarterly changes in lagged GDP 
on money. Sims (1972) found that money Granger—caused output 
in a simple bivariate autoregression. Sims (1980) later added 
interest rates and other control variables to the estimating 
equation and found that the interest rate was significant but 
the money aggregate was not.
Using annual data from 1954-1976, Barro (1977) found that 
only "unanticipated" innovations in money affected output. 
Mishkin replicated Barro's study with quarterly data and 
longer lags, and concluded that both anticipated and unantici-
1A11 of these empirical studies, including the more recent vector 
autoregressions, sure subject to Tobin's critique (1970), post: hoc, ergo proper 
hoc. Statistical correlation with a lagged independent variable does not prove 
physical causality one way or the other.
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pated changes in money have long-lasting effects on output. 
Beroanke (1986) and Bernanke and Blinder (1988) found evidence 
that the availability of credit in the banking system signifi­
cantly affected lagged real output; however, Meltzer (1995) 
has questioned the quantitative importance of the credit 
channel. Romer and Romer (1989) updated the Friedman and 
Schwarz study using content analysis of contemporary Federal 
Reserve Board records, and concluded that six of eight U. S. 
postwar recessions from 1945 to 1980 were preceded by deliber­
ate contractionary Federal Reserve policy actions intended to 
fight inflation.
Other investigators have come to somewhat different 
conclusions from the data. Litterman and Weiss (1987) conclud­
ed that the nominal interest rate leads changes in output
(inversely) , and that the role of money is insignificant.
King and Plosser (1984) found a weak and brief effect of 
changes in the monetary base on output, with both Ml and the 
credit channel being insignificant; Eichenbaum and Singleton 
(1986) found that even the monetary base was insignificant. 
Kydland and Prescott (1982) in the context of a real business
cycle model, argued that the correlation between money and
output represents a reverse-causation: the central bank's
monetary interventions are reactions to current and forecasted 
economic activity, and are partly endogenous. Shapiro(1994) 
critiqued Romer and Romer, and concluded that the Federal
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Reserve's policy actions during the period were endogenous to 
current and forecasted conditions in the economy. Thus, part 
of the money-output connection may be circular, although the 
central bank can exert an influence that is either restrain­
ing, neutral or stimulative. Ultimately, it is the actions of 
independent agents —  firms, households and financial institu­
tions, which determine the relationship between the monetary 
base and economic activity2.
While a short-run positive correlation between money and 
output is well established, the economic mechanisms through 
which money affects output is not well understood. Attempts 
to quantify the importance of transmission channels such as 
interest rates, the exchange rate, asset prices, Tobin's q, 
wealth, bank credit and firm balance sheets have had meager 
success (Mankiw, 1994; Mishkin, 1995). To quote Sims (1992):
Monetary aggregates tend to move in the same direction as 
aggregate economic activity, as has been repeatedly documented. 
...the profession as a whole has no clear answer to the question 
of the size and nature of the effects of monetary policy on 
aggregate activity.
Thus, the nature of the money-output connection itself is 
somewhat of a puzzle that tends to Balkanize the profession, 
and the debate is a continuing one.
2
For contemporaneous reviews of this literature, see Cagan (1989), 
Blanchard (1990), Mankiw (1994) and Mishkin (1995).
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No attempt will be made here add to the body of empirical 
evidence regarding the money-output connection, or to recon­
cile the different interpretations. The issue is brought up 
only to point out that the several monetary transmission 
channels that have been heretofore proposed have weak empiri­
cal validity, and that this is an area of ongoing research.
In this chapter I show that, in a flexible-price version 
of the static IS/LM model, a one-time change in the monetary 
base affects the interest rate and nominal wages and prices. 
These in turn affect the real value of household financial 
wealth, and if wealth is an explanatory variable in the excess 
demand functions for goods, money and labor, employment and 
output will also be affected. This represents an extension of 
the wealth monetary transmission channel to aggregate labor 
supply. If firms are also assumed to have monopsony power in 
the labor market, as in Chapter IV and V, then the wealth 
transmission channel will extend to labor demand also, which 
under monopsony is not independent of the elasticity of labor 
supply.
Much of the modern analysis of monetary economics has 
been undertaken within an optimal monetary growth framework. 
The seminal paper by Sidrauski (1967) showed that in a 
Walrasian setup, money is both neutral and superneutral with 
respect to real, interest rates and output, thereby overturning
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the finding of Tobin (1965) that increases in money growth 
rates lead to reductions in real interest rates and increases 
in the level of output3. Subsequent authors, however, have 
shown that the strong super-neutrality result of Sidrauski 
does not hold up in less restrictive specifications, so that 
in general changes in money growth rates do lead to changes in 
real interest rates and output levels in the long run. But, 
these departures from super-neutrality have not gone consis­
tently in one direction. Some studies found that higher 
monetary growth rates lead to a higher equilibrium capital 
stock and output (e. g., Fischer [1979] and Cohen [1985]), 
while others found the converse (e. g., Stockman [1986] and 
Wang and Yip [1992]4. Perhaps partly due to this ambiguity, 
the sentiment in the literature is that although departures 
from super-neutrality are supported by theory, the magnitude 
of these departures are small5. Thus, the lesson from the 
optimal monetary growth literature seems to be that money
3Mundell [1963] showed in a traditional non-growth framework that changes 
in anticipated inflation led to less them one-for-one changes in nominal interest 
rates when wealth was an argument in the consumption function. As such, the 
negative relationship between monetary growth rates and real interest rates is 
often called the Mundell-Tobin effect.
4Wang and Yip [1992] show that in the popular money-in-utility-function 
setup, the effect of money on output depends crucially on the cross partials of 
the utility function and that the comparative statics are inconclusive overall. 
Turnovsky [1987] shows that the matter also depends on whether the existing tax 
structure induces firms to finance their investment by issuing bonds or by 
issuing equities.
5Danthine et al. (1987) provide calculations suggesting that although 
violated, the super-neutrality proposition is not an unreasonable approximation. 
The studies of Lucas (1980), Geweke (1986) and Stockman (1986) provide empirical 
evidence supporting this view.
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plays no role for real outcomes in a Walrasian setting with 
perfect markets.
This view that money plays no "real” role in a Walrasian 
framework is the premise separating two currently dominant 
"schools" of thought that have evolved on the subject of 
business cycle behavior —  the Real Business Cycle (RBC) and 
New Keynesian schools6. The RBC models, which maintain the 
standard assumptions of the Walrasian setup, attribute short­
term fluctuations in output to real shocks rather than 
monetary shocks. They explain the observed correlation 
between money and output as a consequence of a reaction by the 
monetary authority to changes in output rather than the other 
way around (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; King and Plosser, 
1984).
The New Keynesian view is that a causal mechanism from 
money to output does exist, and this has led to exploring 
departures from the frictionless Walrasian setup in one or 
more markets. These departures include money illusion; nominal 
wage rigidity due to implicit long-term employment contracts; 
staggered wage-setting; nominal price rigidity due to menu 
costs and second-order gains from changing prices under
6These "schools" of research have been surveyed by Rotemberg (1987),- 
Fischer (1988), Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Phelps (1990), and Mankiw and Romer 
(1991, Vol.l).
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conditions of imperfect competition; and "efficiency wage" 
constructions. Although none of these explanations have 
dominated the field of play, it would not be inaccurate to say 
that the non-neutrality of money at business-cycle frequencies 
has come to be identified with the New Keynesian school, which 
relies upon inhomogeneities and non-tatonnement market imper­
fections7 .
The objective of this chapter is to show that when 
Ricardian equivalence does not hold in a Walrasian framework, 
any monetary policy action which increases the ratio of 
outside money to outside bonds (e. g., an open market purchase 
by the central bank) will lead to a decrease in real interest 
rates and an increase in employment and output, i. e., X show 
that money is not neutral even with perfectly flexible prices 
and market-clearing. The channel through which an open market 
operation affects real interest rates and output is through 
its effect on real wealth; a parity exchange of money for 
bonds takes place in nominal terms but not in real terms, and 
real economic activity is affected.
In order to show this in the simplest way, the static, 
general equilibrium framework of Patinkin (1965) will be 
employed. But, unlike Patinkin's model, which incorporated
7The Monetarist and Post-Keynesian schools also weigh in on the non- 
neturality of money without necessarily subscribing to New Keynesian mechanisms.
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real wealth as an argument only of the consumption and money 
demand functions, in this model real wealth is incorporated as 
an argument in all household excess demand functions, i. e. , 
wealth is also assumed to affect aggregate labor supply. With 
real wealth connecting all three excess demand equations, 
(goods, money and labor), the model is not block recursive 
with respect to the labor market. An open-market purchase of 
bonds increases nominal prices and wages and lowers the 
interest rate, the net effects of which are to reduce both the 
real wage and the real value of household financial wealth. 
The demand for labor increases due to the reduction in the 
real wage, and the supply of labor increases because the 
wealth effect more than offsets the reduction in the price of 
leisure. Employment and output increase, along with invest­
ment, income, and the demand for real money balances.
The main implication of the model is that, when wealth is 
consistently incorporated into a Walrasian framework, changes 
in money affect real outcomes and the direction of this effect 
is unambiguously positive. As long as there is at least some 
departure from perfect Ricardian equivalence, so that house­
holds consider some fraction of their government bond holdings 
as net wealth, a positive money-output connection will result. 
If agents consider none of their bond holdings as real wealth, 
then money neutrality reappears.
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It: is important: to note that the wealth channel through 
which money affects real outcomes in this model is absent in 
most optimal monetary growth models. This is because Ricard­
ian equivalence is a common assumption in this class of 
models, implying that government bonds play no role in agents* 
intertemporal budget constraints. In these models, a one-time 
swap of bonds for money leads only to a proportionate increase 
in goods prices, with no effect on real outcomes. That is 
also the case in the model presented here, if agents are 
Ricardian.
The results derived from the model in this chapter also 
match up well with Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), which show in 
an overlapping generations framework that open market opera­
tions are non-neutral with respect to real interest rates in 
fiscal regimes that are "non-Ricardian",(i. e., where govern­
ment debt is not fully backed by future direct taxes).They 
conclude that government bonds may matter in a manner as 
described in the traditional literature [e. g., Patinkin 
(1965), Mundell (1971)]. Aiyagari and Gertler assumed, 
however, that output is exogenous, so that no money-output 
connection exists in their model. The results of this chapter 
show in a simple static framework that the wealth effects 
uncovered by Patinkin (1965) in a non-optimizing framework and 
by Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) in an optimizing framework also
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work to influence the levels of employment and real output8.
The model presented in this chapter has a causal money- 
output connection in the absence of Keynesian wage-price 
rigidities. The introduction of such non-Walrasian features 
would augment the non-neutrality properties derived here, but 
are not necessary for the basic results and play no role in 
the model presented here.
The results obtained in this chapter have some obvious 
implications for the money neutrality debate. First, it is 
not necessary to leave the Walrasian market-clearing paradigm, 
as the New Keynesians do, in order to have a theoretical link 
between money and output. This is not to say that the New 
Keynesian research program is on the wrong track, but merely 
that the money-output relation need not depend on a Keynesian 
rigidity or inhomogeneity. Second, advocates of the New 
Classical/RBC view are no longer required to argue that the 
only causal relationship is from output to money, or to 
rationalize the existence of a monetary reaction function. 
Under plausible assumptions which do not violate the Walrasian 
paradigm, a causal money-output relationship has been revealed
Q
Leeper (1991) and Woodford (1994) also examine non-Ricardian fiscal 
regimes in an optimizing framework. As with Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), output 
is assumed, to be exogenous in these papers. See also Marini and van der Ploeg 
(1988).
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which could serve as a legitimate explanation of the observed 
positive correlation.
The significance of this model for the broader investiga­
tion of this thesis is that real wealth is a shift variable 
for the aggregate labor supply function. A decline in real 
wealth due to an open-market operation will shift the labor 
supply curve out, increasing aggregate labor supply, equilib­
rium employment and output. If the wealth effect on labor 
supply is strong enough, employment and output could increase 
even if the real wage does not decline; this opens up the 
possibility that the real wage could be acyclical or even 
procyclical. This also avoids the situation described in 
Chapter I where the assumption of nominal and real rigidities 
in New Keynesian models pre-determines the behavior of the 
real wage. Thus, the model provides a framework for analyzing 
the unrestricted behavior of the real wage in a monetary- 
induced business cycle.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the
complete model is specified in Section 2. The comparative 
static analysis of an open market purchase are summarized in 
Section 3, and a detailed mathematical analysis of the model 
is contained in Appendix B. Section 4 analyzes the implica­
tions of degrees of Ricardian equivalence. Section 5 presents 
some conclusions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
2.3 The Standard Flexible-Price Macro Model
Consider a closed monetary economy in short-run static 
equilibrium with no net growth in population or labor supply. 
The economic agents of interest are large numbers of house­
holds and firms and a single government entity which includes 
a central bank. These three classes of agents trade in 
perfectly competitive markets for goods, labor services, money 
and financial assets. Firms trade with households in the 
goods, labor and financial asset markets, demanding labor 
services and funds to finance real investment, and supplying 
goods for consumption and investment.
As is customary in models of business cycle phenomena, 
the capital stock is assumed to be fixed. Households receive 
wages and profits from firms with which they purchase goods 
for consumption and equity shares to add to their financial 
wealth. Since the model is static, agents are assumed to hold 
static expectations concerning nominal and real values. The 
government purchases goods for public consumption and finances 
its operations by levying taxes and issuing fiat money and 
debt in the form of perpetuities paying $1 per year. The 
government is the monopolist issuer of fiat money. In this 
chapter, the economic behavior of agents within each sector is 
assumed to be sufficiently homogeneous so as to justify its 
representation by a representative agent. Except for having
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real wealth as an argument in the labor supply function the 
model is a fairly standard one, and in the interest of brevity 
further discussion of microfoundations will be omitted except 
where it is pertinent.
2.3.1 Market E q u i l i b r i u m  Conditions
General equilibrium conditions on the aggregate excess 
demand functions in the four markets are specified as fol­
lows:9
Goods Market: c d (z, Q) + i d{r,y) + g - y 3(w) = 0 (2-la)
-t- + - +• -
Money Market: m d(y, r, Q) - m = 0 (2-lb)
Labor Market: I* (v) - Is (w, Q) = 0 (2-lc)
~ •+• -
Asset Market: f d (z, y, r, m, Q) - f s(r,y) = 0 (2-ld)
•+•+ + — +■ - +■
Government Budget Constraint: g + — ~xn = (2-le)
P ° P rP
Where z is disposable income, ft is real household wealth, 
w = W/P, m = M/P, and signs under arguments denote the signs 
of partial derivatives which are the basic behavioral assump­
tions of the model. md = ms and fd = fs are stock equilibrium 
relations, since the demand and supply of money and earning 
assets are in terms of balances.
Q
A glossary of mathemat:leal symbols with definitions is contained in 
Appendix A. Note that the balance sheet constraint on assets allows the market 
for financial assets to be ignored.
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Household real wealth is defined as real money balances 
plus the present value of claims to perpetual cash flow 
streams from government bonds and private equities:
Q = Q (P, W, r; M, k B )  = ** + + 
P rP •(*)"]
OiKil (2)
where k is a parameter representing the extent to which the 
representative household regards its holdings of government 
bonds to be nominal wealth, with k = 0 representing perfect 
Ricardian equivalence. Note that ft is interpreted as net of 
private sector liabilities and inside money, which cancel out 
in the aggregate.
In order to remain faithful to the static framework, it 
is assumed that all endogenous changes in B/P are financed
with lump sum taxes and that ^  = ^ ? = 0 . since it is theP rP
effects of one-time changes in the level of money balances 
through open market operations that are of interest, these 
assumptions sure relatively unimportant10. The endogenous 
variables of this system, therefore, are P, W, r, t and t0> 
and the exogenous variables are the government policy vari­
ables g f H and B. Given the equilibrium values for the
10It is assumed, therefore, that r adjusts endogenously, i. e., 
r » rD + B/P. Assuming that interest payments are bond financed would not affect 
the non-neutrality of money in the model, but it would give rise to intrinsic 
dynamics which would be inconsistent with the static nature of the setup.
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endogenous variables, the equilibrium values of fl, £ and y can 
be determined. The representative agent in each sector is 
subject to a budget constraint: household desired aggregate 
consumption and saving is constrained by disposable income and 
wealth; firms pay out all profits to households and thus must 
finance new investment by selling new equities; finally, as
shown in (2-le), together with the assumption that = —  = 0 ,p rp
the government must finance continuing purchases with lump sum 
taxes.
2.3.2 Important Features of the Model
Equations (2-1) describe a standard textbook flexible- 
price model in which the classical dichotomy has been bridged 
by the addition of a labor market equilibrium condition which 
depends on real wealth. Since n appears in all three excess 
demand functions the three markets are linked by wealth ef­
fects. The model is not dichotomous and must be solved out 
simultaneously. Thus employment and output are not determined 
independently of money market equilibria. In general, the 
classical dichotomy between real and nominal variables breaks 
down in the presence of real wealth effects. All of the 
endogenous variables are free to move instantaneously to clear
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the four markets. The model contains no Keynesian rigidities, 
stickiness or inhomogeneities.
As indicated previously, this model follows Patinkin 
(1965) except that wealth is incorporated into the labor 
supply function. It does not appear from the literature that 
the implications of open market operations (involving a swap 
of bonds for money) have been examined in such as setting. 
Phelps (1972) does add wealth to the labor supply function, 
but the comparative static exercise conducted (which is mainly 
graphical) is a swap of money for capital. There are no 
government bonds in Phelps' model, and so the issue of 
Ricardian equivalence does not arise.
Another important difference is that Phelps constrains 
the interest rate to be equal to the marginal product of 
capital. With this assumption, the real interest rate 
increases with output due to a monetary expansion, contrary to 
the finding here that it must decline in order to equilibrate 
the goods market at a higher level of output. This difference 
highlights the fact that Phelps interpreted his model as 
applying to the long-run steady-state, whereas the model 
presented here is more applicable to the short-run business 
cycle where the capital stock is assumed to be fixed and 
monetary intervention is more relevant.
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Like Patinkin, and in contrast to Phelps' graphical 
analysis, standard comparative static analysis will be 
employed to determine stability conditions and sign the money 
multipliers. This approach also reveals that the money-output 
connection holds up except in the extreme case of perfect 
Ricardian equivalence for government bonds.
2.4 Analysis of the Model
The comparative static analysis of this non-recursive 
3x3 system involves a fair amount of algebra, and the details 
are consigned to Appendix B. Only the principal results will 
be summarized and interpreted in this chapter. However, it 
may be helpful to introduce here some notation and definitions 
from Appendix B.
Differentiation of the system of equations (2-1) and 
rearrangement produces the matrix differential equation 
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-K  d-- CqrP “ <**o
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In (2-4), nEDXw denotes excess demand in the market for X, 
subscripts denote partial differentiation, and the signs are 
signs of the first partial derivatives. (The partial deriva­
tive expansions of each term in A are derived in the Appendix, 
but will not be needed in most of what follows.) The signs of 
the first partials depend on the original behavioral assump­
tions contained in (2-1) and on the stability conditions 
derived in Appendix B.
2.4.1 Analysis of an Open Market Operation
The primary question of interest is the effect of pure 
monetary policy on real economic variables. I will examine 
the implications of a one-time increase in M with a propor­
tional decrease in B/r, i. e., of setting dB = -rDM in (2-5), 
with dg = dr0 = 0. (Details are in Appendix B) . It may seem 
that the value of k is important for the results of this 
model; however it turns out that as long as k > 0 , the value 
of k affects the magnitudes of the comparative static deriva­
tives but not their algebraic signs. The results for the case
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viiere k = 1 are summarized here. The implications for 
Ricardian equivalence (0<k<1) are discussed in Section 2.5.
The results in (2-6a) and (2-6b) are not surprising, 
since P and W are nominal and would increase with M in any 
event. The result in (2-6c) also seems unsurprising, since 
Patinkin found that an open market purchase decreased real 
wealth. But the result is far from obvious in the full 3x3 
system. In Appendix B it is shown that the sum of the first 
three terms is negative. One way to see this is to note that 
that (2-6d) holds unambiguously, which means that n must 
decline in order to restore equilibrium in the labor market.
ftp i-1  <■-> «-»
[EDGr‘EDLW- EDLC'EDGV]} > 0
COMPARATIVE STATIC DERIVATIVES FOR K = 1





dM = - [A|-1{P-2[-«S(Qp+ < 0
C -) CH c-j
(2—6d)
(2-6e)
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The sign of (2-6e) is unambiguously negative due to 
stability condition (i) [See Appendix section B.2] and here 
these results contradict Phelps (1972) , but agree with 
Patinkin and economic reasoning: an increase in money balances 
and a corresponding decline in the supply of outstanding bonds 
will cause bond prices to increase; the interest rate must 
decline in order to equilibrate the goods market following the 
wealth shock to consumption.
The partial derivatives of n are:
M  + xB 
P rP zP > 0 (2-7a)
kB + jz_ 






The sign of (2-7a) is strictly ambiguous, but the fact that 
the nominal wage bill is on the order of 10 times greater than
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
nominal interest payments on bonds and money implies that it 
is positive11.
The conclusion is that an even exchange of bonds for 
money between the public and private sectors increases both 
the price level P and nominal wages W. The net effect of dP 
and dW reduces real wealth ft, which creates disequilibrium in 
all three markets. The decline in real wealth stimulates an 
increase in labor supply which is accommodated along a stat­
ionary and downward sloping labor demand curve by a reduction 
in the real wage. This produces a higher level of employment 
and output. In the goods market the effect of the reduction in 
the real wage and wealth on consumption demand is more than 
offset by an increase in income and the increased investment 
demand induced by a decline in the interest rate. Finally, an 
open-market operation causes money supply to increase in real 
terms, i. e. the increase in the price level is less than 
proportional to the increase in M, and money is not neutral.
It is shown in Appendix B that dP/dM has its largest 
positive value when k = 0, i. e., when dP/dM = P/M. For
Economic Report of the President, 1992. As of 1991:IV, total employee 
compensation [Table B-22] was $3,425.1 Billion; Federal net interest paid [Table 
B-79] was $190.5 Billion; M2 [Table B-65] was $3,425.4 Billion and the monetary 
base [Table B-67] was $324.78 Billion. (All data in annualized 1991 dollars.) 
Imputing a 5% annual interest rate to the monetary base, W£d exceeded (.OSMjj + 
B) by $3,2178.4 Billion, or 16 times. Using M2 the ratio is 8 times. Therefore 
Op is unambiguously positive.
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k  > 0, dP/dM < P/M, which means that d(M/P)/dM > 0 and the 
real money supply increases. Thus, the demand for real balanc­
es must also increase, implying that the income and substitu­
tion effects on money demand are greater than the wealth 
effect.
2.4.2 Summary of the Results.
Under the behavioral assumptions of the model (which are 
standard) the reduction in the value of real wealth induced by 
an open market purchase stimulates private agents to increase 
employment and output, their rates of saving and investment, 
and their holdings of real money balances. A portion of the 
original private wealth, in the form of bonds, will have 
vanished and the motivation of the private sector is to regain 
lost utility by increasing income and the rate of wealth 
accumulation. An open-market sale of bonds would have just 
the opposite effects all around.
Although this static short-period model is somewhat 
antiquated, its predictions are unambiguous and match up well 
with the stylized facts of active monetary intervention; 
Expansionary monetary policy stimulates investment, employment 
and output, with a corresponding rise in prices and wages and 
a decline in the real interest rate. The implications of the
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model that depart from the stylized facts of the business 
cycle are (a) any unemployment is voluntary, since the labor 
market always clears; (b) with decreasing returns to labor, 
the aggregate real wage is countercyclical. These properties 
derive from the Walrasian heritage of the model.
The terms "involuntary unemployment" is another way of 
saying the labor market does not clear. Such a non-Walrasian 
feature is characteristic of many New Keynesian models (See 
the related discussion in Chapter I.) The results of this 
section indicate that although non-clearing markets may be 
important for explaining involuntary employment, they are not 
necessary for money to be non-neutral.
The fact that the observed aggregate real wage appears to 
be anything but countercyclical has prompted Kuh (1966) and 
more recently Hall (1991) to conjecture that the aggregate 
marginal product of labor is constant, or nearly so. In the 
model presented here, the more elastic the labor demand curve, 
the larger will be the money multiplier on output, i.e., the 
wealth effect will be more pronounced. In the extreme case of 
constant returns to labor, yz = a = w, ye£ = 0, and the labor 
demand function £d(w) is undefined. Conditions in the labor 
market will then be defined by I = £s(a,n) ; the equilibrium 
values of I and y are determined by labor supply which, with 
a constant real wage, is a function of only A. The real
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effect of an open-market transaction is transmitted to output 
via the multiplier:
dM Q dtf
Thus, with a constant-returns technology the real wage is 
fixed and the wealth effects of an open-market transaction on 
employment and output in this model would be stronger.
2.5 Ricardian Equivalence
A case has been made for a positive causal connection 
between money and output in the absence of Ricardian equiv­
alence (k=1) . As one would expect, for the case of perfect 
Ricardian equivalence ( k  = 0) it is possible to show after 
some algebraic manipulation, that dP/P = dW/W = dM/M, and 
therefore d(W/P)/dM = 0, d(M/P)/dM = 0 and dfi/dM = 0. Bonds 
exchange for money, but bonds are not counted in real wealth 
so wealth doesn't change and money is neutral. It is clear 
that it is the presence of government bonds as a component of 
wealth and not money or equities that causes the non-neutral­
ity of open-market operations in this model.
The question of whether government bonds represent net 
wealth to the private sector remains a controversial one. (see 
Barro (1974, 1976), Buchanan (1976), Feldstein (1976), and 
more recently Bernheim (1987), and Buiter (1991). The issue
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is whether it is reasonable to assume that government bonds 
are perceived by private agents as a temporary postponement of 
increased tax liabilities which are equivalent in present 
value, i.e., whether government bonds should be counted as net 
wealth, by the private sector12. In the final analysis this 
is an empirical question, but it becomes a theoretical issue 
because of two sets of canonical assumptions that are normally 
made in macroeconomic modeling, namely, those of rational 
expectations and the representative agent.
The Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is closely allied 
with the perfect foresight version of rational expectations. 
For an individual bondholder to equate his claim to a definite 
stream of cash receipts to another stream of uncertain tax 
liability payments and cancel them out in his mind requires 
not only something close to perfect foresight, but some 
additional assumptions. One of those assumptions is that the 
bondholder will be the taxpayer who is liable for those tax 
bills when they are levied. There are several ways that an 
individual bondholder can avoid the tax levy even under the 
assumption of infinitely lived agents or intergenerational 
altruism, but the main point is that the distribution of bond 
holdings and the distribution of their implied tax burden 
among households are not necessarily the same unless one is
12It appears that Ricardo recognized the prevalence of "fiscal illusion", 
and did not actually subscribe to the concept which has been associated with his 
name. See O ’Driscoll (1977) and Bernheim (1987).
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talking about a representative agent. In that event, the 
representative agent consumer pays all of the taxes, either 
directly or indirectly through ownership of all the firms, and 
government bond payments simply go from one pocket of the 
representative agent to the other. If bonds are perpetuities 
and government debt service is financed out of current taxes, 
then not much foresight is needed if tax collections are 
coincident with bond receipts. The absence of a store of 
value will be obvious to the representative agent.
The model described in this chapter is a representa­
tive agent model, but it is also a timeless static equilibrium 
model in which agent expectations are static. As such it is 
open to criticism on those grounds13. The representative 
agents of this model are naive and myopic, and plausibly could 
have fiscal illusion with respect to the incidence and inevit­
ability of future taxes. If so, then there still may be a 
case for wealth effects. The real issue here has to do with 
the level of aggregation. Bonds and other debt contracts of 
the private sector do cancel out when aggregating over the 
private sector, even on a balance sheet basis. Cancelling out 
all debt claims between the government and private sectors on 
the basis of equivalent present value of assets and liabili­
ties would be equivalent to aggregating the government and
13In the concluding section of this chapter I argue that the implications 
of this static model should hold up in a dynamic framework with rational 
expectations.
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private sectors together and eliminating the distinction14. 
That would be moving in the direction of a Robinson Crusoe 
economy, and although there are uses for such a model, it does 
not make for very interesting macroeconomics.
Thus, although the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis 
follows as a logical consequence of rational expectations and 
representative agent aggregation, it potentially involves a 
fallacy of composition. What can be perceived as net wealth 
by a subcategory of consumers who are bondholders, cannot be 
net wealth for the collective representative agent15. On 
the other hand, if some fraction of bondholders have fiscal 
illusion, or bondholders as a group do not completely discount 
their claims for implied taxes and regard some fraction of 
their bond holdings as net wealth, then Ricardian equivalence 
will be imperfect for a representative agent who is truly 
representative, and there may be a wealth effect from govern­
ment bonds. This possibility will now be investigated.
In this model k = 1 (non-equivalence) and k = 0 (perfect 
equivalence) represent the polar extremes of the Ricardian
14To be consistent, the same equivalence proposition should be applied to 
transfer payments and other pecuniary government services. Taking this to its 
logical conclusion would also eliminate financial markets, firms and money, 
institutions which enable consumers to deal with time and uncertainty.
15The fact that foreign entities who are not subject to direct U. S. 
taxtion hold approximately 15% of Treasury securities means that the implied tax 
burden is somewhat larger than the domestic bond receipts.
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equivalence controversy. An interesting question is what 
happens in the intermediate case when bondholders regard some 
positive fraction of their bond holdings as wealth, i. e. when 
0 < k < 1. Given the structure of the model, deriving the 
comparative static results for this case is a rather tedious 
exercise. (See Appendix B, Section B.4) . the argument will be 
summarized here.
2.5.1 Comparative Static Results for 0<k <1
Suppose that the model has a money-neutral equilibrium 
solution for an open-market operation when 0<K<e<l, where e 
can be arbitrarily small. Then it follows that dP/P = dW/W = 
dM/M, d(W/P) = 0 and dr/dM = 0. Now examine the implications 
for dfl:
where 0 = B/M , and under the neutrality conditions assumed,
Thus, in order for money to be neutral we must have either
Q
which cancel to 0
(a) k = 0, or (b) = 0. The first condition in (a) hasdM
been ruled out by assumption. As for (b) , we have:
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—  = irdB _ b ]
dM MldM Ml
so that. d0/dM = 0 if and only if dB/B = dM/M, i. e., if
0 = B/M remains constant. But this implies that an open-
market operation, for which 0 is most definitely not constant,
will be non—neutral when 0<k<1. Any positive amount of
government bonds that is regarded behavior a 11 v as private
wealth will produce a non-neutral response to an open-market
operation in this model16. Money neutrality requires perfect
Ricardian equivalence on government bonds. This conclusion
can be stated as follows:
With real wealth effects in all three markets, an 
open-market purchase is non-neutral and increases 
employment and output as long as 0 < k  < 1.
The consequences of imperfect Ricardian equivalence for 
other real variables can be similarly derived. In Appendix B, 
Section B.4, it is shown that the signs of dP/dM and dW/dM are 
both positive and independent of the value of k . It is also 
true that:




16the magnitude of the non-neutral response will depend directly on the 
value of k in the interval [0,1].
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Substituting the expressions for dP/dM and dW/dM for the case 
where 0 < k < 1 in Appendix B, Section B.4 into Equation 2.8, 
expanding and collecting terms, I derive the result that the 
real wage declines unconditionally. Thus: 
dw f = 0, K = 0
- i  {  < o , o < K i l  ( 2 - 9 >
Applying the same reasoning as before, it follows that
real wealth 12 must also decline in order to achieve equilib­
rium in the labor market, and the implications of the model 
will hold except for the extreme case of k = 0, i. e., perfect 
Ricardian equivalence. Of course, the closer k  is to 1, the 
larger in magnitude those implications will be.
The foregoing analysis also makes it clear that any 
change in the ratio of bonds to money will be nonneutral. 
This would include the fabled "helicopter drop" of currency, 
or more realistically, a one-time devaluation of the currency. 
The fact that neutrality arises in the constant 0 case is 
uninteresting because there is no mechanism for maintaining a 
constant ratio of bonds to money while the monetary base is 
being changed. Open-market operations are the principal 
vehicle for fine-tuning the rate of growth of the money supply 
and are undertaken precisely because they are not neutral. 
They are, in Woodford's (1995) terminology, delicate instru­
ments of non-Ricardian monetary policy.
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This chapter has presented a model in which money is non­
neutral with respect to the real interest rate, employment and 
output in a Walrasian general equilibrium framework when 
wealth is incorporated consistently into all household excess 
demand functions and Ricardian equivalence does not hold 
perfectly. The predictions of the model are found to be 
unambiguous and surprisingly "Keynesian," An increase in 
money causes a decrease in the real interest rate, an increase 
in employment and output, and increases in nominal wages and 
prices.
The source of non-neutrality is the fact that the central 
bank can make a parity exchange of money for bonds only in 
nominal terms? it cannot bring about a parity exchange in 
terms of the components of real wealth. The central bank is 
in an analogous position to Keynes' workers who attempted to 
set their real wage by bargaining for a nominal wage; it 
behaves as if it had "money illusion" in the bond market, 
except of course there is no illusion. The intention of 
nominal open-market operations is to affect real economic 
activity, and the monetary policy transmission mechanism is a 
change in the real value of private wealth. The swap of bonds 
for money reduces the real value of wealth held in the private 
sector, and correspondingly reduces the real value of govern­
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ment obligations. Monetization of the government's debt 
entails a corresponding reduction in real private wealth, to 
which agents respond predictably: they strive harder to regain 
lost utility.
The model presented here is a static, non-optimizing 
general equilibrium model in which capital, money and bonds 
are exogenous and expectations are static, i. e., a tradition­
al static macroeconomic model with naive agents. Nevertheless, 
the implications of this simple framework match up well with 
those of the optimal monetary growth literature. As in that 
literature, when Ricardian equivalence holds perfectly, open 
market operations imply no wealth effects and money is 
neutral. But, if Ricardian equivalence holds less than 
perfectly, then open market operations do imply wealth 
effects, which turn give rise to an unambiguous causal money- 
output connection.
It is fairly standard practice to assume that capital 
stocks are fixed when analyzing macroeconomic fluctuations at 
business-cycle frequencies. An important question, however, 
is whether the non-neutrality results obtained here would hold 
up in a dynamic framework in which money and bonds have non­
zero growth rates and agents form rational expectations. The 
analysis of Mundeli and Tobin, which assumed output to be 
exogenous, showed that with real wealth as an argument of
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consumption and money demand functions, changes in the growth 
rate of money cause changes in real wealth and real interest 
rates. It should be evident from the results derived in this 
chapter that if wealth is consistently incorporated into a 
dynamic framework, so that wealth is also an argument for 
labor supply, then monetary policy actions would be both non­
neutral and non-superneutral.
The question naturally arises as to whether the qualita­
tive effects of money on output via real wealth represent 
significant quantitative effects. No attempt will be made 
here to answer this empirical question, other than to point 
out that the higher the elasticity of aggregate labor demand, 
the greater will be the magnitude of the money multipliers on 
real interest rates and output. It is important to note that 
the monetary transmission mechanism in the present model, 
which operates through an effect on wealth, differs from the 
mechanism present in most of the optimal growth literature, 
the significance of which is typically assumed to be small. 
In the optimal growth literature, perfect Ricardian equiva­
lence is typically assumed at the outset, which precludes any 
wealth effect from monetary policy actions.
It appears that the wealth effects examined in this 
chapter, which arise in the case of less-than-perfect Ricard­
ian equivalence, are becoming of more interest in the liter­
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ature. This is partly due to the fact that wealth effects 
seem to be important for solving the price-indeterminacy 
problem which arises when the central bank targets interest 
rates instead of a monetary aggregate (Leeper, 1991; Woodford, 
1994.) It is also partly due to the significance that wealth 
effects have for monetary and fiscal policy, as argued by 
Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) and Marini and van der Ploeg 
(1988).
It appears that wealth fell out of favor as an explan­
atory variable at about the same time the neo-classical 
synthesis unraveled. This may have been unjustified. It does 
not seem unreasonable to assume that households take their 
current real financial wealth into account when making 
important choices about consumption, saving and leisure; or 
that subsequent changes in the market value of financial 
wealth as a consequence of inflation and interest-rate 
fluctuations compel those decisions to be revised. But 
reasonableness is not always a reliable guide. Empirical 
evidence would be more persuasive.
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CHAPTER III
MONOPSONISTIC LABOR MARKETS AND AGGREGATE REAL WAGES
3.1 Introduction and Overview
An important conclusion in Chapter I was that it appears 
to be difficult to construct an aggregate model in which money 
and output are positively correlated and real wages are 
acyclical or mildly procyclical. This conclusion appears to 
hold up over a broad range of macro-models including those 
ordinarily classified as Traditional Keynesian, New Keynesian, 
and Real Business Cycle models1.
The Traditional Keynesian approach to rationalizing the 
non-neutrality of money was to posit some form of nominal 
wage-price rigidity or stickiness which worked by influencing 
aggregate labor supply. A major criticism of this class of 
models was their prediction of a countercyclical real wage, as 
well as failure to explain why nominal rigidities would 
persist under conditions of perfect competition.
Chapter I contains a review of the relevant macroeconomic literature and 
arguments which lead to this conclusion. The macro-model classifications 
"Traditional Keynesian, Mew Keynesian”, etc., used in this Chapter are also 
defined in Chapter I.
80
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New Keynesian models have provided a number of competing 
explanations for wage-price stickiness, including models of 
imperfect competition in which the economic incentives for 
price-setting agents to change prices is weak. Efficiency- 
wage models of the labor market imply rigid real wages and 
neutral money under profit maximization (Akerlof and Yellen) . 
Models of monopolistic competition require the additional 
assumption of second-order menu costs in order for money to be 
non-neutral, and some of these models predict strongly 
procyclical real wages which are counterfactual2. Christiano 
and Eichenbaum (1992) point out that, in general, Keynesian 
models understate and Real Business Cycle models overstate the 
degree of positive correlation observed between real wages and 
employment.
Chapter II presented a f lexible-price general equilibrium 
macro model with wealth effects in labor supply. In that 
model, as with Traditional Keynesian models, open-market 
operations resulted in changes in employment and output 
through their effect on aggregate labor supply. However, the 
model in Chapter II makes a ,,Keynesian,, connection between 
changes in money and output under the assumptions of perfect 
competition and perfectly flexible wages and prices, thereby
Real Business Cycle models also exhibit strongly procyclical real wages, 
but deny a role for- money. These models will not be considered further in this 
thesis.
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avoiding one of the major criticisms of Traditional Keynesian 
models. This result suggests that, while nominal wage-price 
rigidities may be necessary for disequilibrium explanations of 
unemployment, they are not necessary for establishing a 
connection between money and output. However, as with the 
Traditional Keynesian models which rely on aggregate labor 
supply to produce a money-output connection, the real wage in 
the model of Chapter II is unambiguously countercyclical. 
Thus, the model described in Chapter II is unsatisfactory to 
that extent.
The objective of the next three chapters of this thesis 
is to show that it is possible to reconcile, within a Keynes­
ian framework, both sets of stylized facts: the positive
correlation between money and output, and acyclical or mildly 
procyclical real wages.
This chapter explores the implications of imperfect 
competition in the labor market for the behavior of real wages 
and markups. The question explored in this chapter is: Does 
the assumption of monopsony power in the labor market help to 
reconcile Keynesian-type models with the empirical record on 
real wages? In a Keynesian model with a perfectly competi­
tive labor market, the profit-maximizing equilibrium real wage 
will be countercyclical if the marginal product of labor 
declines with employment when the capital stock is fixed,
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which is generally assumed. However, with monopsony power in 
the labor market the profit-maximizing equilibrium real wage 
is less than the marginal product of labor by a markdown 
factor which depends directly on the degree of monopsony 
power. If monopsony power in the labor market is weaker in 
expansions than it is in recessions, then the markdown will 
vary accordingly and the real wage may be procyclical, 
acyclical, or at least less countercyclical than it would be 
under perfect competition. This chapter explores in some 
detail the implications of the standard monopsony model for 
this question, and in particular, determines the conditions 
that are necessary for a monopsonistic labor market to exhibit 
acyclical or procyclical real wages.
In addition to providing a possible explanation of the 
absence of countercyclical real wages, there are three reasons 
for investigating the implications of monopsony power in the 
aggregate labor market. First, it complements the more recent 
New Keynesian literature on imperfect competition in the goods 
market; in fact, monopsonistic labor markets have been largely 
overlooked in the macroeconomic literature. Second, the 
behavior of the labor market is critical to a Keynesian money- 
output connection, and unlike New Keynesian models of imper­
fect competition in which behavior in the labor market is 
implicit, with monopsony power the aggregate labor market 
takes center stage and the elasticity of aggregate labor
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supply plays an important role in determining equilibrium 
outcomes. Finally, the monopsony assumption provides a 
different interpretation of the empirical evidence on markups 
of price over marginal cost, i. e., as markdowns of real wages 
from the marginal product of labor.
Econometric studies of U. S. industry data have consis­
tently found evidence that markups of prices over marginal 
factor cost are countercyclical [Bils (1987) , Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1991) ]. The reasons for this are not well under­
stood. The assumption of monopsonistic labor markets allows 
for an interpretation that the observed markups are actually 
markdowns which vary countercyclically with monopsony power. 
With monopsony power there is a close relationship between the 
behavior of markdowns and real wages, which will be examined 
in this Chapter.
The main contribution of this chapter is to show that in 
the Traditional Keynesian setup, incorporating monopsony power 
into the labor market in a representative agent framework, 
does not lead to either acyclical or procyclical aggregate 
real wages. In fact, with monopsony power the real wage is 
more countercyclical than if the labor market were perfectly 
competitive. Correspondingly, markups in the standard 
monopsony model are procyclical. Both of these predictions 
are counterfactual, and move us further away from explaining
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the stylized facts. Thus, in the Traditional Keynesian setup, 
monopsony power alone is of no help in explaining the real 
vage and marlcup anomalies.
Further analysis in this chapter shows that the stumbling 
block here is the representative agent method of aggregation, 
the logical requirements of which preclude the elasticities of 
either either aggregate goods demand or aggregate labor supply 
from being procyclical. Thus, the major conclusion of this 
chapter is that macro models which utilize the representative 
agent method of aggregation cannot explain the cyclical behav­
ior of real wages or markups in terms of cyclical changes in 
demand or supply elasticities.
Thus, one way to to reconcile the Keynesian money-output 
connection with real wage behavior may be to relax some of the 
restrictive assumptions of the representative agent method. 
That is the objective of Chapter IV, which extends the 
analysis of monopsony power in the labor market to the case 
where workers are heterogeneous and representative agent 
aggregation is not applicable to labor supply.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 briefly
describes the real wage and markup anomalies. Section 3.3 
relates these anomalies to standard models of imperfect 
competition, and presents an interpretation in terms of
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monopsonistic labor markets. Section 3.4 discusses the role of 
monopsony power in the labor market search literature, which 
provides some justification for assuming monopsony power in 
a static equilibrium framework. The principal results of the 
chapter are derived in Section 3.5, where the standard 
monopsony model is analyzed in some detail. Section 3.6 
restates the conclusions of the chapter. Some supporting 
arguments and mathematical derivations are contained in 
Appendix C.
3.2 The Real Wage and Markup Anomalies
Macroeconomic theory has found it difficult to provide a 
satisfactory explanation for two persistent stylized facts of 
the business cycle: (1) The aggregate real wage is acyclical, 
and at times slightly procyclical [Abraham and Haltiwanger 
(1995)]; (2) Markups of price over marginal cost are counter­
cyclical in concentrated industries. [Bils (1987), Hall 
(1988), Rotemberg & Woodford (1991) ]3. (A summary of this 
evidence is contained in Chapter I.)
The observed behavior of the aggregate real wage has been 
an anomaly in macroeconomics ever since Keynes grappled with
A procyclical variable increases with output and employment, a countercyc­
lical variable moves just the opposite. References to cyclicality imply the 
existence of a business-cycle generating mechanism in the economy which causes 
output and employment to move in irregular cycles.
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it in The General Theory. The absence of a strong correlation 
between aggregate real wages and employment contradicts the 
theory of competitive labor markets, in which the real wage 
cam be either procyclical or countercyclical depending on 
whether the labor demand curve shifts or the labor supply 
curve shifts when employment and output change4. The 
absence of any consistent statistical relationship between the 
aggregate real wage and employment is an anomaly which has 
motivated a number of reappraisals of the applicability of the 
standard competitive market model to the aggregate labor 
market. Any of the standard assumptions —  market clearing, 
perfect competition, declining marginal labor productivity, 
utility and profit maximization, perfect information, leisure 
as a normal good, and the representative agent (RA) method of 
aggregation —  are suspect for the labor market. It appears 
that for a model of the aggregate labor market to be consis­
tent with the stylized facts, at least one of these canonical 
assumptions may have to be abandoned.
The cyclical pattern of price markups is also not well 
accounted for by standard price theory. Econometric studies 
of U. S. industry data have consistently found evidence that 
markups in concentrated industries are countercyclical. [Bils
4Obviously, one curve must: shift more than the other for the real wage to 
change. Real Business Cycle models assume that the sources of cyclical fluct­
uations are shocks to technology or productivity which shift only the labor 
demand curve. Many of the Older Keynesian models assume fixed technology and 
associate shifts of the labor supply curve with changes in aggregate demand.
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(1987, 1989); Hall (1988); Rotemberg and Woodford (1991)]. 
Bils found that markups in two-digit level industries de­
creased by 3.3% for each 10% expansion in output; Rotemberg 
and Woodford found elasticities of markups relative to hours 
worked on the order of -1. This evidence is consistent with 
the view that many goods markets are imperfectly competitive, 
and that the degree of market power possessed by firms varies 
over the cycle. However, theoretical mechanisms which could 
explain cyclical market power at the aggregate level are not 
well developed.
The real wage and markup anomalies are closely related 
and may have a common source. The idea that monopoly power in 
goods markets (measured as the percentage markup of price over 
marginal cost) might vary countercyclically originated with 
Pigou (1937) and Kalecki (1938), and was mentioned by Keynes 
(1939) as a possible explanation for the early Dunlop-Tarshis 
finding of procyclical real wages. Keynes' conjecture was 
that if monopolistic firms use markup pricing and tend to 
lower their markups in an expansion, the ratio of nominal 
prices to wages will decline, resulting in a procyclical real 
wage. Although the stylized facts on markups and real wages 
are closely related, it will be shown later in this chapter 
that the necessary conditions for real wages to be procyclical 
are stronger than for markups to be countercyclical; the 
former imply the latter, but not conversely, i.e., Keynes'
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conjecture is not enough to obtain acyclical or procyclical 
real wages.
3.3 The Interpretation of Countercyclical Markups
3.3.1 Countercyclical Monopoly Power
In this subsection I discuss countercyclical markups in 
terms of monopoly power in the goods market. The case of 
monopsony power in the labor market is treated in the next 
subsection.
The studies of markups by Bils and Rotemberg and Woodford 
shared a common premise that goods markets were monopolisti- 
cally competitive and labor markets were perfectly competi­
tive, and therefore attributed the cyclicality of markups to 
changes in the degree of monopoly power over the business 
cycle. With these assumptions, the relationship between the 
markup and monopoly power is given by the first order condi­
tion for profit maximization for a monopolist.
Assume that a monopolist has a short-term production 
function y = F(£, k) where labor I is variable and capital k 
is fixed, with F£ > 0, FZJt <0; the monopoly price is given by 
the industry inverse demand curve P(y). With a perfectly
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competitive labor market, the money wage W will be the market 
wage. The monopolist's profit is then:
n(y,W,r) = P{y)y-Wl-rk (3*1)
Since capital is assumed to be fixed in the short run, y is a 
function of only the level of employment. The first-order 
condition for profit maximization is, in markup fora:
E H  - 1w li +1 
n
Here Fs is the marginal product of labor, tj is the elasticity 
of total market demand faced by the firm, and L = 1\/r\ | is 
Lerner's index of monopoly power. (0 < L < l). with perfect 
competition assumed in the labor market and capital fixed in 
the short run, marginal cost is W/F£. With L > 0, price 
exceeds marginal cost and the difference is called a markup.
Equation 3.2 gives the optimum markup for a profit- 
maximizing monopolist, and it is evident that a countercyc­
lical markup at the firm or industry level implies countercyc­
lical monopoly power L and procylical elasticity of demand, t|. 
Thus, a profit-maximizing monopolist will lower its markup in 
response to an increase in demand if and only if the elastici­
ty of demand also increases in the vicinity of the equilibrium 
price as the demand curve shifts out. However, if the market 
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The problem is that there appears to be very little basis 
in conventional price theory for demand elasticities to be 
procyclical. In the most common setup of the consumer's 
problem, namely, a homothetic utility function and linear 
budget constraint, all demand elasticities are constant with 
respect to the scale variable, income. A market model in 
which demand elasticities vary with income requires the 
assumption of non-homothetic preferences. This is not a 
particularly acute problem for microeconomic analysis, since 
it has been known for some time that the assumption of 
homothetic preferences, which implies linear Engel curves, has 
been repeatedly rejected by household expenditure studies. 
(Prais and Houthakker (1971 Chap. 2; Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980), pp.142-145; Deaton (1992) p.9). Microeconomists 
have no basis for assuming that consumption preferences of 
individuals or households are homothetic.
When it comes to aggregation and macroeconomics, however, 
nonhomothetic preferences are problematic, because they 
invalidate the representative agent method of aggregation and 
require some form of nonlinear aggregation5. When aggrega­
tion is nonlinear there is no simple correspondence between 
the functional forms which are used to describe the behavior
Aggregation, issues are not confined to macroeconomics. The first level of 
aggregation over consumers is a household demand curve.
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of individual agents and firms, and those which would consis­
tently describe the corresponding behavior of aaggregates. The 
whole idea of micro-foundations for macroeconomics is chal­
lenged. This may be why nonhomothetic preferences are not 
prevalent in the macroeconomic literature.
A theoretical basis for countercyclical market power 
can be found in game-theoretic analyses of collusive oligopol­
istic behavior ( Friedman (1977, 1983), Rotemberg and Saloner 
(1986), Bagwell and Staiger (1995)). One conclusion of this 
line of research is that tacitly colluding oligopolies are 
likely to behave more competitively (i. e., engage in deviat­
ing price wars) during booms than in busts. Of the models 
tested by Rotemberg and Woodford [1991], a model of implicit 
oligopolistic collusion gave the best fit to industry markup 
data. These models were reduced form markup equations at the 
firm or industry level, not structural general equilibrium 
models. The extension of this approach to a general equilib­
rium framework is an active area of research by Rotemberg, 
Saloner and others. Although it is potentially an alternative 
explanation of countercyclical markups, it is not within the 
scope of this thesis, which is to explore the implications of 
imperfect competition in the labor market.
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One of the major messages of this thesis is that there is 
an alternative interpretation of the evidence in the litera­
ture on markups, which is that firms engage in strategic 
wage—setting behavior over the business cycle, and have 
stronger monopsony power over wages in recessions than in 
expansions. If, in contrast to the studies cited in the 
previous section, if firms are assumed to be price-takers and 
wage-setters, then what appears to be a markup of price over 
marginal cost can be interpreted as a markdown of the wage 
from the firm's marginal revenue product. With perfect 
competition assumed in the goods market and monopsony power 




where e is the wage-elasticity of labor supply. If both the 
goods and labor market were perfectly competitive, the profit- 
maximizing price P would be equal to marginal cost W/F£ and 
there would be no markup or markdown. However, with monopsony 
power in the labor market, the marginal cost of labor is
W r l l—— [1 + — J and is greater than average cost W by the amount of
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the markdown6. The real wage W/P is less than the marginal 
product of labor by the proportionality factor [1 + l/e]-1. 
The ratio PF^/W which was interpreted as a price markup in 
Equation 3.2 can now be interpreted as a wage markdown in 
Equation 3.3. If labor markets are monopsonistic, and if 
wage markdowns are countercyclical, the implication would be 
that the elasticity of labor supply e in Equation 3.3 must be 
procyclical and monopsony power l/e must be countercyclical. 
The inference would be that labor supply in equilibrium is 
less elastic (less sensitive to wage differentials) in reces­
sions than in expansions, and conversely7. As in the case 
of monopoly, the challenge is to explain why e might be 
procyclical, and to determine what assumptions about the labor 
market are consistent with that explanation.
Of course, a monopoly-monopsony combination is possi­
ble8. The corresponding first-order condition would then be:
The marginal cost of adding one worker is the incrementally higher wage 
W paid to that worker, plus (dW/dL)L, the wage increase paid to all infra­
marginal workers in the absence of wage discrimination. The latter expression 
is equal to W/e, the amount of the wage markdown from the marginal revenue 
product. See also Figure 3-1.
7This is just an inference from the empirical record. It does not say that 
e is procyclical in the standard monopsony model. In fact, in Section 3.5.3, I 
prove that just the opposite is the case. An interpretation in terms of 
collusive wage-setting behavior, analogous to Rotemberg and Woodford [1991], is 
possible but will not be pursued here.
O
This general case may be more realistic, since monopsony power in the 
labor market may be associated with strong monopoly power in the goods market. 
According to Joan Robinson (1932, p. 227), "A monopolist must necessarily be a 
monopsonist of the factors which he employs". This statement would be 
especially applicable to a workforce with firm-specific or industry-specific 
skills.





[1 + ^] (3.3)
Here the ratio PF^/W reflects both price markups over 
marginal cost as in Equation 3.2 and wage markdowns from 
marginal revenue product as in Equation 3.3. This equation 
shows that hypotheses about the cyclicality of markups M ( t| , e) 
are necessarily joint hypotheses about the cyclical behavior 
of r\ and e. Since and e are not observable, it appears that 
it would be difficult to identify empirically their separate 
contributions. This identification problem, which tends to 
confound statistical estimates of labor supply and demand 
elasticities from aggregate data, is discussed in Killings- 
worth (1983) and Pencavel (1986).
The interpretation of the markup evidence depends on what 
assumptions one wishes to make about the competitiveness of 
goods and factor markets. The studies cited previously 
focused on monopoly power l/r\ and assumed that labor markets 
were perfectly competitive (l/e = 0) . I will take the 
opposite approach and assume that labor markets are monopso­
nistic and explore the implications of monopsony power and 
heterogeneity in the aggregate labor market for macroeconomic 
outcomes, especially the the predicted pattern of real wages 
and markdowns. In order to focus on the implications of
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monopsony power in the labor market I will henceforth assume 
in this thesis that the goods market is perfectly competitive, 
i. e., 1/ti = o.
3.4 Monopsonistic Labor Markets in Search Equilibrium
Although the case of a pure monopsony employer has often 
been regarded as somewhat of a textbook curiosum, applicable 
only to isolated company towns, professional sports leagues 
and university faculties, the construction of models involving 
monopsony power has been an important line of research in 
labor market theory. (Boal and Ransom [1997] provide a recent 
comprehensive survey.) This is because a competitive market- 
clearing model has been unable to account for some important 
and commonly observed phenonema, (e.g., involuntary unemploy­
ment, sticky money wages, acyclical real wages, wage differen­
tials, etc.) As a consequence, many theorists have abandoned 
the frictionless Walrasian tatonnement paradigm in favor of an 
explicit analysis of out-of-equilibrium wage-setting and 
market adjustment processes (Lilien and Hall, [1986])9. This 
has produced a voluminous literature on the economics of 
search and disequilibrium dynamics in labor markets.
Q
Much of the impetus for this research was the search for microfoundations 
of Keynesian macroeconomics, which began in the 1970's, e. g., Phelps (1970).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
Two dominant characteristics of labor market search 
theory are: (a) an emphasis on matching workers to job
vacancies, implying that the relevant labor supply to a firm 
is the number of workers rather than hours, with individual 
labor supply assumed to be fixed; and (b) the assumption that 
firms set wages (or wage offers) which workers either take or 
reject. There is no presumption in this literature that the 
labor market operates like a competitive auction market. 
Monopsony power is implicit in most search theory models as a 
consequence of the assumption that firms make wage offers and 
workers are wage-takers. Arrow [1958] pointed out that, in 
the absence of an auctioneer, price-setting necessarily 
defaults to agents and price-setting by agents is the de facto 
exercise of market power10. Thus, it should not be surpris­
ing that monopsony power is implicit in most search models of 
the labor market. (E.g., Phelps [1968], Mortensen [1970], 
Lippman and McCall [1976 ], Pissarides [1976] and Baily
[1975], where monopsony power is explicitly recognized). 
However, the monopsony power of search theory occurs in a 
dynamic, out-of-equilibrium market-adjustment framework. An 
important question is whether the dynamic monopsony power in
Arrow's observation applies strictly where agents’ offer prices are 
oncontested and become the transaction price. This is seldom, if ever the case 
in oligopoly. In Bertrand duopoly, for example, there is a dynamic pricing 
sequence which leads to the competitive price as an equilibrium. Union wage 
bargaining involves bilateral monopoly, the outcome of which is generally 
indeterminate. These exceptions are not considered to be relevant to the 
aggregate U. S. labor market.
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search disequilibrium persists or vanishes when a state of 
equilibrium is attained.
Host macro models, including the model described in 
Chapters II and V, are highly aggregated general equilibrium 
models. There are several advantages to utilizing a static 
equilibrium framework in this investigation: (a) It is simpler 
to formulate and explain; this helps to highlight the essen­
tial differences between the monopsony model and other 
approaches; (b) Within the scope of this thesis, we are 
interested in examining the implications of monopsony power is 
the labor market for macroeconomic equilibrium outcomes; the 
models in Chapter II and V are static equilibrium models. 
Thus, the specification of monopsony power in those models 
needs to be an equilibrium one, since dynamics are not
specified. The question is, then, does the assumption of
monopsony power in an underlying disequilibrium search process 
imply the existence of monopsony power in equilibrium?
Appendix C contains a brief review of the relevant 
literature on this topic, specifically, the works of Mortensen 
(1970), Diamond (1971, 1982), Rothschild (1973), Baily (1975) 
and Pissarides (1976, 1988). The important conclusion from 
this review is that if wage-setting firms are governed by 
profit-maximizing behavior in disequilibrium trading, then in 
the absence of any countervailing market power the optimum
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wage path will converge to the monopsony wage in equilibrium. 
In general the long-run equilibrium or stationary state 
resulting from a dynamic monopsony search process retains a 
markdown and is not a competitive equilibrium (Baily (1975) , 
Diamond, (1982)). Thus, for profit-maximizing firms, monopso­
ny power in disequilibrium implies monopsony power in equilib­
rium —  the auctioneer is not rehired.
This conclusion provides some justification for the 
methodology employed in this and subsequent chapters, which 
assumes monopsony power in the labor market and utilizes a 
static equilibrium framework. There are also precedents for 
this approach in the literature; Okun (1981) and Chick (1983) , 
for example, feature the static monopsony labor market model 
in their respective interpretations of the economics of 
Keynes, while asserting that the underlying market adjustment 
process is a search process.
3.5 A Neoclassical Static Monopsony Model
This section explores the implications of a standard 
neoclassical model of the labor market for the elasticity of 
labor supply and the cyclicality of markdowns and the real
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wage. Here the analysis is conducted in a static partial 
equilibrium framework11. It is shown more formally that, 
while procyclical elasticity of labor supply is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for markdowns to be countercyclical, 
a stronger sufficiency condition is required for the real wage 
to be acyclical or procyclical. The most important finding in 
this section is that labor supply elasticity in the standard 
choice-theoretic monopsony model will always be countercycli­
cal when preferences are assumed to be convex and homothetic. 
This parallels the situation for monopoly, where homothetic 
preferences imply constant demand elasticities.
These results lead to the conclusion that representative 
agent models, which preserve homotheticity in aggregation, are 
incapable of explaining countercyclical markups or acyclical 
real wages in terms of procyclical elasticities of either 
goods demand or labor supoply. Thus, these anomalies cannot 
be explained by standard market models of imperfect competi­
tion that employ the representative agent method.
3.5.1 A Standard Model of Monopsony
The essential features of nondiscriminating monopsony 
are: (a) the firm faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve;
11In Chapter V the analysis will be conducted in a macroeconomic general 
equilibrium framework.
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(b) all workers are paid the same wage, and (c) profit maxim­
izing by the firm results in a monopsony wage that is less 
than labor*s marginal revenue product. The real wage and the 
equilibrium levels of employment and output are all less than 
would prevail under perfect competition. Labor receives less 
than its marginal revenue product, and the difference is 
appropriated by the firm as monopsony rents.
A firm maximizes profits when it hires labor services up 
to the point where the marginal product of labor equals its 
marginal cost. A monopsonist firm faces an upward sloping 
labor supply curve and must raise its wage offers in order to 
attract additional job applicants. It is assumed that the 
firm knows the labor supply curve £s(w), and sets the wage to 
maximize the following profit function:
it(w) = F(£,k) - w£8 (w) - rk (3.4)
where F(£,k) is assumed to be a linearly homogeneous quasi­
concave production function; t represents a flow of labor 
services; k represents the capital stock, which is assumed to 
be fixed in the short run over the business cycle; w = W/P 
is the real wage; and r is the rental cost of capital. The
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first-order condition for profit maximization equates the 
marginal revenue product of labor with its marginal cost12:
PFje = W[l + l/e] (3.5)
Here, e is the real wage elasticity of a static labor supply 
curve, defined as
e = (dle/Ze)/(d w/w) (3.6)
If the monopsonist firm does not discriminate when it 
raises its wage offer, it must offer the higher wage level to 
all of its employees and the marginal cost of hiring an 
additional worker is the nominal wage W plus the monopsony 
markdown W/e which represents the infra-marginal cost13. 
(Note: Equation 3.6 is a rearrangement of the markdown
equation 3.3.) It will be convenient to work with equation
3.6 in real terms:
Fz = w[l + l/e] (3.7)
12The firm chooses W (for a given P) and accepts the supply of labor at 
that wage. Since the locus of profit-maximizing employment is on the labor supply 
curve, this is equivalent to choosing the profit-maximizing level of employment. 
The quasi-concavity of F(£, k) guarantees the second-order conditions for a 
maximum.
13The possibility of discriminating monopsony is excluded here. One way to 
justify this is to assume that discrimination among identical workers would lower 
productivity and induce quits. The monopsonist incurs an opportunity cost of 
foregone producer surplus for choosing not to discriminate.
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w = ([1 + l/e]_1)Fjg = EF£ (3.8)
Equation 3.7 shows that with monopsony the equilibrium real 
wage is less than the marginal product of labor by the amount 
of the markdown, w/e£w. The markdown factor is:
E(e) = [1 + l/e]"1 , 0 < E < 1 (3.9)
Following Lerner [1934], l/e is a measure of the firm's 
monopsony power over the real wage; higher elasticity of labor 
supply implies lower monopsony power (i. e., a smaller
markdown) , and conversely. The limiting case of a perfectly 
elastic labor supply curve corresponds to perfect competition 
where both firms and workers are wage-takers. The markdown
factor E can be interpreted as an index of labor market
competitiveness, since E * 1 as l/e ~ 0, and E • 0 as l/e -* «. 
Under pure monopsony, employment, output and the real wage are 
less than if the firm were a perfectly discriminating monopso­
nist or if the labor market were perfectly competitive. 
Figure 3-1 shows these relationships, along with the amount of 
the monopsony markdown w/e.
It is evident from Equation 3.9 that countercyclical 
markdowns under profit maximizing monopsony imply procyclical
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Figure 3-1. Monopsony Power in the Labor Market
- r ?
Figure 3—2. Countercyclical Monopsony Power
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elasticity of labor supply e; in the monopsony model they cure 
logically equivalent. However, I show in the next section 
that the procyclical requirement on e is stronger for acyc­
lical or procyclical real wages than for countercyclical 
markdowns.
3.5.2 Endogenous Elasticity of Labor Su p p Iv
In order to have cyclical changes in output and employ­
ment, there must be some mechanism which shifts either the 
aggregate marginal product curve or the aggregate marginal 
labor cost curve (or both) to a new equilibrium point in real 
terms14. Two possible mechanisms have been treated exten­
sively in the business cycle literature: (l) the marginal
product of labor curve shifts against a stationary labor 
supply curve, because of exogenous productivity shocks to 
technology F(£,k) (the Real Business Cycle (RBC) mechanism) ; 
or (2 ) the labor supply curve shifts against a stationary 
marginal product curve, due (for example) to workers’ monetary 
misperceptions of the real wage or perceived changes in real 
wealth (the Traditional Keynesian mechanism) . Here, I will 
make use of the framework established in Chapter II, and 
assume a Keynesian shift of the labor supply curve due a 
wealth effect. (The specific source of labor supply shifts is
14Unless otherwise stated, only equilibrium trading will be assumed in this
thesis.
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not important here; the immediate purpose is to focus on the 
cyclical behavior of e. However, throughout this chapter and 
subsequently the analysis is confined to models in which only 
the labor supply curve shifts).
For the purpose of exposition I will assume a labor 
supply curve that is monotonically increasing with w, so that 
l/€jgw = eW£f elasticity of the real wage with respect to
employment which is a function of I, and E = [1 + eWje)-1*
Now assume a non-neutral one-time increase in the nominal 
money stock (as described in Chapter II) which decreases real 
nonlabor income through a negative effect on wealth, which in 
turn causes the labor supply curve to shift out so that 
employment and output increase15. (A more complete analysis 
of this mechanism in macroeconomic general equilibrium is 
presented in Chapter II) . With employment increasing, the 
elasticity of the profit-maximizing real wage with respect to 
employment is given by applying the elasticity operator to 
Equation 3.8.
«i[w*] = **[E] + «i[Ff] (3.10)
(?) (-)
In the wealth effects macro-model of Chapter II, an open-market purchase 
of government bonds increases W and P nonproportionally and decreases the value 
of real wealth Q from which nonlabor income is derived. The net effect in the 
model is an increase in employment and output. To quote Hall [1980], "Changes 
in the money stock unambiguously shift the labor supply function."
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Equation (3.10) follows from the elasticity of the product EF2 
in equation (3.8). For the elasticity of the equilibrium real 
wage with respect to employment to be non-negative, the sum of 
the elasticities of E and F£ must be non-negative. A neces­
sary condition for the monopsony real wage to be procyclical 
is for S]g[E] > 0. Since E = [1 + l/€£w]_1, the wage elasticity 
of labor supply e£w must increase as employment and output 
increase. However, this is only a necessary condition; A 
sufficient condition for the optimum real wage to be either 
acyclical or procyclical is for (3.10) to be non-negative,
i. e.:
> o (3.ii)
It can be shown that:
«i[E] = (3.11)
i + e£w
so that the elsticity of e£w must be procyclical and large 
enough to satisfy the inequality in Equation 3.11. Thus, 
procyclical elasticity alone is sufficient for markdowns to be 
countercyclical, as indicated by Equations 3.3 and 3.9, but 
for the real wage to be either acyclical or procyclical the 
stronger inequality condition in (3.11) must be satisfied, due 
to the assumed negative elasticity of the marginal product of 
labor. Thus, even if e£w is procyclical, the real wage could 
be countercyclical, acyclical or procyclical depending on the 
magnitude of the elasticity of e2vr Of course, as long as e£w
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is procyclical, w will be less countercyclical than if e2w 
were constant or decreasing. Real wages are more likely to be 
procylical if the marginal product of labor F2 is inelastic 
and e£w. is procyclical and highly elastic with respect to 
employment16.
The conclusions from this analysis, for the Traditional 
Keynesian setup, are:
1. Under static equilibrium monopsony, a necessary
condition for real wages to be procyclical and for 
markdowns to be countercyclical is for the elasticity 
of labor supply to depend on factors that shift the 
labor supply locus, i. e., it must be endogenous 
to the driving forces of the business cycle.
2. Procyclical elasticity of labor supply is a sufficient 
condition for markdowns to be countercylical, but only 
a necessary condition for real wages to be acyclical or 
procyclical.
For a monopsonies the inverse of the marginal product of labor curve is 
not a labor demand curve. The firm's demand for labor is determined by the 
equality of marginal product and marginal labor cost, and depends on e,u. Also, 
it should be clear from the preceding discussion that the reduced-form elasticity 
of w in (3.11) represents the response of e to a shift of the labor supply 
curve, and is not the same as the change in e£w along a stationary labor supply 
curve.
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3. A sufficient condition for real wages to be either 
acyclical or procyclical is that [ e ], the elasticity
of the elasticity of labor supply, be positive and 
large enough in magnitude so that
(* ^ V )  *  l * i w l  ( 3 - 1 2 )
This is a necessary and sufficient condition for the real wage 
to overcome the "tyranny of the labor demand curve."
3.5.3 Elasticity of Labor Su p pIv in the Standard Model
In Appendix C, Section C2, I show that in the standard 
monopsony model with homothetic preferences, the elasticity of 
labor supply e is always countercyclical. implying that the 
standard monopsony model presented here is inconsistent with 
countercyclical markdowns or acyclical real wages. The cause 
of this inconsistency is the assumption of homotheticity.
In the standard labor-market model, labor supply is a 
function of the real wage and nonlabor income: £8 = lB(w, v) . 
This means that the elaticity of labor supply is also a 
function of w and v, with de/dw < 0, de/dv > 0. When homo­
thetic preferences are specified in the standard monopsony 
model, e increases with real nonlabor income v. What does 
this imply for the cyclicality of e? The only shift variable
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for* the labor supply function in this model is real nonlabor 
income v, which may be regarded as being derived from property 
or wealth. Since d£s/5v < 0, a decline in v will cause the 
labor supply curve to shift out, increasing the level of 
employment and output in monopsony equilibrium. But since 
8 e/8v  > 0, e will decrease and thus be countercyclical. As 
the labor supply curve shifts out and the economy expands, 
monopsony power 1/e will increase, the markdown will be 
procyclical and the real wage will be more countercyclical 
than it would be in a perfectly competitive labor market. 
Thus, the implications of the standard monopsony model with 
homothetic preferences are inconsistent with the stylized 
facts of countercyclical markdowns and acvclical real wages. 
In this respect the standard monopsony model is even more 
counter factual than a perfectly competitive model of the labor 
market.
The reason why this standard setup is counterfactual, 
with or without monopsony power, is the assumption of homo­
thetic preferences U(c,£) which determines the algebraic sign 
of the change in the elasticity of the demand for leisure, x\g 
in Equation C2.8, reproduced below:
%  dv
dld J > 0  (3.13)
(!-**) (l-£rf) (l-£d)
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(In Equation 3.13r I represents leisure and £d represents the 
demand for leisure, in keeping with the notation in Appendix 
C and Equation C2.8) With homothetic preferences, 3tije/8v = 0, 
and from Equation 3.13, 3e/dv > 0. In order for 8e/3v to be 
negative, di\£/dv would have to be positive and large enough to 
offset the positive influence of the second term (an elastici­
ty condition corresponding to Equation (3.11)); but if this 
were the case, individual preferences would not be homoth­
etic17.
This result by itself does not constitute an adequate 
basis for rejecting the neoclassical model of individual labor 
supply or the standard monopsony model at the level of the 
firm. The evidence on markups and real wages refers in most 
instances to highly aggregated data, and may be irrelevant for 
many purposes of microeconomic analysis18. The implications 
for aggregate models of the labor market are more serious, and 
are addressed in the next subsection.
17Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) also make this point for the elasticity of 
product demand. Their econometric tests rejected homothetic models of demand.
18There is some evidence that real wages are more procyclical at lower 
levels of aggregation, and that aggregation introduces a countercyclical bias in 
measurements of the real wage. (See Chapter I). Such evidence is not favorable 
to models which employ the representative agent.
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In macroeconomic modeling it is common practice to 
assume a "representative agent" whose behavior is described by 
demand and supply functions which are implicitly assumed to be 
an. exact linear aggregation of corresponding individual 
demands and supplies, i. e ., an aggregate labor supply curve 
is posited as:
Ls(w, v) = Z ^ C w ,  vL) (3.14)
where L8 and Is are assumed to have the same homogeneous 
functional form. When exact linear aggregation is applicable, 
it preserves a one-to-one correspondence between the function­
al forms at the macro and micro levels, thereby rationalizing 
the idea of "microfoundations" for macroeconomics.
Notwithstanding the intuitive appeal of (3.13) as an 
"adding up" method, it is mathematically consistent only for 
the quasi-homothetic class of indirect utility functions which 
have the Gorman polar form (Deaton and Muellbauer, [1980, Sec. 
6.3]):
U(W, P, Yl) = ai(W,P) + b(W,P)Yi (3.14)
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Where YL is total income or expenditure. For exact linear 
aggregation of (3.14), and YL can vary among individuals, 
but b(W,P) cannot. When at = 0, preferences are homothetic. 
The corresponding demand for leisure, which can be derived 
using Roy's identity, can be written in the following form:
fd(W, P, Yl) = ^(W,?) + P(W,P)Yi (3.15)
In Equation 3.15, ai(W,P) is a minimum leisure requirement 
that can vary among workers, P(W,P) is the marginal propensity 
to consume leisure out of total income, which must the same
for all workers, and Yj^ = WT + is the total income endow­
ment. Leisure is a normal good and therefore 0 > 0. Since
leisure and consumption are the only two commodities they must 
be gross substitutes, and therefore [3ai/8W + 5P/3W) < 0.
It is apparent that demands must be linear in total 
income Y^ with the same coefficient P(W,P),i. e., all workers 
must have linear Engel curves for leisure with the same slope 
P,  but possibly different intercepts c^ . When preferences are 
homothetic, = 0 for all workers, Engel curves are identical 
rays through the origin, the income-elasticity of leisure 
demand is unity, and the wage-elasticity of leisure demand is 
the elasticity of P(W,P) which is independent of the distribu-
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'tion of worker endowments19. When preferences are quasi-homo- 
thetic, only aggregate or per capita endowments of nonlabor 
income and time matter for aggregate demand.
The labor supply function corresponding to equation 
(3.15) is:
es(W, P, Yl) = T - at(W,P) - P(W,P)Y± (3.16)
The individual labor supply function derived from the 
solution to the consumer's problem will have this form if and 
only if the consumer preferences represented by U(c,I) are 
quasi-homothetic20. In other words, for exact linear aggreg­
ation (and thus the representative agent) to be valid, the 
functional forms in Equations (3.15) and (3.16) are required 
at the micro-level; that functional form is a solution to the 
consumers' problem if and only if the individual's budget 
constraint is linear and continuous and preferences are 
quasi-homothetic, as in Equation (3.14).
19Deaton (1992) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1987) emphasize that linear 
Bngel curves, which are implied by the homotheticity requirement of the 
representative agent method, have been consistently rejected in empirical 
studies.
20The class of quasi-homothetic utility functions include Cobb-Douglas, 
with Sf * 0, Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) with a{ equal to a 
positive constant, and the Stone-Geary Linear Expenditure System (LES) with 
Sf constant and minimum demand quantities cQ, iQ that are positive.
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If the time endowment T is the same for all workers, 
linear aggregation of the labor supply function in (3.16) will 
reproduce the same form with average endowments Y and a(W,P) 
in place of Y£ and (P) , respectively, and the same value for 
P. The elasticity of individual labor supply for this 
functional form is:
where Yt = WT + VL. At the micro level, individual elastici­
ties at a given wage W depend on individual endowments and 
a^P), and therefore may vary among individuals. Under exact 
linear aggregation the elasticity of aggregate labor supply 
will have the same functional form as Equation (3.17), with Y 
and a(W,P) replacing Y£ and aL. (Because elasticity is a 
logarithmic measure, there is no linear aggregative relation­
ship between individual and aggregate elasticities) .
The cyclicality of e for the quasi-homothetic class of 
labor supply functions can be determined by differentiating 
Equation (3.17) with respect to Y, the income or scale 
variable:
(3.17)
[oti + | i -  2*]
(3.18)
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Since 5(J/3W < 0 and (da/dVl + 3P/3W) <0, it follows that de/dY 
> 0. Since Y = WT + V where V is nonlabor income, it also 
follows that de/dV will be positive in both the aggregate and 
disaggregated versions of Equation (3.17), and from the 
derivation and accompanying discussion in Appendix C, the 
elasticity of labor supply in the aggregate model will be 
countercyclical, not procyclical, whenever representative 
agent aggregation is valid. The assumption of monopsony power 
in a Keynesian model with representative agent aggregation of 
the labor market will result in countercyclical real wages and 
procyclical markdowns, both of which are counter factual.
3.6 Conclusions
The main conclusion of this chapter is that the assump­
tion of monopsony power in a Keynesian labor market does not, 
by itself, lead to an explanation of countercyclical markdowns 
or acyclical aggregate real wages when the representative 
agent method of aggregation is employed21. The representa­
tive agent method is valid only if preferences are quasi- 
homothetic. If preferences are assumed to be quasi-homothet­
ic, then the elasticity of labor supply of the representative 
worker will be countercyclical (as it is for each individual 
worker) , and this implies procyclical markdowns and an
21This conclusion holds in the absence of positive exogenous shocks to the 
marginal product of labor, and applies also to the possibility of explaining 
these two anomalies in terms of procyclical elasticity of goods demand.
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aggregate real wage that is more countercyclical than it would 
be under perfect competition.
Alternatively, if preferences are assumed to be not 
quasi-homothetic, then nonlinear aggregation does not preserve 
functional forms derived at the micro level, and the logical 
basis for microfoundations is compromised. This would be 
counter to the macroeconomic research program of the past two 
decades22.
This chapter has revealed that the assumptions which 
underlie the representative method of aggregation preclude an 
explanation of the real wage and markup anomalies in terms of 
cyclical elasticities of labor supply or goods demand. If the 
elasticities of aggregate goods demand and aggregate labor 
supply have any economic significance, the empirical record on 
markups and real wage behavior suggests that perhaps the real 
aggregate economy is not that homothetic. Therefore, the next 
chapter of this thesis departs somewhat from representative 
agent aggregation in the labor market, and explores the 
implications of monopsony power when labor is heterogeneous 
and the distribution of agent characteristics matters.
22It should be noted that the representative agent (homotheticity) 
assumption is ubiquitous in macroeconomic theory, and is implicit in all attempts 
to extrapolate theories of the individual consumer and the firm to higher levels 
of aggregation.
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CHAPTER IV
AN AGGREGATE LABOR SUPPLY FUNCTION FOR HETEROGENEOUS LABOR
4.1 Introduction and Overview
In the flexible-price macro model of Chapter II, a one­
time increase in the money stock raised the price level, 
lowered the interest rate, and reduced the real value of 
aggregate wealth. Since the aggregate labor supply function 
in the model of Chapter II was based on a representative 
agent, only the mean or per capita real wealth effect mattered 
for labor supply1. In Chapter III it was shown that when a 
representative agent is assumed for aggregate labor supply, an 
increase in labor supply due to an aggregate wealth affect 
will always be accompanied by a decreasing or countercyclical 
wage-elasticity of labor supply. The implication for
monopsonistic labor markets is that the real wage would be 
more countercyclical (and therefore more counterfactual) than 
under perfect competition. The principal conclusion of 
Chapter III was that the representative agent assumption 
precludes an explanation of countercyclical markups and 
procyclical real wages in terms of procyclical elasticity of 
aggregate labor supply.
1In the representative agent model of Chapter II the aggregate or mean- 
level wealth effect is sufficient to shift the aggregate labor supply curve and 
make the connection between a change in the money stock and real output. However, 
the real wage in that model is countercyclical.
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In this Chapter I show that, by moving away from the 
representative agent framework for labor supply and allowing 
for worker heterogeneity and distribution effects, it is 
possible to construct an aggregate labor supply function that 
exhibits procyclical elasticity, which was shown in Chapter 
III to be a necessary condition for real wages to be acyclical 
and a sufficient condition for markups to be countercyclical 
When labor markets are monopsonistic. This is accomplished in 
a standard decision-theoretic framework with the additional 
requirement that preferences are nonhomothetic. The resulting 
aggregate labor supply function has the potential, when 
imbedded in a general equilibrium framework, of predicting 
cyclical behavior of markups and the real wage that is more 
consistent with the stylized facts.
The spirit of this investigation is squarely within the 
New Keynesian literature, in that it explores the implications 
of imperfect competition in the labor market for the money- 
output connection and the behavior of real wages. It differs 
in that it does not utilize the representative agent method of 
aggregation for labor supply, a feature that is common to both 
the New Keynesian and Real Business Cycle literatures. Conse­
quently, the marginal responses of individual workers are not 
restricted by the homotheticity assumption, and the distribu­
tion of workers' marginal responses matters.
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Individual labor supply is assumed to be constrained by 
a fixed work week and workers are assumed to be heterogeneous 
with respect to their nonlabor income endowments and their 
preferences for risk. This heterogeneity gives rise to a 
distribution of reservation wages which provides the link 
between individual and aggregate labor supply.
A key assumption is that nonlabor income is derived 
primarily from holdings of financial assets, augmented on the 
low end by transfer payments. Therefore, the distribution of 
nonlabor income, and consequently of reservation wages, is 
proportional to the size distribution of real wealth holdings 
in the workforce, which is assumed to be Lognormal2. The 
aggregate labor supply function takes on the properties of the 
size distribution of financial wealth in the workforce.
I show that if workers have nonhomothetic preferences 
with increasing relative risk aversion then the elasticity of 
the reservation wage function will be an increasing function 
of real nonlabor income; if real nonlabor income declines for 
all workers, the elasticity of the reservation wage function 
will decrease, implying (i) aggregate labor supply will 
increase at all wages, and (ii) the elasticity of labor supply 
will increase. Thus, the real wage-elasticity of labor supply
2
There is theoretical and empirical support for the lognormal assumption 
in the literature, e. g., Sargan (1957), Atkinson (1975), Pestieau and Possen 
(1979) and Vaughn (1988).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
will be procyclical. This result: requires only the assumption 
of increasing relative risk aversion, and is independent of 
the functional form assumed for the distribution of wealth.
I also show that if nonlabor income is assumed to be distrib­
uted Lognormal, the point elasticity of the distribution is 
inversely related to the inequality of the distribution of 
nonlabor income in the labor force, measured by the variance 
of the logarithm. A decrease in the inequality of the 
distribution of nonlabor income will cause the elasticity of 
the distribution to increase over a central range of reserva­
tion wages which includes the mean. This result is specific 
to the Lognormal distribution.
I also show that if workers have increasing relative risk 
aversion for wealth, they will rebalance their financial-asset 
portfolios in response to an open-market purchase of bonds by 
the central bank in a heterogeneous manner. Wealthier workers 
with higher relative risk aversion will reduce their bond 
holdings and income disproportionally, and will absorb a 
disproportionate amount of the additional money created by the 
banking systemn. This will reduce the dispersion of the 
distribution of income from bonds in the workforce, which will 
cause the elasticity of the labor supply function to increase 
as it shifts out. An open market sale of bonds would produce 
the opposite result.
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Computations with a calibrated version of the model 
produce large positive (i. e., procyclical) labor supply 
elasticities for aggregate wages corresponding to labor-force 
participation rates of 40% to 78%. This range includes the 
current U. S. labor-force participation rate of 66% at the 
calibrated mean reservation wage. Sensitivity tests indicate 
that the model is fairly robust against variations in its key 
parameters. The model is critically dependent on its two 
principal assumptions: nonhomothetic preferences with increas­
ing relative risk aversion; and Lognormal distributions of 
wealth and nonlabor income in the work force.
This chapter makes a theoretical connection between 
monetary policy actions and aggregate labor supply by modeling 
the effects of open market operations on the distribution of 
wealth and nonlabor income. Open market operations shift 
the aggregate labor supply curve and change its elasticity 
procyclically over a relevant range of reservation wages. 
This "monetary theory" of aggregate labor supply, together 
with the assumption of monopsony power in labor markets, 
provides a theoretical basis for countercyclical markups and 
acyclical or procyclical real wages within an otherwise 
Traditional Keynesian setup, and may serve to restore some 
respectability to that class of models.
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The Chapter is organized as follows: The static monopsony 
model with heterogeneous labor supply is formally specified 
and developed in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 the theoretical 
and empirical relevance of the Lognormal distribution to this 
problem is discussed, and the mathematical properties of the 
distribution are described. Section 4.4, supplemented by 
Appendix D, contains the principal analytical result of the 
chapter, which is the construction of an aggregate labor 
supply function, the elasticity of which depends on monetary 
policy actions. Section 4.5 describes the calibration of the 
model to the U. S. economy, and the computational procedures. 
Computational results are presented in Table 4-4 and Exhibits 
4-1 through 4-15 at the end of Section 4.5, and are the basis 
of the claims made for the model. Section 4.6 presents some 
conclusions that may be drawn from the research described in 
this chapter.
4.2 Heterogeneous Labor Supply
In this section I develop an aggregate labor supply 
function for a workforce that is heterogeneous with respect to 
nonlabor income. The approach taken preserves the principle 
of individual utility maximization, while allowing aggregate 
labor supply to be determined by the distribution of wealth in 
the workforce. The aggregate supply function thus derived is
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a monotonic transformation of the distribution of wealth in 
the workforce.
4.2.1 Heterogeneous Workers
I will investigate the implications of two possible 
sources of heterogeneity in individual labor supply: (1)
increasing relative risk aversion with respect to nonlabor 
income, and (2 ) a distribution of reservation wages based on 
heterogeneous nonlabor income endowments.
Increasing relative risk aversion is a departure from 
homotheticity that has some theoretical and empirical support 
in the literature (Arrow, 1970). However, it has the distinct 
disadvantage of excluding most of the standard utility funct­
ions used in economic theory, and requires some form of non­
linear aggregation for both leisure and consumption. In an 
attempt to preserve a role for standard assumptions about 
preferences, I will also examine the case where preferences 
sure identical and homothetic, but workers differ in their 
nonlabor income endowments and therefore in their reservation 
wages. The advantage of focusing on nonlabor income as the 
heterogeneous parameter is that it is potentially measurable, 
it has a plausible connection to macroeconomic variables, and 
it already plays a role in the standard labor-market model.
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4.2.2 Indivisible Labor
The first assumption will be to equate hours with workers 
by assuming that labor services can be traded only in fixed 
quantities of h hours per period. Thus, the labor supply 
schedule to a firm, an industry and the economy will be 
measured by the number of workers who choose to work h hours 
at the prevailing wage.
There is considerable support in the macroeconomic 
literature for this approach to modeling aggregate labor 
supply. First, macroeconomic theory and policy have been 
more concerned with changes in the number of persons employed 
and unemployed than in total hours or changes in the length of 
the work week. Many specifications of the aggregate labor 
market in theoretical models make no important distinction 
between the number of workers and hours per worker. Second, 
although there are small adjustments in the length of the work 
week in the manufacturing sector, it is well established that 
most of the quarterly and annual variation in aggregate man- 
hours comes through fluctuations in the number of workers 
employed rather than in hours per worker. Some evidence for 
this claim is presented in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 below, which are 
taken from Heckman (1984) and based on Coleman (1984) . To 
quote Heckman from the original:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126
Table 4-1
Fluctuations in  Total Hours, Hours per Worker, and 
Ntmfaer of G*»loyees 1970-1979 

















































<70+71+74+75)/2 -6.05 -0.98 -5.08
Source: Table 103, BLS Handbook of Labor S ta tis tics , Bulletin 2070.
Taken from Heckman (1984) and Coleman (1984)
Table 4-1 
By Industry
Average Percentage Point Deviation from Trend for the Two 
Contractions of the 1970's, 1970-1971 and 1974-1975
Total Hours Per No. of
Hours Worker Emolovees
Private Business -6.1 -1.0 -5.1
Total Nan-Agricultural -5.2 -1.0 -4.2
Mining -2.9 -1.2 -1 .6
Construction -11.2 -0.3 -11.0
Manufacturing 11.4 -2.0 -9.5
Transportation and 
Public U t i l i t ie s -5.1 -1.3 -3.9
Wholesale and Retail Trade -2.9 -0.04
Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate -2.5 0.2 -2 .7
Services -2.5 -0 .6
Source: Tables 103 and 72, BLS Handbook of Labor S ta tis tics , Bulletin 2070
Business S ta tis tics , 1979. Taken from Heckman (1984) and Coleman (1984).
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...any serious empirical model of business-cycle labor market: 
fluctuations must account for manhour variations at the exten­
sive margin (employment or labor-force entry decisions) as well 
as manhour variations at the intensive margin .... The * repre­
sentative consumer' always works, and so an interior solution 
labor supply theory is invoked to account for the facts. Tables 
1 and 2 reveal how poorly a representative consumer model des­
cribes the facts. As Coleman (1984) stresses, the data do not 
support a representative consumer model... As long as represent­
ative consumer models are used, micro evidence cannot be used to 
"calibrate'' macro models.
The analysis of Chapter III is consistent with Heckman's 
comments, in that it was demonstrated that the representative 
agent construction precludes a model from exhibiting acyclical 
real wages.
Other labor economists seem to concur with Heckman. 
Knieser and Goldsmith (1987), in their survey article on 
models of the aggregate labor market, report aggregate elast­
icities based on annual data for the entire postwar period 
1948-1985, and conclude that:
...the elasticity of aggregate employment with respect to real 
GNP [.44] is over twice the elasticity of the average workweek 
with respect to real GNP [.20]. Thus, cyclic movements in labor 
utilization appear to be dominated by changes in the number of 
workers with jobs rather than characterized by short hours or 
worksharing arrangements... Any satisfactory model of the 
aggregate labor market must be consistent with these empirical
regularities..... In order to shed light on aggregate movements
in employment, micro-economic reseeurch must account for changes 
in labor force participation rather than variations in hours 
of work of the continuously employed individual.
[Italics added]
Pencavel (1986, p. 83), also citing Coleman, concludes that:
...the larger part of the movement in aggregate manhours over 
the business cycle is attributable to movements in the number of 
workers employed and not to movements in the hours worked of 
those continuously employed.
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Lilien and Hall (1986) arrive at the same conclusion
based on their analysis of annual U.S. data on per capita
hours from 1956 - 1983, which updates and confirms Heckman's
conclusion from BLS data. Finally, Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980, Ch. 11, pp. 283-290) discuss the implications of
quantity rationing in the labor market, and conclude that:
...for short-run analysis there are many types of jobs in which 
it is more realistic to take hours as given or at any rate set 
by employers. To some extent this is true even in jobs where 
overtime at a higher wage rate is common.
There also is precedent in the macroeconomic literature 
for treating labor supply as discrete and indivisible, (e.g., 
Sherman and Willett [1972]; Branson [1989], p. 123; Hall and 
Taylor [1983] pp. 452-455). Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988) 
and Rogerson and Wright (1988) have developed models with 
"indivisible labor", where it is assumed that each worker is 
endowed with the same fixed unit of labor per time period.
Treating aggregate labor supply as a flow of workers 
providing fixed quantities of labor is also consistent with 
the search models of labor market adjustment which are assumed 
to underlie the static equilibrium framework. Thus, the 
assumption that individual labor hours are traded only in 
fixed quantities has considerable precedent in the business 
cycle literature. With fixed individual labor supply the 
operative labor supply decision of the consumer is whether to 
work at the extensive margin; utility maximization still
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applies, but with a highly constrained opportunity set. 
Aggregation of labor supply will be over workers at their 
extensive margins of labor-force participation3
4.2.3 Behavioral Asstimptions About the Labor Market
I will assume that the labor services of individual 
workers are purchased only in discrete units of h hours per 
worker per time period, due to technological or institutional 
quantity constraints, and will abstract from variations in 
hours per worker and perturbations in h. Thus, this assump­
tion is taken merely as an institutional datum4.
I also assume a large population of potential labor-force 
participants who have identical tastes for non-negative
The approach here differs somewhat from that of Rogerson and Hanson 
(1988), who assumed that individual preferences for leisure are discrete and 
therefore nonconvex. Instead, I assume that preferences are convex but are 
quantity-constrained, resulting in a discrete, nonconvex opportunity set for the 
individual worker. The nonconvexity will be overcome in aggregation by assuming 
a continuous distribution of reservation wages over workers.
&
There is some variation in h by industry and occupation, and one could 
extend the model by assuming a finite set {h-} and working with an aggregate 
average h. This complication will be avoided here. Also, no presumption is made 
here that the institutional datum h is Pareto optimal, or anything other than an 
accepted norm of implicit labor contracts given by history and the institutional 
setting. The origins, history and political economy of the 8-hour workday and 
the 40-hour workweek in the U. S. and England have been researched by Dankert, 
Mann and Northrup [1965]; Langenfelt [1974], Cross [1988, 1989], Hinrichs, Roche 
and Sirianni [1991], all of whom emphasize the important roles of religious and 
cultural norms and the political influence of organized labor. The standard 40- 
hour workweek in U. S. manufacturing has not changed significantly since 1946, 
and there appears to be no strong movement underway to reduce it. (Owen [1989]). 
It appears to be in long-run equilibrium.
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quantities of a composite consumption good c and nonmarket 
(leisure) time I which can be completely represented by a 
concave subutility function U(c,£) with the standard proper­
ties that Uc > o, Ujg > 0, Ucc < 0 and U££ < 0.
In addition, I assume that each worker has tastes and
preferences for holding a portfolio of endowed wealth n as a 
store of value, disaggregated in the form of real money
balances m = M/P and earning assets f = F/P (where m + f = fl) ,
and that those preferences can be represented by a concave 
subutility function H(m, f) which possesses the same proper­
ties as U. Earning assets provide utility by earning a return 
in the form of income, and appreciation which is not certain. 
Thus, earning assets are risky. Money balances provide 
utility by facilitating transactions and providing a risk-free 
store of value compared to earning assets.
Each worker has choices to make regarding c, £, m and f. 
I will assume that workers have identical preferences over 
c,£,m and f which are weakly separable, i. e. ,
?(c,e, m, f) = Y[ U(c,£), H(m, f) ]
This will enable the analysis of optimum choices to be carried 
out in separate stages, wherein U and H are optimized indepen­
dently subject to their own constraint sets. That being the
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case, X will defer discussion of the workers' portfolio 
balancing problem until later in the chapter (Section 4.4 and 
Appendix D, Section 7) where it will play a major role. In 
order to concentrate on the labor market at this stage, I will 
assume that each worker's portfolio balance problem has been 
pre-solved, and each worker holds an amount of endowed wealth 
fli = aini + (l_ai)nir where a£ is the fraction of wealth held 
in earning assets. This results in each worker receiving 
portfolio income from the yield on earning assets: yL = rf£
= airfii. This, together with transfer payments ti from the 
government, constitutes a worker's source of nonlabor income
vi * Yi. + ti..
In the most general case, n L, ai and tif and consequently 
vir are all different for each worker. Thus I assume that 
workers have identical convex indifference maps but differ in 
their wealth endowments and nonlabor income. I also assume 
that the number of workers is sufficiently large and compact 
that the distribution of nonlabor income among the worker 
population can be well described by a cumulative distribution 
function $(v) that is continuous and twice differentiable.
4.2.4 Individual Labor S u p p I v  Subject to Quantity Constraints
This section contains a more formal specification of 
individual labor supply subject to quantity constraints.
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The approach to specifying the labor market follows Killings- 
worth (1983), Rogerson (1988) and Branson (1989) .
With the imposed quantity constraint, I can be either 0
or 1-h, but not both. The consumer's problem becomes, with 
the additional quantity constraints:
Max U(c,£), subject to the constraints 
c ,1 (4.1)
c < + w(l-£)
and £ = 1
or t = 1 - h
where w = W/P is the real wage, and 1 is the maximum time 
available in the time period. Because of the discrete labor 
hours constraint, the constraint set of (4.1) is not convex 
and therefore the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a constrained 
maximum are not applicable5. In general the marginal rate of 
substitution between c and I will be different from the real 
wage w at both corner points, and will not be a guide to which 
point has the higher level of utility. (See Figure 4-1) .
For a worker with nonlabor income vL who is offered a 
real wage w to work exactly h hours, the choice is between 
only two points on his budget line cL = vt + w(l-£) : choose
between work and leisure based on the highest total (direct)
®The sets {c, 1-h} and {c, 1} are disjoint, i. e. {c, l-h>n{c, 1} = 0, 
and therefore {c, l-h}u{c, 1} cannot be a convex set.
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utility between U(vi, i) and U(V£ + wh, l-h) . For a given h, 
each worker's choice will depend on the values of w and vL. 
The offered wage at which a worker is just indifferent between 
working h hours or not at all is called his reservation wage. 
t»L, and is formally defined by the identity :
Vl(y,q, h) = U0(vir 1) - Uj^Vi + ©jh, l-h) s o (4.2)
Equation (4.2) expresses the worker's indifference at the 
reservation wage. U0 is the section of the utility surface 
along t = 1, and is the section along t = l-h. (See Figure
4-1).
It is assumed that monopsony firms set the wage w that is 
offered to all workers, including the marginally unemployed 
workers. (See Chapter III for a discussion of the monopsony 
assumption and its motivation.) The worker's binary choice 
between work and nonwork can be reduced to a reservation wage 
rule:6
0 , w < ©
hL = (4.3)
h, w > ©
The reservation wage © will be a monotonic increasing function 
of v, f(v) , the properties of which can be derived from (4.2)
6Thls follows 'the development in Killingsworth [1983]
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via the implicit function theorem7. (The derivation is in 
Appendix D) . Thus, values of v, w = i|r(v) , w and h completely 
parameterize the individual worker's constrained decision.
Figure 4-1 illustrates the binary choice confronting an 
individual worker whose labor supply is constrained to a fixed 
number of hours h. Each worker will be on an indifference 
curve corresponding to their nonlabor income. v0, vlr v2, 
etc., and each worker has a reservation wage = ijr(vi) at 
which they are just indifferent between working h hours at 
that wage or not working and receiving only their nonlabor 
income vL. The opportunity set of a worker with nonlabor 
income endowment v^ is constrained to the two sets of points 
{(vir 1) ; (v± + wh, l-h)}, w > 0, and thus the only relevant 
portions of the indifference map are along the separate vert­
ical lines defined by I = 1 and I = l-h. In general, a 
worker's indifference curve will not be tangent to the offer- 
wage budget line at points such as A0, Ax, etc. along the 
hours constraint line in Figure 4.1, and the worker's marginal 
rate of substitution at these points will not equal the 
reservation wage.
7
The theorem is applicable here due to the assumptions about U(c,£), which 
also guarantee that t(v> will be monotonic. See Appendix D, Section Dl.




F ix£D M o o r s  
CoMSTRtiiHT
Figure 4-1. Constrained Labor-Leisure Choice
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Although a worker's choice to accept work at or above his 
reservation wage may be the best he can do under the quantity 
constraint, in general it will not be globally optimal absent 
that constraint. Some workers will be over-employed in the 
sense that they would prefer to work fewer than h hours at the 
prevailing wage, and others with lower reservation wages may 
be underemployed in the sense that they would be willing to 
work more hours at the prevailing wage and are receiving 
rents above their reservation wage8.
4.2.4 Aggregate Labor Supply
The main implication of quantity constraints in this 
model is that, to a first approximation, changes in aggregate 
labor supply over the business cycle will be determined by the 
participation decisions of potential workers at the extensive 
margin in response to changes in the wage offer or their 
endowments, rather than adjustments in hours of employed 
workers. The supply of 'h-hour' blocks of labor services to a 
firm (and ultimately the economy) will be determined by the 
number of individuals who choose to participate in the labor 
force at various wage levels. The aggregate labor supply 
curve, then, represents a supply of workers at the margin of
O
The behavioral pressures against the fixed hours constraint may give rise 
to shirking and absenteeism by over-employed workers, and moonlighting by 
underemployed workers. The model presented here abstracts from those 
possibilities.
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labor—force participation, and will be determined by the 
cumulative distribution of reservation wages in the workforce, 
(designated by *(w) = Pr(w < w) , an approach suggested by 
Ben—Porath (1973).
The general functional form of the aggregate labor supply 
function can be expressed as follows:
Ls(w,a) = Nh$(w,a),
0 < $(w,a) < 1, (4.4)
lim $(w,a) = 1
w  -  oo
3#/3w = <p(w,a) > 0
The cumulative distribution function $(w,a), with parameter 
vector a, represents the proportion of the workforce popula­
tion N having a reservation wage a less than or equal to w, 
and therefore who are willing to work h hours at the wage w. 
The marginally employed worker has a reservation wage a = w. 
The parameter vector a contains shift variables which capture 
exogenous changes in the distribution of nonlabor income.
The concavity of U ensures that it has decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, which in turn ensures that the 
reservation function a = t(v) is monotonic. (See Appendix D, 
Section Dl.) It follows that:
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€(w,a) = Pr(o) < w ) = Pr(f < w ) = Pr(v < g(w)), 
where g = f"1 (See Figure 4-2) . Then (4.4) can be written in 
a composite form as:
L*(w, a) = Nh$(g(w), a), g(w) = ^ ( v )  (4.5)
The aggregate labor supply function is a composite function of 
(a) $(v,ot) the cumulative distribution of nonlabor income
(nonhuman wealth) in the workforce, and (b) the inverse of the 
reservation wage function, g(w) = iji-1 (v) , which relates the 
reservation wage, and thereby the labor force participation 
rate, to nonlabor income.
Figure 4-2 illustrates three possible reservation wage 
functions, with constant (4r0) , increasing (fx) and decreasing 
(f2) elasticities, and their respective inverses g^w) .
The wage-elasticity of this aggregate labor supply function is 
equal to the product of two elasticities:
ezw = 2’g [ * ( g ) 3 'S ’„i:g(w)]
or e = y ' 9
where ^[y] = d(log y)/d(log x) is the elasticity operator.
(4.6a)
(4.6b)




Figure 4-2. Reservation Wage Functions and 
Their Elasticities, £
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Equation (4.6) follows directly from (4.5) and the elasticity 
of a composite function; the elasticity of aggregate labor 
supply is the product of the elasticities of the two functions 
4(g) and g(w) . Note that since f is monotonic,
«wtg(w)] = 1 / Z - e.
Changes in the elasticities of either $ or g will result 
in corresponding changes in e£w. Expressed in terms of 
elasticities of elasticities. = ^[Y] + if x
represents a procyclical variable such as employment, output, 
money supply or the price level, A positive value for ^x[£] 
means that e will also be procyclical.
It remains to consider the determinants of these func­
tions in this model, derive expressions for their elasticities 
and subject them to comparative static analysis.
4.2.5 Elasticity of The Reservation Wage Function
Individual preferences determine aggregate labor supply 
through the reservation wage function $ = i|r (v) , and will also 
affect the elasticity of aggregate labor supply through the 
inverse function g(w). The reservation wage function also 
establishes a link between aggregate labor supply and the 
distribution of nonlabor income (or wealth).
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The properties of f are derived in Appendix D, where it 
is shown that 5 , the elasticity of $ is constant for homo- 
thetic preferences (f0 in Figure 4-2), and increasing with v 
for preferences that have increasing relative risk aversion Rr 
(e. g-,ti in Figure 4-2)9. In the homothetic case £'= 0' = 
£^[9] = 0 , and the elasticity of aggregate labor supply will 
be unaffected by the reservation wage function lfr as v changes. 
However, in the case of increasing relative risk aversion,
> 0 , 0 * < 0 , £^ .[0 ] < 0 and therefore ^,[0 ] will make a 
negative contribution to &v[e] i. e:
KC*1 = KlYl + KtQ1 (4-7>
(?) (-)
This means that e will increase whenever nonlabor income 
declines. Since labor supply increases when v declines, 
the change in e will be procyclical.
Thus, a reservation wage function based on homothetic 
preferences will not change the elasticity of labor supply as 
nonlabor income declines. However, a function based on 
preferences with increasing relative risk aversion will 
increase the elasticity of labor supply as nonlabor income 
declines. Since labor supply also increases when nonlabor 
income declines, IRRA will cause e to be procyclical.
Q
Since uncertainty has not been explicitly modeled, R. can be interpreted 
as a measure of the relative concavity of D(c, SL). Decreasing relative risk 
aversion can be ruled out theoretically; see Appendix D.
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Thus, heterogeneity of preferences, in the specific form 
of increasing relative risk aversion for nonlabor income 
(wealth) is one possible source of procyclical elasticity of 
aggregate labor supply.
Arrow (1970) shows that increasing Rr is the only non- 
homothetic specification that is consistent with the Expected 
Utility Theorem, and also argues that it is the only specifi­
cation that is consistent with a wealth elasticity of the 
demand for cash balances greater than unity, which has been 
found in several empirical studies. Cash balances appear to 
be luxury goods, or at least not necessities, and that 
stylized fact is consistent with increasing Rr.
It remains to evaluate the possible effects of 
changes in the elasticity of S(g) on e. It is clear that if 
preferences are homothetic, 0 is constant and the only way 
that c can change is through changes in y. A necessary and 
sufficient condition for e to be procyclical is that 
^[yj < 0 in the vicinity of the equilibrium real wage. For 
a general cumulative distribution function i there is no 
assurance that this will be the case, or that 3v[y] will be 
monotonic over the entire domain of *. To evaluate point 
elasticities, it will be necessary to assume a specific
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functional form for *. That issue will be taken up in the 
next section10.
4.3 The Distribution of Nonlabor Income and Wealth
4.3.1 Nonlabor Income and Wealth
The real nonlabor income of a household is defined as 
the sum of real financial and transfer income. More specifi­
cally:
v = V/P = (B/P + T/P + n) > 0 (4.8)
where B is nominal interest receipts on government bonds, n is 
total returns from private equity claims, T represents nominal 
transfer receipts from the government sector, and P is a price 
index. Excluding the equalizing effect of transfer payments, 
which accrue mostly to lower income households, the distribu­
tion of income from bonds and equities is likely to be similar 
to the distribution of the holdings of those assets in the 
workforce. For example, the flow of nonlabor income can be 
related to nonhuman wealth n as follows:
v = r[(B+T)/rP + 7r/r] = r[« - M/P] (4.9)
10Once the homotheticity assumption is abandoned, distributions and the 
functional forms used to represent them matter.
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Here M is the aggregate money supply (e. g., M2), £1 is the 
stock of real nonhtunan wealth including "transfer" wealth, and 
r is the real market rate of interest on long-term claims. 
(Note that in (4.9), v is not a function of r.) Thus, the 
distribution of v would be proportional to the distribution of 
f = (£2 - M/P), which consists of bonds, equity and transfer 
payments in the workforce.
I have assumed a very large number of households which 
can be ordered on R+ according to their nonlabor income v at 
a point in time. I also assume that their measure on that 
interval is such that the distribution of nonlabor income over 
households can be represented by a continuous distribution 
function i(v, a) that is twice differentiable in v and each 
element of the parameter vector a. Two critical questions 
are: How is nonlabor income distributed in the population, and 
what would be a reasonable functional form to describe it?
4.3.2 Stylized Empirical Facts on Nonlabor Income
There is an extensive body of empirical literature on 
the distribution of income in the U. S. and Britain (e. g., 
Lydall (1973), Champernowne (1973), Blinder (1974) , Smith 
(1975, 1980), Atkinson (1983), Slottje (1989), and Bergstrand 
et al (1994) ; also, the Review of Income and Wealth) . Nearly
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all of these studies have focused on the distribution of 
earned income, and even when property income is included there 
is very little data on the separate distribution of nonlabor 
income as defined in (4.8) above. Most income distribution 
data include retired, disabled, the very wealthy and other 
individuals who are not part of the labor force. Available 
data appears to be insufficient to directly estimate a distri­
bution of nonlabor income only among potential workforce 
participants. Nevertheless, it is possible to infer some of 
the essential characteristics of such a distribution from the 
income distribution data that is available.
There is a broad consensus among the several studies of 
the distribution of wages and salaries and total income. This 
was best summarized by Lydall (1973, pp. 66-67), whom I will 
paraphrase in the interest of brevity:
(1) the distribution is "hump-shaped", and if it is confined to 
adult males working full time the left-hand tail is asymptotic 
to the income axis.
(2) the central part of the distribution, between the 10th and 
80th percentile, is close to Lognormal. However, the tails of 
the distribution contain an excess of frequencies compared with 
the Lognormal (i. e., are leptokurtic in the log of income).
(3) The upper tail often approximately follows the Pareto 
law for at least the top 20 per cent of the distribution.
Thus the distribution of earned income is unimodal, positively 
skewed, leptokurtotic, and asymptotic to the income axis.
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Neither the Lognormal nor the Pareto distributions give a 
satisfactory fit over the entire range of incomes.
If the distribution of nonlabor income is considered to 
be roughly proportional to the distribution of wealth, as 
suggested by Equation (4.8), then there is some theoretical 
justification for assuming that the distribution of nonlaor 
income is Lognormal, based on Gibrat's "Law of proportional 
effect.” (Gibrat, 1957). If zt is a stochastic variable 
distributed according to an arbitrary distribution Ft(zt) at 
time t, and subsequent values of z are generated by a process 
zt+1 = Uj. • zt where the u^. are i.i.d random variables, then 
zt = Zq’IIu^ , where zQ follows some arbitrary initial distribu­
tion. This is a first-order Markov process; zt depends only on 
zt-1 and the random element u^ .. The evolution of z can also 
be written as log zt = log zQ + Z(log uk) . Under the 
assumptions which are necessary for the application of the 
Central Limit Theorem, zt will be described by a self-repro­
ducing Lognormal distribution. [Aitchison and Brown (1954, 
1963) ].
This has some intuitive appeal because the evolution of 
the distribution of financial wealth can be viewed as such a 
process, where - nt = pllt and p is a random return that
is i.i.d across households. This random variable p is not 
necessarily a pure interest rate, but a periodic effective
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return that reflects the combined effects of saving, dis­
saving, asset management, market returns and risk. This is 
similar to Friedman's view (1953) that the distribution of 
income is the result of different choices by individuals with 
different tastes and preferences, tempered by chance11.
Gibrat's law of proportional effect was used by Champ- 
emowne (1936; 1973) , Kalecki (1938) , and Aitchison and Brown 
(1963) to derive the size distribution of total income. 
Champernowne's limiting distribution was Pareto, but Aitch­
ison and Brown (1954) showed that, with a small alteration of 
his assumptions, Champernowne's model produces a Lognormal 
distribution. Wold and Whittle (1957) and Steindl (1972) used 
methods similar to Champernowne's to derive an asymptotically 
Pareto distribution of wealth, and Vaughn (1988) extended 
their results using a life-cycle model of saving. Their 
results are also subject to the Aitchison and Brown critique. 
Sargan (1957) developed the most comprehensive model of wealth 
accumulation, for which the only tractable solution was a 
Lognormal distribution. Using Gibrat's method, Pestieau and 
Possen (1979) derived a Lognormal distribution of wealth 
directly, and studied the effects of risk aversion and 
government tax parameters on the inequality of the distrib­
11Blinder (1974) has criticized such stochastic models of income and wealth 
distribution for their lack of decision-theoretic content. His criticism does 
not apply, however, to the models of Sargan (1957) and Vaughn (1979, 1988), which 
are based on intertemporal optimization.
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ution. Thus, the Lognormal distribution has been established 
both empirically and theoretically as a useful description of 
the distribution of total income for populations which include 
but are not limited to the workforce.
Another reason for choosing the Lognormal distribution in 
this investigation is that it more likely to accurately 
represent the relevant range of nonlabor income than the 
Pareto distribution. The concentration of transfer payments 
near the lower end of the income range is likely to create a 
mode, or Lydall's "hump1', which the Pareto cannot produce. 
Also, most households in the highest guintile of the income 
and wealth distribution, where the Pareto fits best, are not 
likely to be included in any useful definition of the labor 
force. Financial wealth in the U. S. is highly concentrated 
with a Gini coefficient of .90; In 1989 the top 1% of wealth- 
holders owned 48% of the financial wealth in the U. S. 
(Wolff, 1994) . Approximately 30% of these were over age 65, 
but it is reasonable to assume that all were financially 
independent12. Thus, the thinner upper tail of the Lognormal 
distribution should be a better approximation to the distribu­
tion of wealth in the labor force. The Pareto distribution
12Persons over age 65 made up about 20% of both the lowest and highest 
deciles of the wealth distribution in 1979 (Radner and Vaughn, 1987). Excluding 
them would thin out both tails. Excluding the independently wealthy would thin 
out the upper tail significantly, due to their large share of total wealth.
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also has the disadvantage of having an infinite variance for 
some very reasonable values of its single parameter.
For these reasons, the Lognormal distribution will be 
used to characterize the distribution of financial wealth and 
nonlabor income in the remainder of this chapter. This is 
posited as a reasonable choice in order to proceed. We do not 
really know what the distributions of wealth and nonlabor 
income in the workforce are. More research in this area is 
needed, especially on the extent to which the distributions of 
income and wealth change over the business cycle.
4.3.3 The Lognormal Distribution13
The Lognormal distribution is:
X
-(lnx - n)2] . ,
 z 2 dx = N(lnx | fi, a2), x> 0
ax
(4-10)
where N( • | ji, a2) represents the Normal distribution with mean 
H and variance a2. The jth moment of A about the origin is:
*j' = exp{j fi + %j2o2} (4.11)
from which the mean a and variance fi2 of A are given by
13Xhe classical reference on the Lognormal distribution and its appli­
cations is Aitchison and Brown (1963).
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a = exp ifi + %a2}
(4.12)
P2 = [exp{a21> - l]exp{2/x + a2}
Other useful characteristics of the Lognormal are:
mode: exp{/x - a2} (4.13)
median: exp {/*} (4.14)
coefficient of variation P/a = y = [exp{a2> - I]*1 (4.15)
Note that fi is the arithmetic mean of In x and also the 
geometric mean and the log median of x. The parameter a2 is 
the variance of In x, and although it is a measure of relative 
dispersion from (4.15), it is not the variance of x, which is 
given in (4.12). The Lorenz measure of income inequality for 
the Lognormal is can be defined in terms of the standardized 
Normal distribution (Aitchison and Brown, op. cit.):
L = 2N(a//2|0,l) - l (4.16)
Values of L can be obtained from tables of the standardized 
Normal distribution for values of a. Note that dL/da > 0, so 
a decrease in a2 corresponds to a decrease in income or wealth 
inequality.
Figure 4-3(a) shows a family of Lognormal density 
functions for n = 0 and several values of a2. Figure 4-3 (b) 
shows density functions for a2 - 0.5 and several values of n.
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0 1 32 4
Figure 4-3(a) Lognormal density functions for n = 0 and 
various values of a2.
l-o
i) 2 3 4I
Figure 4-3(b) Lognormal density functions for a2= .5 and 
various values of /x
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the relationship between the Normal and Lognormal distribu­
tions allows the following useful transformation:
V z (4.17)
A (w )  = | Mr o2)dw = J ( p ( z ) d z  = N(zI 0 ,  1)
z _ lnw - fi 
a
If nonlabor income and reservation wages are measured in log 
units, then all the properties of the Normal distribution 
apply. This fact is utilized to advantage in Appendix D and 
the computations of Section 4.5.
Another useful property of the Lognormal distribution is 
that it has a closed form under a log-linear transformation of 
the random variable. Aitchison and Brown (op. cit.) prove the 
following theorem:
If X is distributed Lognormal A(n, a2) and Y = aXb, 
then Y is distributed Lognormal A (In a + b/i, b za2) .
It is evident that a multiplicative shift of magnitude a 
will change n by In (a) but will not affect a2. However, an 
exponential transformation Xb will affect both n and a2 as 
shown. This property of the Lognormal will turn out to be 
useful in the analysis to follow.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
153
4.4 The Lognormal Aggregate Labor Supply Function
Specifying A(w) for the function *(g(w)) in Equation 
(4.5) yields the following expression for the aggregate labor 
supply function:
L s(ir;n,o2) = tfhA(w| n, a2) , w>0 (4.18)
Here N represents the total size of the available workforce, 
h is the fixed number of hours per worker, and A(w) is the 
cumulative distribution of reservation wages, which in this 
instance is a linear transformation of the distribution of 
nonlabor income v, which itself is a linear transformation of 
the distribution of wealth. The simplest form of a reservation 
wage function derived from homothetic preferences is i|r(v) = v, 
whereupon g(w) = ^_1(v) = w. In general U will be non-
homothetic, the argument of A will be g(w) and a composite 
function will be involved, as indicated in Equation (4.6). 
This aggregate labor supply function has two shift variables 
ft and a2, both of which enter into the moments of A.
Figure 4-4 shows graphs of the labor supply function A(w) 
and its elasticity e(w) and marginal factor cost functions, 
for a mean reservation wage of $500 per week, a minimum wage 
of $200 per week, and a coefficient of variation of approxi­
mately 1. This is a benchmark case that will be used in 
Section 4.5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154


























200 300 400 300 600 700 000 900 1000 110(1200
w(i) r t












200 300 400 300 600 700 000 900 1000 110(1200
w(z)TI





















0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.9 1
A(Z>
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In the Traditional Keynesian setup, with technology and 
labor productivity assumed to be fixed in the short run, 
increases in aggregate output and employment are associated 
with shifts of the aggregate labor supply curve. That is 
exactly the mechanism that is assumed to be at work in the 
present model. The shift variables of the lognormal aggregate 
labor supply function are /x and a2, which are also the parame­
ters of the distribution of nonlabor income. Thus, changes in 
the distribution of nonlabor income, or wealth from which it 
is derived, will cause the aggregate labor supply curve to 
shift and change its shape.
Expressions for the partial derivatives of A with respect 
to fi, and a2 are derived in Appendix D and are summarized 
below. (Subscripts denote partial derivatives.)
z
Ay = - i  f z < p ( z ) d z  < 0 (4.19)
z
(4.20)
> 0, In w < fi
(4.21)
< 0, In w > n
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
156
These partial derivatives show that (a) a decline in 
geometric mean nonlabor income v will increase labor supply at 
all wages; (b) an increase in the inequality of nonlabor 
income, measured by an increase in a2, will increase the labor 
supply of lower wage workers (In w < ft) and decrease the labor 
supply of higher-wage workers (In w > (i) . This is the 
response of aggregate labor supply to an increase in the 
inequality of workers' nonlabor income14.
Conversely, a decline in a2 decreases the inequality of 
v and increases the labor supply of high-wage workers and 
reduces the labor supply of lower-wage workers. The density 
of reservation wages will increase in the vicinity of the log 
median15. Since the elasticity of the distribution function 
A(w) at a point wQ is a measure of its relative density there, 
an increase in the concentration or density of reservation 
wages corresponds to an increase in the elasticity of labor 
supply. As a2 declines, nonlabor income becomes more homoge­
neous and consequently labor supply becomes more elastic in 
the vicinity of the median reservation wage. In the limit as
^The symmetry of the dispersion effect is due to the symmetry of a2, the 
variance of In w, about fi in the Lognormal distribution.
15It follows from Equations (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13) and Figure 4-3 
that a decline in cr alone will shift the mean reservation wage to the left and 
the mode to the right, leaving the median unchanged. A decline in fi alone will 
shift all three parameters to the left. A decline in both ft and a2 will increase 
the concentration of reservation wages around the new lower median e*‘. Aggregate 
labor supply will increase at most wages, and most importantly, the elasticity 
of labor supply will increase in the vicinity of the original log median 
reservation wage.
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ct2 0, all workers have the same nonlabor income and reserva­
tion wage, and labor supply is perfectly elastic. This 
indicates an inverse relationship between the dispersion of 
wealth (i. e. inequality) the elasticity of labor supply at 
the log median reservation wage. The more compact the 
distribution of wealth, and therefore the distribution of 
reservation wages, the greater the response of labor supply to 
a change in the wage, i. e., the greater is the elasticity of 
labor supply.
4.4.2 The Monev-Elasticitv of Aggregate Labor Supply
The shift variables p. and a2 are metrics of the nonlabor 
income distribution. Nonlabor income payments are in nominal 
values, with real values determined by the price level. The 
geometric mean or log median of v can also be expressed in 
terms of nominal values V and the price level P:
(i = E[ln v] = E[ln (V/P) ] = E[ln V] - In P (4.22)
Thus, an increase in the price level P without a proportional 
increase in nominal nonlabor income V, reduces p and conse­
quently, from Equations (4-12) through (4-14), reduces the 
mean a, variance P2, mode and median of the distribution.
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An Increase in the price level alone will shift the density 
function <p (v) to the left, increasing its skewness and 
increasing #(w) at every w.
To the extent that contractual payments of nonlabor 
income in Equation (4.7), particularly bond interest and 
transfer payments, are fixed in nominal terms and are not 
indexed, nonlabor income will not move proportionally with 
changes in the price level and the aggregate labor supply 
function will shift due to a change in the price level. The 
function will be static with respect to changes in P only if 
all nonlabor income payments are perfectly indexed. In the 
analysis that follows, I assume that the aggregate price 
level is a shift variable for this labor supply function 
through its effects on (i.
In flexible-price macro models, an increase in money is 
usually associated with an increase in aggregate demand and 
the price level. For example, in the model of Chapter II the 
response to a one-time open-market purchase is a less-than- 
proportional increase in the price level and a reduction in 
the interest rate. For the aggregate labor supply function 
developed in this chapter, an increase in the price level P 
unaccompanied by a proportional increase in nominal median 
nonlabor income will reduce all values of v proportionately,
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shifting the entire aggregate labor supply curve toward 
increased supply at all wages16.
The outward shift in the labor supply curve will due to 
an increase in P will reduce e at every wage, because the mean 
of the distribution will be declining while the marginal 
values will increase at each wage. Thus, monetary policy, 
through its affect on the price level, will shift this 
aggregate labor supply function, but the price-level effect on 
€ will be countercyclical.
It turns out that an increase in P alone will have no 
effect on the dispersion parameter a2, because:
a2 = E[(In v)2] - (E[ln v])2
= E[ (In V)2 - 2 (In V) (In P) +(ln P)2] - (E[ln V] - In P)2 
= E[ (In V)2] - (E[ln V])2 
Thus a2, the measure of dispersion or inequality of the 
Lognormal distribution is unaffected by changes in a scale 
factor relating v and V, which is what the price level is17. 
A change in P will shift A procyclically, but it will not
■^®In Chapter V this shift mechanism for labor supply is imbedded in a full- 
fledged general equilibrium macro model.
17This result is specific to the Lognormal distribution, because of the 
log-linear property described in Section 4.3.3. Note that an increase in the 
price level will have an effect on P2, the variance of the Lognormal distribu­
tion, through its effect on (i. (See Equation 4.12).
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change the dispersion of A and therefore will not have a 
procyclical effect on e, the elasticity of the distribution.
4.4.3 Portfolio Rebalancing with Increasing Rn
In the macroeconomic model of Chapter II, an open-market 
purchase of bonds for high-powered money reduces the total 
amount of bonds outstanding and also reduces the interest rate 
and the value of real wealth. If workers are holding optimum 
portfolio allocations of bonds and money prior to an open- 
market operation, then those allocations will be changed to 
reflect the new asset quantities and relative prices. In 
giving up bonds for money, workers will reduce their holdings 
of risky assets but also forego interest income. How the 
asset reallocation is accomplished over the population of 
workers will determine the effect on the distribution of 
nonlabor income. In this section I will show that if workers 
rebalance their portfolios in a way that is nonhomogeneous, 
open market operations will affect a2, and consequently the 
elasticity e.
The portfolio balancing problem is well known in the 
literature, and only the points essential to the analysis at 
hand will be emphasized here. A more rigorous argument based 
Arrow (1970), and Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) is presented in
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Appendix D, Section 7, which will be incorporated by refer­
ence.
In terms of the notation of Equation (4.8), I define two 
classes of real financial assets in the aggregate economy:
Earning assets: f = (B/rP + w/r)
Real money balances: m = (M/P)
Earning assets provide a return r which is not certain, while 
money offers no return but provides transaction services in 
consumption.
Aggregate portfolio shares are: A = f/n and (l-A) = m/n
The value of A in the aggregate is determined by the ratio of 
the value of earning assets to total financial wealth, which 
is influenced by monetary policy. In particular, for the non­
neutral open-market purchase of bonds described in Chapter II:
The sign of nM is negative from the results of Chapter II. 
Thus, a non-neutral open-market purchase necessarily reduces 
the proportion of aggregate wealth that will be held in risky 
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For an individual wealth-holder, I define:
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a^  — f^ /n^ , (1—a^ ) — m^ /n^
Individual wealth-holders allocate their wealth between f and 
m to maximize the utility of services obtained by holding 
them. A standard assumption is that the utility function for 
wealth H(Q) = H(f + m) is concave and at least twice differen­
tiable, so that wealth-holders are risk averse and prefer to 
diversify between f and m. The standard setup, with indiffer­
ence curves tangent to a budget constraint at an interior 
solution, is illustrated in Figure 4-5, (a) and (b).
It is well known that, in the two-asset case, if prefer­
ences are assumed to be identical and homothetic, then wealth- 
holders have constant relative risk aversion (Rr) and the 
marginal rate of substitution between risk-free and risky 
assets will be independent of the size of total wealth 
holdings. (See Appendix D, Section D7.) Therefore, identical 
homothetic preferences imply that the relative demands, or 
optimum portfolio shares, for the two asset classes, will be 
the same for all wealth-holders and equal to the aggregate 
portfolio. Jt also implies that the fractional portfolio 
balance adjustments to an open-market operation will be 
identical for all workers, and therefore homogeneous across
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Figure 4-5(a). Portfolio balance decision with Homothetic
Preferences (Constant Relative Risk Aversion)
ZjifatiSJC*/ r%7H
Figure 4-5(b). Portfolio balance decision with 
Increasing Relative Risk Aversion
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workers. Homogeneous rebalancing adjustments will not change 
the dispersion of the distribution of v.
The case of homothetic preferences is illustrated in 
Figure 4-5(a). The assumption that H is homothetic implies 
the following: (a) a.L is independent of ni and is equal to A 
for all wealth-holders; (b) the wealth-expansion path of 
optimum portfolios will be a ray from the origin, along which 
the marginal rate of substitution will be constant; [This is 
shown as points A-B-C in Figure 4-5(a)]; (c) f and m are
normal goods but neither is a luxury good; (d) the Engel 
curves for both f and m are rays with 45° slopes.
Thus, whatever adjustments wealth-holders make to their 
portfolio shares [air 1-ajJ, in response to an open market 
operation, it will be the same for all wealth-holders, and the 
change in income yield vL will be proportional to S1L and 
therefore proportional to rAf^ = vLia. It has already been 
shown above, in the case of changes in P, that a proportional 
change in v has no effect on the dispersion parameter a2 of 
the Lognormal distribution of v. Therefore, homothetic 
preferences rule out any distribution effects on v from an 
open-market operation.
1ft
The interest rate r is also changing, but the substitution and wealth 
effects of this are independent of the size of wealth holdings and consequently 
are the sane for all wealth-holders. That is the main implication of the 
homotheticity assumption.
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However, if H has increasing relative risk aversion, 
a^ will decrease with (See Appendix D, Section D7.)
Increasing relative risk aversion implies: (a) the marginal
rate of substitution between f and m will increase with 
wealth; (b) wealthier investors will require a higher expected 
rate of return to hold the same portfolio mix, and will hold 
a smaller proportion of the risky asset for the same return; 
(c) the wealth-expansion path of optimum portfolios will have 
a decreasing slope, favoring m as shown in Figure 4-5(b); (d) 
money balances are a luxury good19.
The functional properties of increasing Rr can be demon­
strated by applying the elasticity operator to the marginal 
rate of substitution in the first-order condition for the 
constrained maximization of H (f,m), given by Equation D7.2 in 
Appendix D:
*’4~li]=®‘’[|j]=roh'] - ?» ( 4 h w  ♦««<*■>] - i
This expression gives the relationship between the elast­
icities of marginal utility of f and m as n increases along 
the wealth expansion path, which is a locus of optimum points 
(f*, m*) for a constant r. If l+r, f/m = a/(l-a) and df/dm
19With decreasing absolute risk aversion, the amount of risky assets held 
will increase with wealth, but their share of wealth in the portfolio will de­
crease. Formally, 0 < £^[f{] < 1 and £^[a{] < 0
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remain constant as ft increases, the path will be a ray from 
the origin as shown in Figure 4-5(a). But then the above 
expression is zero and relative risk aversion must be the same 
for all points (f,m) along the path; since a different r will 
map out a different path, that must be true for the entire 
indifference map. Constant relative risk aversion implies 
that the utility function H is homothetic; the wealth expan­
sion path will be a ray from the origin, along which the 
marginal rate of substitution on each intersecting indif­
ference curve will be the same. Along that path, the own- 
price elasticity of the demand to hold absolute amounts of f 
and m will also be constant, as will be their portfolio shares 
a and (1-a).
Arrow (1970) showed that if H has increasing Rr, the 
above expression is positive. [Arrow, 1970, Appendix [5]]; see 
also Appendix D, Section D7.) In that case, along a ray 
(where f/m = a/(1-a)), -df/dm, (1+r) and H^Hf will have 
positive wealth elasticity and therefore will be increasing. 
The slope of the wealth expansion path (with (1+r) constant) 
will be df/dm = a/(l-a), and from Arrow's proof:
rQ[df/dm] = 2jj[a/ (1-a) ] = ^[a] - ^[(1-a)] < 0
Since, necessarily, ^[a] + £Jj[(l-a)] = 0, the conclusion is 
that increasing Rr implies that ^Q[a] < 0. Portfolio shares
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in ‘the risky asset class will decline with wealth and the 
wealth expansion path will have a declining slope, as shown in 
Figure 4-5(b)20. Since the proof of this holds without 
restriction on values of f and m, the indifference contours 
in f-m space must be asymmetrical, as shown in figure 4-5(b) . 
This is consistent with the assumption that m is a risk-free 
asset.
Thus, with an open-market operation wealth holders must 
rebalance their portfolios, but with increasing Rr this 
rebalancing occurs in a nonhomogeneous way. Workers with 
higher amounts of income from bonds will reduce their bond 
income more than proportionally to those receiving lower bond 
income, and will absorb a disproportionate amount of the 
additional money created by the open market operation. The 
result of this portfolio balance trading in the financial 
markets will be a reduction in the dispersion of nonlabor 
income in the workforce, i. e.
„ 3of 3A 0 (4.26)
3m 15a 15m
Assuming perfect information and efficient, frictionless 
financial markets this will happen instantaneously.
20It is assumed that H has decreasing absolute risk aversion, so that 
the amount invested in earning assets £ increases with Q even though the 
portfolio share declines.
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With increasing relative risk aversion, a.L is a function 
of and r , and for a continuous distribution of fl over 
workers we may write a(r,fl) . Note that a (r,n) is a relative 
demand function which depends on preferences, but since 
preferences depend on wealth and wealth is distributed over 
the workforce, the distribution of a(r,H) will depend on the 
distribution of Q, subject to the aggregate constraint:
00
A = |a(r,n) A.(n)dn (4.27)
where 1CH) is the density function for wealth in the work­
force21. Thus, for a given r, A is the weighted average of 
a(r,ft), and will be a function of the parameters of the 
density function 1(£I).
To use a concrete example, let H(H) be Pratt's utility 
function with decreasing RA and increasing Rr as introduced in 
Appendix D, Section D4, Equation D4.3.:
H(U) = -exp(-np/p) 0 < p < 1
21The relative demand for money may also be a function of an individual's 
income, in which case a(*) = a(r,y,Q), where y = v if the individual is not 
working and y * v + wh if working. Whether both income and wealth need to be 
included as scale variables in the money demand function is not a settled issue 
in the literature. To simplify the notation, the income variable will be 
supresaed in the material immediately following.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Relative risk aversion for this function is:
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-H"I2/H» « Qp + (1 - p) « np for large n .
Thus the wealth-elasticity of relative risk aversion is 
approximately p. Since relative risk aversion increases 
proportionally with n at the rate p, a reasonable assumption 
would be that to a first approximation a(r,fl) declines propor­
tionally with increasing wealth at the same rate, i. e. , 
^nCa I  *  “ P* This corresponds to the function a(r,n) = n _p. 
Xf we also assume that n is distributed in the workforce 
according to a Lognormal distribution A (n |  Mu,au2) , then we 
have:
= exp( -p/ifc, + % P2ff«) (4.29)
Although we do not know the values of the parameters and 
<JU2 for the distribution of wealth in the workforce, the 
relationship between A and a2, the dispersion parameter of the 
nonlabor income distribution, can be found by utilizing 
Theorem 2.1 of Aitchison and Brown, previously cited in 
Section 4.3, in the following argument.
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If v is distributed A(fi, a2) and f = v/r, then f is 
distributed A(-ln r + n, a2) . With increasing relative risk 
aversion, f = a(r,n)n. Using the Pratt utility function, 
f =(n1_P)n, where p is the elasticity of relative risk aver­
sion. But if n is distributed A (fi0, ctu2) , then f must also be 
distributed A((l-p)jtu, (l-p)2<xB2). Equating the dispersion 
parameters in the two exprssions for the distribution of f 
gives aB2 = a2/(l-p)2. Substituting this in Equation 4.29 and 
deriving the elasticity of a2 with respect to A, yields:
rA[g2] = 2(12~-t - > 0 (4’30)oA o-2 p2a
Thus, for this nonhomothetic utility function, the elasticity 
of the change in a2 associated with a change in A depends 
directly on C(l-p)/p]2 and inversely on the value of a2. The 
effect of portfolio rebalancing on the dispersion of nonlabor 
income, represented by a2, will be greater for small values of 
a2 (low Gini coefficients) and for values of p less than %.
These results lead to the conclusion that, with increas­
ing relative risk aversion and a Lognormal distribution of 
wealth, an open-market purchase of bonds will reduce the 
dispersion (inequality) of the distribution of financial 
wealth and nonlabor income. This provides a second channel 
through which changes in monetary policy can not only shift 
the aggregate labor supply function A, but most importantly,
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change its elasticity22. In this formulation, both n and 
a2 are shift variables for aggregate labor supply A(w) and its 
elasticity e? fj. is affected by P and a2 is affected by r and 
ft indirectly through A.
The implications of the flexible-price macro model in 
Chapter II, if not significantly altered by the additional 
monopsony assumption, lead to the conclusion that an open- 
market operation will shift this aggregate labor supply 
function and change its elasticity through its short-run 
effects on P, r, and ft. This constitutes, in effect, a 
monetary theory of aggregate labor supply.
The comparative static derivatives of A and e with
respect to P, r and A are derived in Appendix D, section D5
(Equation D5.ll) and section D6 (Equation D6.10). The results
are summarized below:
%
SJrte] =-3JfCA] -£%[P] + (4.32)
o p o
In these two equations, ^x[y] is the elasticity of y with 
respect to x, z - (In w - /i)/a, and <p(z) and N(z|0,l) are the 
standard Normal density and cumulative distribution functions.
22Note that this argument implies that monetary policy will have a 
countercyclical effect on the dispersion (or inequality) of nonlabor income. 
With increasing Rg , relative demand functions for financial assets will be non- 
homogeneous.
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f z<p(z)dz
r*[A] = - If -®
+ (i-p)





(z^-D - N ( z 10,1) ^ [ A ^ C r ]
The elasticity ^ [ a 2] from Equation 4.30 above has also been 
incorporated in the model. In the next section, these 
equations are evaluated numerically for calibrated values of 
li, a2 and p for the Lognormal distribution and plausible 
values of the monetary elasticities on the right hand side.
4.5 Numerical Analvsis of and J&JL1
The story that emerges from the foregoing analysis is the 
following:
The aggregate labor supply function based on the hetero­
geneous preferences of workers and the distributions of wealth 
and nonlabor income forms part of the wealth effects trans­
mission channel from monetary policy actions to real output. 
The aggregate labor suppy curve is shifted procyclically by 
changes in the aggregate price level, and the elasticity of 
labor supply is affected procyclically by changes in the 
economy-wide interest rate. With monopsony power in the
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labor market, this will cause the markdown to be counter­
cyclical and the real wage to be less countercyclical than 
under perfect competition. A money-output connection has been 
established in a Keynesian model that is capable of exhibiting 
countercyclical markdowns and acyclical real wages. Q. E. D.
The objective in this section is to determine if the 
model equations 4.31 and 4.32 produce positive money-elastici- 
ties of A and e for plausible values of their parameters. 
The equations will be calibrated to representative benchmark 
values of their parameters for the U s. economy, the elastici­
ties of A and e will be computed, and various metrics will be 
examined.
4.5.1 Calibration of the Labor Supply Function
Values of the parameters /z and a2 will be chosen to 
approximate a realistic distribution of reservation wages in 
the U. S. economy. I will utilize the three-parameter Log­
normal distribution with minimum value t = $200, representing 
a fixed 40-hour week at a minimum wage of $5.00 per hour.
The mean of the Lognormal is given in Equation (4.12) as 
a = exp(/x + %a2) . I will choose n and a2 to set a = $300, so 
that r + a = $500, which was approximately the average weekly 
wage in the U. S. economy in 1997. The range of the real 
wage variable will then be w > $200. Using a weekly wage
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based on a fixed 40-hour week is consistent with the previous 
specification of indivisible labor in in Section 4.2.4, with 
h - 40 hours per week.
The dispersion parameter a2 determines the Lorenz measure 
of inequality of nonlabor income in Equation (4.16)23:
L = 2N(a/i/ 2 | 0,1) - 1. Calibrating o2 to an empirical Lorenz 
index for wealth or nonlabor income will complete the calib­
ration of A. Table 4-2 shows Gini (Lorenz) coefficients for 
labor and nonlabor income from IRS data for the years 1952- 
1981 [Slottje, (1989)]. The IRS definition of nonlabor income 
includes interest, dividends, rents and other nonlabor income 
reported on annual income tax returns24. The Gini coeffi­
cients in Table 4-2 were calculated by Slottje after fitting 
a Beta distribution of the second kind to the data. (The 
Beta-2 distribution is a generalization of the Pareto and 
Lognormal distributions). Slottje's Gini coefficients for 
nonlabor income are about .44, and nonlabor income is about
2 3 The Lorenz measure L is also called the Gini coefficient in the 
literature, cf. Slottje (1989) discussed below.
24The IRS data used by Slottje includes rental income which is not 
included in the definition of v, and excludes nontax able transfer payments which 
are included in v. Host likely these are poor substitutes in terms of their 
place in the distribution, so it is not clean: what effect this difference would 
have an the Gini coefficients in Table 4.3.
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FROM SLOTTJE (1989)
GINI COEFFICIENTS OF INEQUALITY FOR THE
m a r g i n a l  distrib ution s o f  l a b o r  e a r n i n g s ,
NON-LABOR INCOME AND TOTAL INCOME
Year Labor Non-Labor T o ta l
Earnings Income Income
1952 0 . 3 1 59 8 4 0 .4175 85 0 . 3 0 8 2 2 8
1953 0 .3 0 86 8 9 0.4 15573 0 . 3 0 1 8 6 5
1954 0 .3 1 41 3 9 0 .4147 86 0 . 3 0 6 8 2 5
1955 0 .2 9 2 8 1 4 0 .383159 0 . 2 8 6 1 4 3
1956 0 .3 0 90 9 3 0 .4008 36 0 . 3 0 2 2 6 3
1957 0 .3 0 43 6 9 0 .399035 0 . 2 9 7 9 4 2
1958 0 .3 2 8 2 0 2 0 .4265 38 0 . 3 2 1 0 4 3
1959 0 .3 2 86 3 6 0 .4254 30 0 . 3 2 1 8 5 2
I 9 6 0 0 .3 2 4 8 4 7 0 .4249 95 0 . 3 1 8 4 6 6
1961 0 .327761 0 .4229 26 0 . 3 2 1 1 6 5
1962 0 .3 2 73 5 7 0 .4217 85 0 . 3 2 0 9 7 3
1963 0 .3 3 1 3 1 9 0 .422219 0 . 3 2 4 8 1 7
1964 0 .334521 0 .422931 0 . 3 2 8 1 2 8
1965 0 .3 3 63 1 9 0 .420617 0 .3 2 9 8 1 7
1966 0 . 3 5 40 5 7 0.442451 0 . 3 4 7 5 0 3
1967 0 .3 5 7 6 6 5 0 .445950 0 . 3 5 1 2 3 6
1968 0 .3 5 9 1 8 0 0 .4455 34 0 .3 5 2 7 9 1
1969 0 . 3 5 05 6 9 0 .447051 0 . 3 4 5 0 5 4
1970 0 .3 5 2 4 1 5 0 .4478 73 0 . 3 4 7 0 0 7
1971 0 .3 4 9 7 6 5 0 .444327 0 . 3 4 4 4 8 0
1972 0 .3 4 78 5 7 0 .4373 17 0 . 3 4 2 5 6 3
1973 0 .346091 0 .433483 0 . 3 4 0 7 3 5
1974 0 . 3 4 50 7 6 0 .429350 0 . 3 3 9 2 5 5
1975 0 .3 4 32 9 0 0 .4370 48 0 .3 3 7 8 4 1
1976 0 .339111 0 .4 29775 0 . 3 3 3 7 4 2
1977 0 .355421 0 .4460 47 0 . 3 4 9 7 2 3
1978 0 .3 1 93 9 9 0 .402100 0 . 3 1 4 2 7 8
1979 0 . 3 5 12 5 7 0 .435840 0 . 3 4 5 2 7 8
1980 0 . 3 4 10 1 8 0 .4386 37 0 . 3 3 6 1 9 5
1981 0 .3 3 8 2 7 3 0 .443703 0 . 3 3 3 1 1 9
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one-third more concentrated than labor earnings (L = .34) and 
total income (L = .33). Although Slottje's Gini coefficients 
vere derived from annual data,they should be equally valid for 
weekly income because the Gini coefficients of both the Beta-2 
distribution and the Lognormal distribution are invariant with 
respect to a constant multiple of the income variable25
One problem in utilizing Slottje's data here is that it 
includes all taxpayers, including the retired and other 
nonworkers, whereas the wealth and nonlabor income of interest 
here is confined to the workforce26. Wolff and Mar ley (1989) 
report Gini coefficients of .82 for financial wealth (exclud­
ing real estate) , but this also includes the retired and very 
wealthy who are not in the workforce. In 1989 the wealthiest 
1% of the U. S. population held 48% of financial wealth, and 
the top 20% held 96% [Wolff (1994)]. Financial wealth is 
highly concentrated in the general population, and most of it 
is owned directly or indirectly by individuals who are not in 
the workforce. It is likely that both financial wealth and 
nonlabor income derived from it are less concentrated in the 
workforce than in the general population, but we really don't
25Weekly time series data on nonlabor income would probably have a larger 
coefficient of variation than annual data. However, the relevant distribution 
here is cross-sectional, over individuals. There is no apparent reason why the 
inequality of the distribution of nonlabor income over individuals would differ 
significantly if measured weekly instead of annually.
26Cross-sectional data on nonlabor income for workforce participants was 
not readily available, but might be reconstructed from the Survey of Consumer 
Finance, a project which might be useful for future research.
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know. The scant: statistical evidence indicates that a Gini 
coefficient in the range of 0.4 to 0.5 would be reasonable for 
the distribution of nonlabor income in the workforce. I will 
use the mid-range value of 0.45.
A minimum weekly reservation wage of t  = $200, a mean 
a =• $500 and a Lorenz coefficient of .45 correspond to cali­
brated values of (i = 5.347 and a = .8444 (a2 = .713) for the 
Lognormal distribution. For this distribution, the mean of 
$500 corresponds to a labor-force participation rate of 66.0%, 
which is close to the official estimate for the U. S. economy. 
(Economic Report of the President, 1992, Table B-34.)
4.5.2 Calibration of Monetary Elasticities
What remains is to calibrate the elasticities in Equat­
ions (4.31) and (4.32). I will test a range of values for 
eachr but a plausible benchmark case should have some empiri­
cal support. ^[P] positive and less than 1 for a non­
neutral open-market operation. Initially I will set it equal 
to 0.8 and test for sensitivity to higher and lower values.
Note that &Klr] is the reciprocal of the interest- 
elasticity of money demand in the Keynesian liquidity pref­
erence relationship. Although M represents the nominal money 
supply, a change in M causes a change in the equilibrium value
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of r along the money demand schedule, and the elasticity of 
this change in r is the reciprocal of the interest-elasticity 
of money demand.
The relevant interest rate depends on the definition of 
money and its assumed substitutes. An open market operation is 
a swap of government bonds for high-powered base money, but 
most bonds traded in open-market operations have short 
maturities and the change in the monetary base acts through 
fractional reserve multipliers to change the monetary aggreg­
ates. The relevant money aggregate to use here should include 
those forms of money stocks which sure utilized by investors as 
risk-free alternatives to bonds and equities, i. e., money 
which is held for the speculative motive. I will use M2 as 
the relevant measure of money, because because checkable 
savings accounts and money-market mutual funds are superior to 
demand deposits as a store of value and are commonly used as 
cash accounts in portfolio management [Laidler (1977,1980)]. 
The institutional money instruments in M3 have little rele­
vance for workforce participants. Dornbusch and Fischer (1977) 
and McCallum (1989)] advocate M2 as the relevant definition of 
money in its speculative function. From 1987 to 1992 The 
Federal Reserve used the growth rate of M2 as an intermediate 
policy target27.
27 Since 1992, Federal Reserve policy has been to target inflation and the 
federal funds rate, letting M2 be endogenous to the economy within broad target 
bands.
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Host: empirical studies of the money demand function have 
estimated cross-elasticities of Ml with respect to short-term 
rates of near-money substitutes such as savings accounts and 
time deposits28. These estimates of the interest-elasticity 
of Ml have varied widely (See Table 4-3) , and there is no 
consensus on whether long rates or short rates, real or 
nominal rates are more important determinants of Ml demand. 
Precision is not possible in these circumstances, but all that 
is required for the present purpose is a representative order- 
of-magnitude value for the interest-elasticity of M2.
Laidler (1980) employed several different structural 
models to estimate M2 demand elasticities from U. S. data for 
the period 1953-1978. His estimates for the three-month T- 
bill interest elasticity of M2 ranged from -.121 to -.176 with 
a clustering in the - .147 to - .176 range. (Coincidentally, 
these are close to the averages for time deposit and long-term 
bond interest elasticities for Ml in Table 4-3, including 
Laidler's own estimate of -.150 for the long-term bond.). 
Initially, I will set the value of ^[M*1] to -.15, and test 
the sensitivity of the model to higher and lower values. This 
value appears to be representative of the short-run interest
28See, for example, the surveys by Feige and Pearce (1976), Laidler 
(1977), and Judd and Scadding (1982).
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Hamburger (1966) -.185 -.014
Lee (1967) -.094 -.019
Tiegen (1969)   -.104
Gramlich &
Kalchbrenner (1970) -.349 -.190
Goldfeld (1973) -.279 -.049
Goldfeld (1976) -.039 -.038
Hafer & Hein (1979) -.040 -.02








Average -.154 -.06 -.178
elasticity of M2 relative to short-term government securities, 
the principal trading vehicle in open-market operations.
£^[A], the interest-elasticity of the proportional demand 
for risky assets, depends on the utility function assumed to 
represent preferences. According to Tobin's (1958) version 
of the portfolio balance model, A(r) should be inelastic at 
high interest rates and highly elastic at low rates, approach­
ing perfect elasticity as r approaches zero. Tobin calculated 
bounds for this elasticity for an assumed quadratic utility 
function. Quadratic utility, however, has neither decreasing
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R& nor increasing Rr, and is inappropriate in the present 
context. Tobin's use of indifference curves in mean-variance 
space requires special assumptions which are inconsistent with 
both decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative 
risk aversion [Borch (1969), Feldstein (1969), Hart (1975)].
However, given values for and [A] can be
determined from the following relationship (Equation (D5.8) in 
Appendix 0):
Representative values for the U.S. economy at the end of 1991 
are: f = $5,035 Trillion, m = M2 = $3,439 Trillion, which
give a value of A * f/(f + m) = .594. (Economic Report of the 
President, 1992). A benchmark value of -.15 will be used for 
as indicated above. Note that for homothetic prefer­
ences (constant relative risk aversion) [Md] = l, and for 
nonhomothetic preferences with increasing relative risk 
aversion ^ [ M d] >1. This implies that ^r[A], and thus £^[e], 
will be larger for preferences with increasing relative risk 
aversion29. I will compute results for both kinds of prefer­
ences and test the sensitivity of the results to the assumed 
values of these elasticities.
2Q Preferences enter into the determination of the elasticity of e via 
and the portfolio balance model.
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The remaining parameter is p, the elasticity of relative 
risk aversion. From the argument leading to Equation 4.30 we 
have:
(1 ~ P)2 = a2/a 2
The value of a2 = 0.713 has already been specified. With the 
assumption that H is distributed A aj2) , a value for aj2 
can be derived from the Lorenz (Gini) coefficient for A from 
the relation Lu = 2N(au/V21 0,1) - 1. It appears that Gini 
coefficients for the distribution of financial wealth in the 
workforce have not been reported in the literature; however, 
an approximate value can be inferred from Gini coefficients of 
total household wealth for the employed.
Table 4-4 lists Gini coefficients derived from several 
cross-sectional studies of households. Gini coefficients for 
measures of the household wealth of workers are shown in Wolff 
(1980) and Diaz-Gimenez et al (1997). The Gini coefficients 
in Table 4-4 correspond to broader definitions of wealth than 
the one used in this thesis30. What is needed here is an 
empirically derived Gini coefficient for the size distrib-
30The data in Table 4-3 exemplifies some of the methodological problems in 
the measurement of wealth. Different investigators have utilized different data 
bases, made different adjustments to the data, and employed different definitions 
of wealth. Consequently, Gini coefficients from different studies are not 
strictly comparable.
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Total Sample Net Worth 0.74 Weicher (1997)
1992 SCF
Total Sample Net Worth 0.73 Weicher (1997)
0.83 Wolff (1998)
Total Sample Net Worth 0.78 Diaz-Gimeniz,
Quadrini, &
All Workers 0.74 Rios—Rull (1997)
MESP: a synthetic data base constructed by Richard Ruggles in the 1970's for the NBER. 
SCF: Survey of Consuner Finances, Federal Reserve Board.
SIPP: Survey of Income and Program Participation, US Bureau of the Census.
^Total Assets *  financial assets ♦ home equity ♦ consuner durables + business equity.
Disposable Health *  Total Assets ♦ other real estate ♦ cash value of pensions - debt.
Marketable Wealth *  Disposable Wealth - consumer durables.
Net Worth *  Total Assets plus autos and other real estate - debt.
Financial Assets = Marketable Wealth - home equity.
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ution of Treasury securities, equities and money in the 
workforce population; in lieu of that, a rough estimate will 
be conjured from the data in Table 4-4.
It is well known that financial wealth is more concen­
trated than household net worth in total population. (A Gini 
coefficient of 0.90 vs. 0.80.) That may not be true of the 
labor force, however, because financial assets are held 
disproportionally by the very rich who are not labor force 
participants in the sense being used here. Wolff (1995) 
shows that the richest 10% of households own approximately 90% 
of stocks and bonds and 60% of deposits. Excluding this top 
tier would leave 10% of stocks and bonds and 40% of deposits 
to be held by the workforce. The degree of concentration of 
these remaining financial assets in the workforce population 
is unknown, but it is most certainly less than their concen­
tration in the total population. In order to proceed, I will 
make an instrumental assumption (based on Table 4-4) that the 
Gini coefficient for the size distribution of financial assets 
in the workforce lies within the range of 0.66 to 0.74. I 
will choose the midpoint of this range, 0.70, and test for 
sensitivity to the upper limit of 0.74. The value of 0.70 is 
close to the Gini coefficients of wealth for the middle
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quintiles of household income in the 1989 SCF, and also for 
the SIPP data31.
Setting 2N(ffu/V2 10,1) = 0.70 yields au2 = 2.15281, and 
this in turn gives:
p = 1 - a/Oa = 1 - (.8444)/(1.4672) = .424
The corresponding value for Lu = 0.74 is p = .471.
This completes the initial calibration of the model. 
Computational results are presented in the next section.
4.5.3 Computational Results
It may be helpful to restate the purpose of the investi­
gation at this stage. The key question is: Does this
calibrated labor supply function exhibit positive elasticities 
of both A and e£v over a relevant range of labor-force 
participation rates in response to a one-time increase in 
money? If so, then the function exhibits procyclical wage- 
elasticity, suggesting that its underlying economic mechanism 
could serve as an explanation of countercyclical markups and 
procyclical real wages. If not, then we have another
32Wolff (1998) points out that, unlike the SCF, the upper tail of the 
wealtb distribution is missing from both the SIPP and PSID data bases, making 
them more useful for studying the wealth accumulation behavior of the middle 
class.
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counter factual model and the problem introduced in Chapter I 
remains.
A positive money-elasticity of A(w) at a real wage wQ 
implies that an open-market purchase will increase the supply 
of labor at that wage. A positive money-elasticity of e at 
the same real wage wQ means that e is procyclical at that 
wage; this occurs when the relative density of reservation 
ages increases at that wage. If both elasticities are
positive over a range of wages, it implies that labor supply 
increases with procyclical elasticity over that range. A 
relevant range of the aggregate real wage for the U. S. 
economy would correspond to a range of labor-force participa­
tion rates of 65% to 80%. which encompasses the observed rates 
for the aggregate labor force. [(Ehrenberg and Smith (1991); 
Economic Report of the President, 1992), Table B-34]. Since 
this aggregate labor supply function is a cumulative Lognormal 
distribution, labor-force participation rates are the values 
of the function, which can be obtained from tables of the 
standard Normal distribution N(z|0,l) . For example, the mean 
wage of $500 for this three-parameter Lognormal distribution 
corresponds to an LFPR of N( .4164610,1) = 66.0%. Thus,
elasticities at and above the mean reservation wage will be 
relevant.
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Finally, where the elasticities are both positive, their 
magnitudes should be realistic in terms of the money-employ- 
ment relationship. At the end of 1991 the civilian workforce 
was 125.7 million, representing a labor-force participation 
rate of 66% of the total population. The unemployment rate 
was 7.1%, and total employment was 116.7 million workers. At 
the same time, nominal M2 was $3,439 Trillion, and had grown 
at a rate of 3.0% over the previous 12 months. Given these 
numbers, an M2 labor supply elasticity of +1 would imply that 
a 1% ($34.4 Billion) one-time increase in M2 would induce a 1% 
increase in aggregate labor supply (1.25 million workers). 
With an M2 multiplier of approximately 8, this would corres­
pond to a 4.3 Billion (1.4%) increase in the monetary base of 
$317 Billion. The monetary base actually grew by 6.4% during 
1991, so the implied expansionary policy would constitute 22% 
of the total monetary base expansion for the year. A monetary 
elasticity of labor supply of +2 would require only one-half 
as much increase in the monetary base.
Fifteen cases were computed, each representing a differ­
ent parameterization of the model. The details are shown in 
Exhibits 4-1 through 4-16 located at the end of this section. 
The results are summarized in Table 4-5.
The computational setup (in Mathcad 4.0) for the homo-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
188
thetic Case H is shown in Exhibit: 4-1 (a); computed values and 
graphs are shown in Exhibit 4-1(b). The M2-elasticity of
labor supply is positive over the entire range of wages, but 
the M2-elasticity of e is positive only up to the weekly wage 
of $395, corresponding to a labor-force participation rate 
(LFPR) of (N(—.110,1) = 46.0%. Above that wage the elasticity 
is negative and e is countercyclical. At the mean reserva­
tion wage of $500 the elasticity of e is -0.5 and e is 
countercyclical32. In fact, e is countercyclical over the
entire relevant range of reservation wages. This result is 
consistent with the main conclusion of Chapter III, i. e., it 
is not possible for e to be procyclical at the average 
aggregate wage if preferences are homothetic.
I will now turn to the results of the nonhomothetic cases 
NH-1 through NH-7.
To represent preferences with increasing relative risk 
aversion requires that the elasticity of the reservation wage 
function $(v) be an increasing function of nonlabor income v., 
i. e.r > 0. (See Section 4.2.5 and the proof in Appendix
3 2Aitchison and Brown (1963) argue that the median (geometric mean ef1) is 
a more logical measure of central tendency for the Lognormal distribution. In the 
homothetic case of Exhibit 4-1, e is slightly countercyclical at the median of 
$410 with an elasticity there of -.083. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence on 
acyclical real wages relates to the equilibrium real wage, which appears to be 
in. the vicinity of the mean of $500, at a labor-force participation rate of 66%.
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Table 4-5. Computational Results of the Labor supply Model






ERM EflM rM[e]a ■'TT +LFPR“
4-1 H .70 .8 -.15 1.0 -0.5 $ 395 46.0%
4-2 NH-1 .70 .8 -.15 1.1 +0.5 $ 835 71.2%
4-3 NH-2 1.3 +1.3 1,300 74 .4
4-4 NH-3 1.5 +2.1 1,599 75.9
4-5 NH-4 -.25 1.1 +0.34 730 70.1
4-6 NH-5 -.05 1.1 +1.3 1,300 74.4
4-7 NH-6 .95 -.15 1.1 +0.33 682 69.5
4-8 NH-7 .74 .8 -.15 1.1 +0.06 539 66.9
4-9 NH-8 .70 .8 -.15 IcMc +3.0 $ 694 77.1%
4-10 NH-9 -.25 *** +1.9 664 76.8
4-11 NH-10 .5 -.15 *** +3.5 720 78.1
4-12 NH-11 .8 -.10 *** +4.5 714 77.9
4-13 NH-12 .74 .8 -.15 *** +1.8 663 76.0
4-14 NH-13 .70 .95 -.25 1.05 +0.05 575 66.5%
4-15 NH-14 .95 -.25 tir* +1.7 647 75.2
4-16 NH-15 .74 .10 -.15 *** +2.6 752 77.9
BMP = 2J,[P]; ERM = ^[M*]; EflM = ^[M*] f L = Gini Coefficient 
of nonlabor income. Lu = Gini coefficient of wealth.
is the elasticity of e at the mean reservation wage of 
$500 per week, where the labor-force participation rate is 66.0%.
+ W  and +LFPR* are the maximum reservation wage and labor-force 
participation rate for which the elasticity of e is positive.
*** EQM * 5 = 61n(w +1), which increases with w.
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section D3.). The simplest specification is that 5* — 6 > 0, 
a constant, from which it follows that:33
i - Sv
» = t(v)= exp(5v)-l (4.34)
v = f-1(v) = g(o) = (In (w + 1 ))/S 
0 * ^wCg] = w/[(w+l)ln(o+l) ]
This specification was implemented by substituting the 
function g(w) in place of w as the argument of A(w|jLi,a2) in 
the elasticity equations 4.25 and 4.26 of Section 4.4.
This is facilitated by setting:34
z = (ln[g(w)] - n)/a, 
whereupon g(w) = exp (m + oz) = ln(w(z) + l) (4.35)
and w(z) = exp(fexp(/i + az)) - l
Setting the constants of integration to 1 in the derivation of the 
reservation wage function if implies that 5(0) = 0 and f(0) = 0, i. e., 
workers without nonlabor income have a reservation wage equal to the minimum 
weekly wage t = $200.
34In principle the chain rule for the elasticity of a composite function, 
which is the basis for Equations 4.6 and 4.7, can also be used, but y ] and ?[6] 
are functions of g(w) and the integrals in Equations 4.25 and 4.26 still have to 
be evaluated. The transformation between the Normal and Lognormal makes this 
straightforward.
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Equations 4.31 and 4.32 were evaluated using the standard 
Normal distributions q>(z) and N(z|0,l) as before, and the 
results were transformed back in terms of w(z) using Equation 
4.35. The constant parameter S was set to calibrate the 
distribution at the mean reservation wage of $500 per week, 
and incorporates the scale factor h - 40 hours in a work week. 
All of this is shown in the computational setup for the non- 
homothetic case NH-1 in Exhibit 4-2(a).
Table 4-5 shows the results for this representation of 
nonhomothetic preferences, for assumed values of 1.1, 1.3 and
1.5 for EftM, representing the range of values estimated by 
Meltzer (1963),[l. 15]; Laidler (1971),[1.4]; and Friedman 
(1959), [1.8] The elasticities of both A and e are positive 
and larger than in the homothetic case, and increase with EflM. 
(See Table 4-5 and Exhibits 4-2(b) through 4-4(b). In Case 
NH-1 the M2-elasticity of e at the mean reservation wage of 
$500 is +0.5 and increases significantly with the higher 
values of EflM in Cases NH-2 and NH-3. More importantly, it is 
positive up to a reservation wage of $1,599 per week, corres­
ponding to a labor-force participation rate (LFPR) of 75.9%. 
For this particular specification of nonhomothetic preferences 
and monetary elasticities, e is procyclical and elastic with 
respect to a one-time change in M2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
192
Using the parameters of case NH-1 as a benchmark, Cases 
NH—4, 5 and 6 test the partial sensitivity of the results to 
changes in the assumed values of the monetary elasticities ERM 
and EMP. Increasing ERM to -.25 (which is about the largest 
estimate found for T-bond interest elasticity and is five 
times the average estimate for T-bills) reduced the magnitude 
of slightly, from +0.5 to +0.34, and lowered the upper
bound of its positive range slightly, to 70.1%. Reducing ERM 
to -.05 had precisely the same effect on the benchmark case as 
increasing EflM from 1.1 to 1.3. Increasing EMP to 0.95 in 
Exhibit 4-7 had about the same effect on the benchmark case as 
increasing ERM from -.15 to -.25, and decreasing EMP to 0.5 
(not shown) increased the elasticities and positive range by 
small amounts. Thus, it appears that for this specification 
of nonhomothetic preferences, implications of the model are 
somewhat sensitive to the assumed values of the monetary 
elasticities, although there is a vector of empirically 
supported values for which the elasticity of e at the mean 
wage is positive.
The computed results of the benchmark Case NH-1 were not 
sensitive to small changes in the Gini coefficient for 
nonlabor income. However, Case NH-7 (Exhibit 4-8) indicates 
that there are limits to the degree of wealth inequality for 
which this model will exhibit procyclical elasticities. 
Increasing the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution
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from .70 to .74 (which corresponds to p = .471) reduced the 
elasticity of € at the mean to +0.06 and made e counter­
cyclical above it35. Increasing the Gini to 0.8 (not shown) 
produced results very close to the nonhomothetic case (Exhibit 
4—1(b), with £Jj[A] < 1. This result implies that monetary 
policy would have a weaker influence on aggregate labor supply 
if the concentration of financial wealth in the workforce were 
greater than a Gini coefficient of 0.74.
Cases NH-8 through NH-13 are based on an alternative rep­
resentation of preferences in the model. In Cases NH-l,-2 and 
-3, was treated as exogenous and results were obtained
for arbitrary values of 1.1, 1.5, and 1.5. For each case, 
was assumed to be constant over the full range of v and 
w. This appears to be inconsistent with the nonhomothetic 
specification that >0, because both and £ measure
the proportional response of workers to a change in a scale 
variable. The reservation wage function t(r(v) can be inter­
preted as the Engel curve of the demand for leisure in the 
constrained work/leisure choice problem of Section 4.2.3, with 
S as its elasticity. If leisure and money balances are 
complements and are luxury goods and if preferences have
Note that elasticity of e of 0 at the mean reservation wage is still 
more procyclical than in the homothetic case, where the elasticity of at the mean 
is -0.5. This can also be seen by comparing the graphs of Exhibits 4-1 and 4-8 
at the mean, reservation wage of $500.
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increasing relative risk aversion, then the wealth elasticity 
of the demand for money balances should change proportionally 
with the income elasticity of the demand for leisure36. This 
feature can be incorporated in the model by setting:
S'aCM*] = I (4.36)
so that [M*3] is endogenous and will increase at the same 
rate as C* For the present reservation wage function 
£ = Sm  — ln(w + 1), which is greater than one for 
v > e - l  = 1.7l8 However, this function causes to
increase too rapidly, producing values in excess of 2.0 around 
the mean, which are not supported by empirical evidence. The 
alternative specification utilized in Cases NH-7 through NH-11 
is:
I = 6v5, 0 < S < 1
♦ (v) = exp(v5) - 1
g(w) = [ln(w + l)]1/6 = v (4.37)
w(z) = exp[exp[6(/* + za) ]] - l 
6v5 = 51n(w(z) +1)
This assumes that relative risk aversion increases at approximately the 
same rate in. both subutiity functions U(c,£) and H(f,m). There is no a priori 
reason for this to be true, but neither is there any empirical evidence to the 
contrary. One could argue that risk is risk, and aversion to it should be 
similar in different contexts. The subutility functions could be parameterized 
to allow for differences in Rg.
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Exhibit: 4-9 (a) shows the computational setup for this specifi­
cation. A value of 0.305 for S calibrates the mean reserv­
ation wage at r + $300 = $500. From Equation 4.37, = $2v6_1
= £2[ln(w + I)]15”1)/6, and since S < 1, this specification 
produces a lower growth rate in that declines with v.
The computed results for this nonhomothetic specification 
are shown in Table 4-5 and Exhibits 4-9 through 4-13. Case 
NH-8 is the basic elasticity computation with the same 
parameter values as in NH-1. The elasticity of e at the mean 
is +3.0 and e is procyclical up to a LFPR of 77.1%. The value 
of the endogenous elasticity in Equation 4.36 is +1.56
at the median wage and +1.74 at the mean. These values are 
close to that for Case NH-3 and represent strong relative risk 
aversion and procyclicality of A and e. Because the reserv­
ation wage functions f in Exhibits 4-2 (b) and 4-9 (b) are 
different, the respective density functions of reservation 
wages are different even though they are based on the same 
underlying distribution of nonlabor income A(v|n,o2). The 
essential difference between these two nonhomothetic represen­
tations is that the first reservation wage function is a 
strong downward compression of the distribution of nonlabor 
income, and the second one is much less so.
Cases NH-9 through NH-12 perform the same sensitivity 
tests as in NH-4 through NH-6. This specification has about
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the same degree of sensitivity to the value of £^ .[Md] (compare 
Cases NH-9 and NH-4), and to the value of Lu (Case NH-7 and 
NH—12) . This version of the model can tolerate a higher Gini 
coefficient for wealth (0.74), undoubtedly due to its higher 
elasticity of relative risk aversion.
Cases NH-13 and NH-14 test each of the two model specifi­
cations for a "worst-case" situation where money is almost 
neutral (EMP = .95), the interest-elasticity of M2 is high 
(-.25) , and the wealth-elasticity of money demand is relative­
ly low (1.05). The result in each case is a small but positive 
elasticity of e at the mean, and a reduction of 3-4% on the 
upper bound LFPR's. The parameters most critical to these 
results are p, the wealth-elasticity of Rr, and ^j[Md, the 
wealth-elasticity of money demand, which has to be greater 
than 1 for e to be procyclical at the mean reservation wage.
Finally, in Exhibit 4-16 (b), NH-15, I show a "New
Keynesian" case, with sticky prices (^[P] = *10), low
elasticity of money demand (^[M*1] = -.15), a wealth Gini of 
0.74, and endogenous wealth elasticity of money demand37. 
The result is a procyclical elasticity of + 2.6 for e at the 
mean wage, which remains procyclical up to the LFPR of 77.9%.
To be rigorous here, a low value of 8J,[P] implies sticky prices only in 
a dynamic framework. In the static framework of Chapters II and V prices jump 
instantaneously, but with a low value of £^[P], not very far.
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The elasticity of A in the vicinity of the mean is about 
+1.25. Thus, New Keynesian price rigidities would enhance 
the procyclical results of this model.
In all of these cases, e is procyclical at the mean 
reservation wage of $500 and LFPR of 66%. In general, the 
upper bound LFPR's are in the range of 70 -78%. Killingsworth 
(1983, p. 103) claims that labor-force participation rates for 
women are in the 50% - 60% range, and for men are 80% - 90%. 
Ehrenberg and Smith (1991) quote participation rates of 77% 
for men, 58% for women, and 67% total,B, from BLS data for 
1979 This agrees with the figure of 66% for 1991 in the 1992 
Economic Report of the President. The upper-bound LFPR' s shown 
in Table 4-5 indicate that the range of procyclical e includes 
all of these figures, and therefore the results are relevant 
to the U. S. labor market. Of course, the elasticity of e 
will be small if the equilibrium real wage in the economy is 
close to the upper-bound LFPR of 78%.
Thus, it appears that the aggregate labor supply function 
developed in this chapter is capable of exhibiting strongly 
procyclical elasticity of A and e over a relevant range of 
labor-force participation rates, for plausible values of its 
parameters. This is conditional on the assumption that 
consumer preferences have increasing relative risk aversion.
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It was established in Chapters I and III that procyclical 
elasticity of labor supply at the equilibrium wage is a 
sufficient condition for the markdown of the real wage from 
labor's marginal product to be countercyclical. This follows 
directly from the markdown relationship:
PF£/W = [1 + 1/e] = e
Thus, the model can serve as one explanation of countercyc­
lical markups, i. e., as countercyclical markdowns in a 
monpsonistic labor markets. It remains to be determined 
whether the magnitudes of the elasticities sshown here are 
large enough to offset the negative elasticity of an aggregate 
labor demand function and cause the equilibrium real wage to 
be acyclical or procyclical. This analysis is carried out in 
Chapter V.
In the first set of computations (Cases NH-1 through 
NH-7) . both the magnitude of the elasticity of e at the mean 
wage and the range of LFPR's for which the elasticity was 
positive were sensitive to changes in the monetary elastici­
ties £Jj[P], and , and the assumed Gini coefficient
for wealth. In the second set (Cases NH-8 through NH-12) the 
model was more stable with respect to changes in these 
parameters. A sensitivity test indicated that, if the Gini 
coefficient of the distribution of wealth in the workforce
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were higher than 0.74, it would be difficult to obtain a 
positive e ] above the mean wage without assuming extreme 
values for the monetary elasticities.
The benchmark Cases NH-1 (Exhibit 4-2) and NH-8 (Exhibit 
4-9 were parameterized conservatively with respect to the 
price-elasticity of money supply and the interest-elasticity 
of money demand. If prices are sticky, in the sense that the 
short-run elasticity of the price level with respect to money 
is less than 0.8, and/or the interest-elasticity of M2 demand 
is less than -.15, then this model will predict even stronger 
procyclicality of A and e.
The interest-elasticity of the demand for money balances 
plays a key role in the model, as it does in the 
monetary policy effectiveness debate. Low elasticities imply 
that exogenous changes in the money supply will have a strong 
influence on interest rates and aggregate demand in the short 
run. (The monetarist view is that the influence is too strong 
and destabilizing.) Similarly, in the model of this chapter, 
with nonhomothetic preferences the procyclical behavior of 
labor supply and its elasticity is driven by the reciprocal of 
i low values therefore imply that monetary policy has a 
strong influence on aggregate labor supply. This is consis­
tent with its influence on aggregate demand. Also, to the 
extent that the money demand function is unstable due to
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disintermediation or changes in the velocity of money, the 
money-elasticity of aggregate labor supply will also be 
unstable.
4.6 Conclusions
I have shown in this chapter that, by abandoning the 
representative agent framework and incorporating heterogeneity 
of labor as an endogenous characteristic, it is possible to 
construct a model of the aggregate labor market that appears 
to be more consistent with some persistent stylized facts of 
macroeconomics —  facts which the representative agent is 
powerless to explain.
The analysis in this chapter has revealed a potential 
source of countercyclical markdowns and procyclical elasticity 
of aggregate labor supply: (1) nonhomothetic preferences with 
increasing relative risk aversion, and (2) an aggregate labor 
supply function based on the distribution of financial wealth 
and nonlabor income in the workforce, the shift characteris­
tics of which are determined by the effects of central bank 
open-market operations.
Increasing relative risk aversion implies that the 
elasticities of the demand for leisure and the demand for real 
money balances increase with income or wealth. The method of
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aggregation employed in this chapter was distributional: the
entire distribution of heterogeneous characteristics (in this 
instance, nonlabor income and risk aversion) was modeled and 
formed the structure of an aggregate labor supply function. 
That function is a composite function of (a) a Lognormal 
distribution of nonlabor income and (b) a reservation wage 
function relating individual reservation wages to nonlabor 
income. The cyclical properties of this aggregate labor supply 
function were then investigated.
The Lognormal aggregate labor supply function developed 
in this chapter exhibited procyclical elasticity at labor- 
force participation rates of up to 78% for plausible values of 
its parameters. This result holds only for nonhomothetic 
preferences with increasing relative risk aversion. This 
property, together with the assumption of monopsony power in 
the labor market, makes this aggregate labor supply model a 
viable candidate for explaining countercyclical markdowns, 
which requires only that e be procyclical.
Whether the elasticity properties of this labor supply 
function can also serve to explain acyclical or procyclical 
real wages is a more complicated question. First, there is 
the question of whether the magnitudes of e] are large 
enough to offset the negative elasticity of the aggregate 
marginal product of labor curve in the standard monopsony
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labor market model (See Equation (3.15) in section 3.5.2 and 
the conclusions of that section, in Chapter III) . This raises 
the empirical question of what the elasticity of the aggregate 
marginal product of labor is, and how to characterize aggre­
gate labor demand in a monopsony model38. Finally, the 
behavior of the labor supply function drived in this chapter 
depends on nonhomogeneous relative demands for financial 
assets and money, which may have other macroeconomic implica­
tions. Therefore, this question needs to be investigated in 
a general equilibrium framework similar to the model of 
Chapter II, That is the objective of Chapter V.
What can be claimed for this model is that it implies 
that, with increasing relative risk aversion in monopsonistic 
labor markets, real wages will be less countercyclical than 
they would be in a representative agent model of labor supply. 
As discussed in Chapter I, aggregate real wages have been at 
most mildly procyclical, and then only at certain times and 
under certain conditions. An acyclical real wage is also 
consistent with the empirical record. What is encouraging is 
that the computed magnitudes of £^[e] at the mean in the 
calibrated version of this model are in the range of +3 to
38Hecall, from Chapter III, that a monopsonist does not have a demand 
schedule that ie Independent of the elasticity of supply.
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+5 for reasonable ranges of the parameters, and e is strongly 
procyclical at the observed labor-force participation rate of 
66%.
In contrast with the representative agent labor market of 
Chapter II, the wealth effects in labor supply in this chapter 
are distributed, and depend on the particular functional forms 
used to represent nonhomothetic preferences and the distribu­
tion of wealth in the workforce. The results obtained here 
are specific to the Lognormal distribution; they cannot be 
obtained, for example, with the Pareto distribution. However, 
the research literature indicates that the Lognormal may be 
the best choice in this context. If the representative agent 
framework is abandoned, then distributions of heterogeneous 
agent characteristics, such as wealth, tastes for work and 
leisure, and aversion to risk will matter for macroeconomic 
outcomes. It is important to represent these distributions by 
functional forms that have theoretical and empirical justifi­
cation.
The model developed in this chapter articulates a 
monetary theory of aggregate labor supply for heterogeneous 
workers. The aggregate labor supply function is directly 
related to the size distribution of financial wealth in the 
workforce. With real wealth as a shift variable in the labor 
supply function, it is not surprising that non-neutral
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monetary policy actions will have an affect on labor supply. 
That was established back in Chapter II. What is new in this 
chapter is that the distributive wealth effects of a Lognormal 
distribution cause the elasticity of labor supply to be 
strongly procyclical over a relevant range of labor-force 
participation rates. In addition to reducing per capita real 
wealth, an increase in money reduces the inequality of the 
size distribution of wealth, which increases the elasticity of 
aggregate labor supply in the vicinity of the mean reservation 
wage. In this model the inequality of the distribution of 
financial wealth matters for labor market outcomes, and 
incidentally, for monetary policy effectiveness.
The willingness of risk-averse agents to adjust their 
portfolio balances in response to changes in expected returns 
on financial assets is an important question in monetary 
theory, since it helps to determine the interest-elasticity of 
the money demand function. And so it is also in this aggre­
gate labor supply function, where the non-neutrality of open- 
market operations, the portfolio balance decision, and the 
elasticity of the Keynesian liquidity preference function play 
major roles in determining the cyclical properties of the 
aggregate labor supply function. The critical assumption 
here, however, is that consumers have increasing relative risk 
aversion with respect to the leisure-labor decision and the 
portfolio balance decision, from which it follows that the
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income-elasticity of leisure demand and the wealth-elasticity 
of money demand are both significantly greater than unity. 
Without that assumption, the model has no important implica­
tions for the cyclicality of markdowns and real wages.
These monetary ideas are not without controversy, and the 
model presented here is subject to some of the same disagree­
ments and criticisms that have been associated with the 
monetary policy effectiveness debate. Nevertheless, from an 
historical perspective the aggregate labor supply model 
presented in this chapter may be viewed as a somewhat belated 
followup of Keynes' attempt to construct a monetary theory of 
production.
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LFPR W
cnotm(z)w(z) » r EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 216.673 0 -1622
0.00187 218.142 -0.68 -1.634
0.00256 219.74 -1.079 -0.94
0.00347 221.48 -1.287 -0.451
0.00466 223.373 -1.367 -0.104
0.00621 225.432 -1J6 0.142
0.0082 227.673 -1.295 0.317
0.01072 230.111 -1 .192 0.441
0.0139 232.765 -1.066 0.527
0.01786 235.652 -0.926 0.586
0.02275 238.793 -0.779 0.625
0.02872 242.212 -0.631 0.648
0.03593 245.931 -0.484 0.659
0.04457 249.979 -0.342 0.661
0.0548 254.382 -0.205 0.656
0.06681 259.174 -0.077 0.644
0.08076 264.389 0.044 0.627
0.0968 270.062 0.156 0.605
0.11507 276.236 0.258 0.578
0.13567 282.954 0.351 0.548
0.15866 290.263 0.434 0.513
0.18406 298.217 0.507 0.475
0.21186 306.871 0.571 0.432
0.24196 316.288 0.626 0.386
0.27425 326.535 0.671 0.335
0.30854 337.68S 0.707 0.279
0.34458 349.817 0.735 0.218
0.38209 363.019 0.754 0.152
0.42074 377.383 0.765 0.08
0.46017 393.014 0.769 0.002
0.5 410.021 0.766 -0.083
0.53983 428.528 0.756 -0.174
0.57926 448.665 0.74 -0.274
0.61791 470.576 0.719 -0.382
0.65542 494.418 0.693 -0.498
0.69146 520.361 0.663 -0.625
0.72575 548.59 0.63 -0.761
0.75804 579.307 0.594 -0.908
0.78814 612.73 0.555 -1.067
0.81594 649.098 0.515 -1.238
0.84134 688.671 0.475 -1.422
0.86433 731.731 0.434 -1.619
0.88493 778.585 0.393 -1.831
0.9032 829.568 0.354 -2.056
0.91924 885.043 0.315 -2297
0.93319 945.406 0.279 -1554
0.9452 1011.088 0.245 -2.826
0.95543 1081558 0.213 -3.114
0.96407 1160.326 0.183 -3.418
0.97128 1244.946 0.157 -3.739
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EXHIBIT 4-2(b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE I
EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 [200.373 0 -22.501
0.00187 200.412 -5.963 -14.763
0.00256 200.456 -9.703 -9.313
0.00347 200.505 -11.924 -5.444
0.00466 200.56 -13.105 -2.678
0.00621 200.622 -13.574 -0.688
0.0082 200.693 -13.556 0.751
0.01072 200.773 -13.207 1.796
0.0139 200.865 -12.637 2.557
0.01786 200.97 -11.924 3.111
0.02275 201.092 -11.121 3.512
0.02872 201.232 -10.268 3.8
0.03593 201.396 -9.392 4.002
0.04457 201.588 -8.515 4.138
0.0548 201.814 -7.65 4.224
0.06681 202.082 -6.808 4.269
0.08076 202.404 -5.997 4.282
0.0968 202.792 -5.222 4.267
0.11507 203.264 -4.487 4.23
0.13567 203.846 -3.795 4.172
0.15866 204.569 -3.148 4.095
0.18406 205.478 -2.546 4.001
0.21186 206.638 -1.991 3.889
0.24196 208.136 -1.482 3.761
0.27425 210.103 -1.02 3.616
0.30854 212.726 -0.603 3.453
0.34458 216.289 -0.232 3.272
0.38209 221.225 0.096 3.071
0.42074 228-209 0.382 2.849
0.46017 238.324 0.626 2.605
0.5 253.347 0.832 2.336
0.53983 276.281 1 2.042
0.57926 312-355 1.133 1.719
0.61791 370.977 1-233 1.366
0.65542 469.677 1.302 0.98
0.69146 642.393 1.344 0-559
0.72575 957.602 1-36 0.099
0.75804 1559.787 1.354 -0.401
0.78814 2768.969 1.328 -0.945
0.81594 5332.314 1.285 -1.536
0.84134 11096.932 1.229 -2.176
0.86433 24921.912 1.161 -1868
0.88493 60483.124 1.085 -3.616
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2 1 0
LFPR W
cnorm(z)w(z) *  x EA(z) He(z)
0.00135 200.373 0 -33.703
0.00187 200.412 -8.94 -22.163
0.00256 200.456 -14.562 -14.031
0.00347 200.505 •17.918 -8.258
0.00466 200.56 ■ 19.721 -4.129
0.00621 200.622 -20.458 -1.156
0.0082 200.693 -20.466 0.995
0.01072 200.773 -19.978 2.56
0.0139 200.865 -19.159 3.701
0.01786 200.97 -18.122 4.534
0.02275 201.092 -16.949 5.139
0.02872 201.232 -15.699 5.576
0.03593 201396 -14.413 5.885
0.04457 201.588 -13.121 6.097
0.0548 201.814 -11.845 6.235
0.06681 202.082 -10.601 6.312
0.08076 202.404 -9.401 6.342
0.0968 202.792 -8.252 6.332
0.11507 203.264 -7.161 6.288
0.13567 203.846 -6.131 6.214
0.15866 204.569 -5.166 6.113
0.18406 205.478 -4.267 5.987
0.21186 206.638 -3.435 5.837
0.24196 208.136 -2.67 5.663
0.27425 210.103 -1.973 5.465
0.30854 212.726 -1.342 5.242
0.34458 216.289 -0.776 4.992
0.38209 221.225 -0.274 4.716
0.42074 228.209 0.166 4.409
0.46017 238.324 0.546 4.071
0.5 253.347 0.869 3.699
0.53983 276.281 1.137 3.29
0.57926 312.355 1.354 2.842
0.61791 370.977 1.522 2.351
0.65542 469.677 1.645 1.813
0.69146 642393 1.727 1.225
0.72575 957.602 1.771 0.584
0.75804 1559.787 1.782 -0.115
0.78814 2768.969 1.763 -0.877
0.81594 5332.314 1.719 -1.704
0.84134 11096.932 1.653 -2.601
0.86433 24921.912 1.571 -3.572
0.88493 60483.124 1.475 -4.621
0.9032 159206.05 1.369 -5.753
0.91924 457019.452 1.257 -6.969
0.93319 1.441-106 1.143 -8.274
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LFPR W
cnorm(z]w (z) -c x EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 200.373 0 -56.107
0.00187 200.412 -14.894 -36.961
0.00256 200.456 -24.282 -23.467
0.00347 200.505 -29.906 -13.885
0.00466 200.56 -32.951 -7.03
0.00621 200.622 -34.225 -2.093
0.0082 200.693 -34.285 1.484
0.01072 200.773 -33.521 4.088
0.0139 200.865 -32.201 5.989
0.01786 200.97 -30.517 7.379
0.02275 201.092 -28.605 8.394
0.02872 201.232 -26.56 9.128
0.03593 201.396 -24.453 9.652
0.04457 201.588 -22.333 10.016
0.0548 201.814 -20.236 10.256
0.06681 202.082 -18.188 10.398
0.08076 202.404 -16.209 10.461
0.0968 202.792 -14.313 10.46
0.11507 203.264 -12.508 10.403
0-13567 203.846 -10.803 10.298
0.15866 204.569 -9.202 10.15
0.18406 205.478 -7.708 9.961
0.21186 206.638 -6.323 9.733
0.24196 208.136 -5.046 9.468
0.27425 210.103 -3.879 9.163
0.30854 212.726 -2.819 8.819
0.34458 216.289 -1.866 8.434
0.38209 221.225 -1.016 8.005
0.42074 228.209 -0.266 7.53
0.46017 238.324 0.385 7.004
0.5 253.347 0.943 6.425
0.53983 276.281 1.412 5.788
0.57926 312.355 1.796 5.088
0.61791 370.977 2.101 4.32
0.65542 469.677 2.331 3.479
0.69146 642.393 2.494 2.559
0.72575 957.602 2.594 1.553
0.75804 1559.787 2.639 0.456
0.78814 2768.969 2.634 -0.739
0.81594 5332.314 2.587 -2.039
0.84134 11096.932 2.503 -3.45
0.86433 24921.912 2.39 -4.98
0.88493 60483.124 2.254 -6.633
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2 1 2
LFPR W
cncxm(z)w(z) -< t EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 200.373 0 14.65897
0.00187 200.412 -3.87888 -9J8413
0.00256 200.456 -6.30069 -6.01011
0.00347 200JOS -7.728 -3.47434
0.00466 200.56 -8.4748 -1.66283
0.00621 200.622 -8.75585 -0.36083
0.0082 200.693 -8.71915 0.57967
0.01072 200.773 -8.46746 1.26143
0.0139 200.865 -8.07264 1.7563
0.01786 200.97 -7J8528 2.11489
0.02275 201.092 -7.04123 2J7303
0.02872 201.232 -6.46608 2.55632
0.03593 201.396 -5.87816 2.68309
0.04457 201.588 -5.29068 2.76654
0.0548 201.814 •4.71317 2.81621
0.06681 202.082 ■4.15254 2.83901
0.08076 202.404 -3.61378 2.83993
0.0968 202.792 -3.10046 2.82253
0.11507 203.264 ■2.61512 2.78936
0.13567 203.846 -2.1595 2.74216
0.15866 204J69 -1.73475 2.68208
0.18406 205.478 •1.34155 2.6098
0.21186 206.638 -0.98023 2.52564
0.24196 208.136 -0.6508 2.42962
0.27425 210.103 ■0.35303 2.32151
0.30854 212.726 -0.08648 2.20086
0.34458 216.289 0.14948 2.06706
0.38209 221.225 0.35564 1.91929
0.42074 228.209 0.53297 1.75661
0.46017 238.324 0.68256 1.57792
0.5 253J47 0.80563 1.38199
0.53983 276.281 0.90357 1.16744
0.57926 312.355 0.97784 0.93281
0.61791 370.977 1.03006 0.67647
0.65542 469.677 1.06193 0.39674
0.69146 642.393 1.07526 0.09179
0.72575 957.602 1.07192 -0.24024
0.75804 1559.787 1.05385 -0.6013
0.78814 2768.969 1.02305 -0.99337
0.81594 5332.314 0.9815 -1.41844
0.84134 11096.932 0.93119 -1.87852
0.86433 24921.912 0.87408 -2.37555
0.88493 60483.124 0.81205 -19114
0.9032 159206.05 0.74688 -3.48787
0.91924 457019.452 0.68023 -4.1066
0.93319 1.441-106 0.61358 -4.7691
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LFPR W
cnocm(z)w(z) » x EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 200.373 0 -28.102
0.00187 200.412 -7.451 -18.463
0.00256 200.456 -12.132 -11.672
0.00347 200.505 -14.921 -6.851
0.00466 200.56 -16.413 -3.403
0.00621 200.622 -17.016 -0.922
0.0082 200.693 -17.011 0.873
0.01072 200.773 -16.593 2.178
0.0139 200.865 -15.898 3.129
0.01786 200.97 -15.023 3.822
0.02275 201.092 -14.035 4.326
0.02872 201.232 -12.983 4.688
0.03593 201.396 -11.902 4.943
0.04457 201.588 -10.818 5.118
0.0548 201.814 -9.747 5.229
0.06681 202.082 -8.705 5.291
0.08076 202.404 -7.699 5.312
0.0968 202.792 -6.737 5.299
0.11507 203.264 -5.824 5.259
0.13567 203.846 -4.963 5.193
0.15866 204.569 -4.157 5.104
0.18406 205.478 -3.406 4.994
0.21186 206.638 -2.713 4.863
0.24196 208.136 -2.076 4.712
0.27425 210.103 -1.497 4.54
0.30854 212.726 -0.973 4.347
0.34458 216.289 -0.504 4.132
0.38209 221.225 -0.089 3.893
0.42074 228.209 0.274 3.629
0.46017 238.324 0.586 3.338
0 J 253.347 0.85 3.018
0.53983 276.281 1.069 2.666
0.57926 312.355 1.243 2.281
0.61791 370.977 1.377 1.858
0.65542 469.677 1.474 1.396
0.69146 642.393 1.535 0.892
0.72575 957.602 1.566 0.341
0.75804 1559.787 1.568 -0.258
0.78814 2768.969 1.545 -0.911
0.81594 5332.314 1.502 -1.62
0.84134 11096.932 1.441 -2.388
0.86433 24921.912 1.366 -3.22
0.88493 60483.124 1.28 -4.118
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2 1 4
LFPR W
caora»(z)w(z) *  x EA(z) Ee(z) EXHIBIT 4-7 (b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE VI
0.00135 200.373 0 -16.367
0.00187 200.412 -4J3 -10.694
0.00256 200.456 -7.03 -6.699
0.00347 200.505 -8.62 -3.864
0.00466 200.56 ■9.449 -1.84
0.00621 200.622 ■9.758 -0.385
0.0082 200.693 9.712 0.666
0.01072 200.773 -9.426 1.427
0.0139 200.865 -8.98 1.979
0.01786 200.97 ■8.432 2.379
0.02275 201.092 -7.82 2.667
0.02872 201.232 -7.174 2.871
0.03593 201.396 -6.514 3.011
0.04457 201.588 -5.855 3.103
0.0548 201.814 • 5.207 3.157
0.06681 202.082 -4.579 3.181
0.08076 202.404 -3.975 3.181
0.0968 202.792 -3.4 3.16
0.11507 203.264 -2.857 3.121
0.13567 203.846 -2.347 3.067
0.15866 204.569 -1.872 2.997
0.18406 205.478 -1.433 2.915
0.21186 206.638 -1.03 2.818
0.24196 208.136 -0.662 2.708
0.27425 210.103 - 0.331 2.585
0.30854 212.726 -0.034 2.447
0.34458 216.289 0.228 2.295
0.38209 221.225 0.457 2.126
0.42074 228.209 0.653 1.941
0.46017 238.324 0.818 1.737
0 J 253.347 0.953 1.514
0.53983 276.281 1.06 1.27
0.57926 312.355 1.141 1.003
0.61791 370.977 1.196 0.712
0.65542 469.677 1.229 0.394
0.69146 642.393 1.241 0.047
0.72575 957.602 1.235 -0.33
0.75804 1559.787 1.212 -0.741
0.78814 2768.969 1.174 -1.186
0.81594 5332.314 1.125 -1.669
0.84134 11096.932 1.066 -2.191
0.86433 24921.912 1 -2.756
0.88493 60483.124 0.928 -3.364
0.9032 159206.05 0.8S3 -4.018
0.91924 457019.452 0.776 -4.72
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LFPR W
coonn(z)w(z) *  t EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 200373 0 -10.652
0.00187 200.412 -1814 -6.937
0.00256 200.456 -4.562 -4.322
0.00347 200.505 -5384 -1468
0.00466 20036 -6.109 -1.144
0.00621 200.622 -6.294 -0.193
0.0082 200.693 -6347 0.492
0.01072 200.773 -6.045 0.988
0.0139 200.865 -5.74 1347
0.01786 200.97 -5.368 1.606
0.02275 201.092 -4.957 1.791
0.02872 201.232 4.523 1.921
0.03593 201.396 -4.082 1009
0.04457 201388 -3.643 1066
0.0548 201.814 -3313 1097
0.06681 202.082 -1796 1108
0.08076 20Z404 -2.396 1103
0.0968 202.792 -1016 1084
0.11507 203364 -1.659 1053
0.13567 203.846 -1324 1012
0.15866 204369 -1.013 1.96
0.18406 205.478 -0.726 1.899
0.21186 206.638 -0.464 1.829
0.24196 208.136 ■0.226 1.749
0.27425 210.103 -0.012 1.66
030854 212.726 0.178 1.561
034458 216.289 0.344 1.451
038209 221.225 0.488 1.331
0.42074 228.209 0.61 1.198
0.46017 238.324 0.711 1.053
0.S 253.347 0.792 0.894
033983 276.281 0.854 0.721
037926 312.355 0.899 0.531
0.61791 370.977 0.927 0.324
0.65542 469.677 0.939 0.099
0.69146 642.393 0.938 -0.147
0.72575 957.602 0.925 -0.414
0.75804 1559.787 0.901 -0.704
0.7S8I4 2768.969 0.867 -1.018
0.81594 5331314 0.826 -1.358
0.84134 11096.932 0.779 -1.727
0.86433 24921.912 0.728 -2.124
0.88493 60483.124 0.673 -1552
0.9032 159206.05 0.616 -3.011
0.91924 457019.452 0.559 -3.504
0.93319 1.441-106 0.502 -4.032
215
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znorm?A jncd
EXHIBIT 4-9 (a)
ELASTICITY OF ELASTICITY COMPUTATIONS 
LOGNORMAL LABOR SUPPLY FUNCTION
2 1 6
LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION CALIBRATION
z = -3 ,-2 .9 _  1.5 a  =300 P = 510 x .= 200 y =
v •= I 2 2P2 = a  -y
It = In (a) -  .5 a2
O t t
= Jln(y2 1- l)
P2 =9.364* I0 y = 1.02 a  =0.844
L = 2-cnonnj-^ I -  1
W 2/ L =0.45
a =0.713 
(i = 5.347 
p = .424
Calibrate Mean Reservation Wage 
For Nonhomothetic Function f l(z )  = z f2(z) = (z2 - l)-( l  -P)2
2 2 p a
S =
In(tn(a r  1)) 
In(a)
Nonhomothetic Reservation Wage Function
8 =0.305
5 = 8v5 V  = exp(vS) - I g (w) - ln(w -  I)
MONETARY CALIBRATION
M 2 = 3.439 F = 5.035 A  =
EMP = .8 
ERM =-.15
M 2 1- F 
A  =0.594
EQM(z) = 5-In(w(z) r  1)
w(z) = exp<exp(8-(p r z a ) ) )  -  I
Mean = exp[exp[s-(p r  ,5-a2) ] ]  -  I n  
Mean =500
Median = exp(exp(8-p)) - l r t  
Median =  366.057
ERA(z) = 
E M A (z) =





(-ERM  r  A  (EQ M (z) -  1)) Equation (D5.8)
■z /
I f l(z )  I / z2 ]
cnorm(z)
. -3




LOGNORMAL DENSITY FUNCTION 
OF NONLABOR INCOME
K2(z) = a C z ) ~ =  exp(— ) dz-f l- )
\  2 I  \cnonn(z)/
EMA(z)
EACz) -= K .l(z) r  K2(z) (Equation D5.11) M -  ELASTICITY OF AGGREGATE
LABOR SUPPLY
fl(z)Ee(z) := -E A (z )  EMP r  Q (z)-EM A (z) (Equation D6.11)
a
M-ELASTICITY OF AGGREGATE LABOR SUPPLY ELASTICITY
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LFPR W
cnonn(z)w(z) -r t  EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 209.605 0 4.326
0.00187 210.28 0.886 2.259
0.00256 211.017 1.008 1.086
0.00347 211.823 0.692 0.478
0.00466 212.707 0.145 0.227
0.00621 213.677 -0305 0.2
0.0082 214.744 -1.177 0.313
0.01072 215319 -1.821 0.512
0.0139 217316 -2.408 0.762
0.01786 218.651 -2.919 1.044
0.02275 220.241 -3.345 1341
0.02872 222.006 -3.684 1.646
0.03593 223.97 -3.934 1.954
0.04457 226.16 -4.098 2.259
0.0548 228.606 -4.18 2.56
0.06681 231.346 -4.183 2.855
0.08076 234.421 -4.113 3.142
0.0968 237.88 -3.976 3.419
0.11507 241.782 -3.778 3.684
0.13567 246.192 -3325 3.936
0.15866 251.191 -3.225 4.172
0.18406 256.871 -2.884 4.39
0.21186 263343 -2308 4.587
0.24196 270.738 -2.105 4.758
0.27425 279309 -1.682 4.9
030854 288.943 -1.246 5.008
0.34458 300.16 -0.803 5.076
0.38209 313.126 -0.361 5.099
0.42074 328.16 0.075 5.067
0.46017 345.648 0.497 4.974
03 366.057 0.899 4.81
0.53983 389.955 1.277 4.563
0.57926 418.036 1.626 4.222
0.61791 451.148 1.94 3.772
0.65542 490.335 2.216 3.199
0.69146 536.885 2.452 2.486
0.72575 592.393 2.645 1.613
0.75804 658.843 2.793 0.559
0.78814 738.714 2.897 -0.697
0.81594 835.113 2.958 -2.183
0.84134 951.956 2.976 -3.924
0.86433 1094.196 2.955 -5.949
0.88493 1268.128 2.897 -8.292
0.9032 1481.789 2.806 -10.984
0.91924 1745.493 2.688 14.062
0.93319 2072.535 2346 17.563
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LFPR W
cnonn(z)w(z) *■ t EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 209.605 0 -1.924
0.00187 21028 -0.663 -1.591
0.00256 211.017 -1.332 -1.186
0.00347 211.823 -1.956 -0.765
0.00466 212.707 -2.509 -0.355
0.00621 213.677 -2.98 0.032
0.0082 214.744 -3.365 0.39
0.01072 215.919 -3.667 0.72
0.0139 217216 -3.891 1.023
0.01786 218.651 -4.042 1.301
0.02275 220241 -4.124 1.559
0.02872 222.006 -4.145 1.797
0.03593 223.97 -4.109 2.019
0.04457 226.16 -4.023 2.227
0.0548 228.606 -3.89 2.421
0.06681 231.346 -3.715 2.604
0.08076 234.421 -3.505 2.774
0.0968 237.88 -3.262 2.933
0.11507 241.782 -2.992 3.079
0.13567 246.192 -2.699 3.213
0.15866 251.191 -2.387 3.334
0.18406 256.871 -2.06 3.44
0.21186 263.343 -1.724 3.528
0.24196 270.738 -1.381 3.598
0.27425 279.209 -1.036 3.647
0.30854 288.943 -0.693 3.671
0.34458 300.16 -0.357 3.666
0.38209 313.126 -0.03 3.63
0.42074 328.16 0.284 3.556
0.46017 345.648 0.581 3.44
0.5 366.057 0.857 3.275
0.53983 389.955 1.111 3.055
0.57926 418.036 1.34 2.771
0.61791 451.148 1.541 2.416
0.65542 490.335 1.713 1.978
0.69146 536.885 1.855 1.448
0.72575 592.393 1.966 0.813
0.75804 658.843 2.046 0.061
0.78814 738.714 2.095 -0.824
0.81594 835.113 2.115 -1.857
0.84134 951.956 2.107 -3.055
0.86433 1094.196 2.073 -4.435
0.88493 1268.128 2.016 -6.019
0.9032 1481.789 1.939 -7.826
0.91924 1745.493 1.844 -9.878
0.93319 2072.535 1.736 -12.198
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p =0.424 8 = 0.305
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LFPR W
cnoim(z)w(z) -r t EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 209.605 0 3.26
0.00187 21038 0.597 1.518
0.00256 211.017 0.524 0.575
0.00347 211.823 0.079 0.133
0.00466 212.707 -0.553 0.001
0.00621 213.677 -1.255 0.061
0.0082 214.744 -1.956 0.239
0.01072 215.919 -2.613 0.486
0.0139 217316 -3.201 0.774
0.01786 218.651 -3.705 1.084
0.02275 220341 -4.119 1.405
0.02872 222.006 -4.441 1.728
0.03593 223.97 -4.671 2.051
0.04457 226.16 -4.813 2.37
0.0548 228.606 -4.87 2.682
0.06681 231.346 -4.848 2.987
0.08076 234.421 -4.752 3.284
0.0968 237.88 -4.588 3.57
0.11507 241.782 -4.364 3.844
0.13567 246.192 -4.084 4.104
0.15866 251.191 -3.757 4.349
0.18406 256.871 -3.389 4.575
0.21186 263.343 -2.986 4.781
0.24196 270.738 -2.557 4.961
0.27425 279.209 -2.108 5.113
0.30854 288.943 -1.646 5.231
034458 300.16 -1.178 5.309
0.38209 313.126 -0.711 5.343
0.42074 328.16 -0.252 5.323
0.46017 345.648 0.194 5.242
0.5 366.057 0.619 5.09
0.53983 389.955 1.019 4.857
0.57926 418.036 1.388 4.53
0.61791 451.148 1.723 4.095
0.65542 490.335 2.019 3.538
0.69146 536.885 2.273 2.842
0.72575 592.393 2.484 1.987
0.75804 658.843 2.649 0.952
0.78814 738.714 2.769 -0.285
0.81594 835.113 2.844 -1.749
0.84134 951.956 2.876 -3.468
0.86433 1094.196 2.867 -5.471
0.88493 1268.128 2.821 -7.789
0.9032 1481.789 2.741 -10.457
0.91924 1745.493 2.632 -13.509
0.93319 2072.535 2.499 -16.983
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2 2 0
LFPR W
cnonn(:w(z) tE A (z) Ee(z) Ew(z)
0.00135209.605 0 12.138 2.483
0.00187 210.28 2.822 7.07 -1.342
0.00256211.017 3.933 3.926 -3.093
0.00347211.823 4.003 2.032 -3.558
0.00466212.707 3.462 0.955 -3.248
0.00621213.677 2.587 0.41 -2.493
0.0082214.744 1.557 0.216 -1.506
0.01072215.919 0.486 0.251 -0.425
0.0139217.216 0.553 0.437 0.662
0.01786218.651 1.515 0.721 1.699
0.02275220.241 2.371 1.069 2.652
0.02872222.006 3.107 1.458 3.501
0.03593h23.97 3.715 1.872 4.235
0.04457(226.16 4.193 2.3 4.85
0.0548228.606 4.542 2.734 5.347
0.06681231.346 4.767 3.17 5.728
0.08076234.421 4.873 3.602 6
0.0968 237.88 4.868 4.027 6.168
0.11507241.782 -4.76 4.44 6.241
0.13567246.192 4.559 4.839 6.227
0.15866251.191 4.273 5.22 6.133
0.18406256.871 3.913 5.578 5.97
0.21186263.343 3.488 5.909 5.744
0.24196270.738 -3.01 6.207 5.466
0.27425279.209 2.489 6.467 5.141
0.30854288.943 1.936 6.68 4.777
0.34458 300.16 1.361 6.839 4.38
0.3820S313.126 0.774 6.935 3.953
0.42074 328.16 0.187 6.957 3.499
0.46017345.648 0.391 6.892 3.018
0.5 1366.057 0.952 6.728 2.508
0.53983389.955 1.485 6.448 1.962
0.57926418.036 1.983 6.034 1.371
0.61791451.148 2.438 5.468 0.721
0.65542490.335 2.845 4.725 -0.007
0.69146536.885 3.198 3.783 -0.838
0.72575592.393 3.493 2.612 -1.801
0.75804658.843 3.727 1.182 -2.932
0.78814738.714 3.9 -0.539 -4.276
0.81594835.113 4.011 -2.59 -5.88
0.84134951.956 4.062 -5.01 -7.8
0.864331094.196 4.057 -7.842 -10.096
0.884931268.128 3.998 -11.133 -12.834
0.90321481.789 3.891 -14.932 -16.084
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LFPR W
caonn(w(2) ->■ xEA(2) Ee(z) Ew(z)
0.00135209.605 0 3.856 3.789
0.00187 210.28 0.85 2.169 0.396
0.00256211.017 1.098 1.173 0.847
0.00347211.823 0.991 0.618 0.856
0.00466212.707 0.688 0.346 -0.61
0.00621213.677 0.287 0.254 0.228
0.0082214.744 0.148 0.276 9.213
0.010722I5.9I9 0.577 0.371 9.667
0.0139217.216 0.976 0.511 1.103
0.01786218.6S1 1.331 0.679 1.505
0.02275220.241 1.633 0.863 1.86
0.02872222.006 1.879 1.056 2164
0.03593 223.97 2.067 1.253 2.415
0.04457 226.16 2.198 1.451 2613
0.0548228.606 2.274 1.647 2759
0.06681231.346 2.298 1.84 2856
0.08076234.421 2.272 2.028 2906
0.0968 237.88 2.201 2.21 2914
0.11507241.782 2.088 2.384 2.883
0.13567246.192 1.938 2.549 2816
0.15866251.191 1.756 2.703 2.719
0.18406256.871 1.545 2.844 2594
0.21186263.343 1.311 2.971 2.445
0.24196270.738 1.057 3.081 2.276
0.27425279.209 -0.79 3.17 2.09
0.30854>88.943 0.514 3.235 1.89
034458 300.16 0.232 3.273 1.677
03820S313.I26 0.049 3.279 1.454
0.42074 328.16 0.326 3.248 1.22
0.46017345.648 0.595 3.174 9.975
03 66.057 0.851 3.051 9.718
0.53983389.955 1.091 2.871 9.444
0.57926418.036 1.311 2.625 9.148
0.61791451.148 1.509 2.305 0.177
0.65542490.335 1.681 1.9 -0.S4
0.69146536.885 1.827 1.398 0.954
0.72575592.393 1.943 0.787 1.434
0.75804658.843 2.031 0.051 1.997
0.78814738.714 2.089 -0.825 2.664
0.81594835.113 2.118 -1.858 3.458
0.84134951.956 2.119 -3.066 4.406
0.864331094.196 2.094 -4.47 5.537
0.884931268.128 2.044 -6.092 -6.88
0.90321481.789 1.974 -7.953 8.468
0.919241745.493 1.885 -10.079 10.334
0.9331S2072.535_ 11 . . ,  i 1.781 -12.495 1 12.512
2 2 1
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LFPR W
cnonn(z)w(z) *■ t EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 200.373 0 -12.446
0.00187 200.412 -3288 -8.104
0.00256 200.456 -523 -5.047
0.00347 200-505 -6.522 -2.88
0.00466 200.56 -7.134 -1.332
0.00621 200.622 -7.349 -0221
0.0082 200.693 -7293 0.58
0.01072 200.773 -7.056 1.16
0.0139 200.865 -6.698 1.579
0.01786 200.97 -6.262 1.881
0.02275 201.092 -5.78 2.097
0.02872 201.232 -5.273 2.249
0.03593 201.396 -4.757 2.352
0.04457 201.588 -4.243 2.417
0.0548 201.814 -3.739 2.454
0.06681 202082 -3251 2.466
0.08076 202404 -2.784 2.46
0.0968 202792 -2.34 2.438
0.11507 203.264 -1.921 2.401
0.13567 203.846 -123 2.352
0.15866 204.569 -1.166 2.291
0.18406 205.478 -0.831 2219
0.21186 206.638 -0224 2.136
0.24196 208.136 -0247 2.043
0.27425 210.103 0.003 1.938
0.30854 212.726 0.224 1.821
0.34458 216.289 0.419 1.692
0.38209 221225 0.586 1.551
0.42074 228.209 0.729 1.395
0.46017 238.324 0.846 1.224
0.5 253.347 0.94 1.037
0-53983 276281 1.012 0.833
0.57926 312.355 1.063 0.61
0.61791 370.977 1.095 0.367
0.65542 469.677 1.109 0.102
0.69146 642.393 1.107 -0.186
0.72575 957.602 1.091 -0.5
0.75804 1559.787 1.062 -0.841
0.78814 2768.969 1.022 -121
0.81594 5332.314 0.973 -1.61
0.84134 11096.932 0.918 -2.043
0.86433 24921.912 0.856 -2.509
0.88493 60483.124 0.792 -3.012
0.9032 1.592-103 0.725 -3.552
0.91924 A <7. tn^ 0.657 -4.131
0 93319 0.591 -4.75
1.441-10
2 2 2
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LFPR W
cnonn(z)w(z) f t EA(z) Ee(z)
0.00135 209.605 0 -1.391
0.00187 21038 -0.518 -1.22
0.00256 211.017 -1.09 -0.931
0.00347 211.823 -1.65 -0-592
0.00466 212.707 -2.16 -0.242
0.00621 213.677 -2.605 0.101
0.0082 214.744 -2.976 0.427
0.01072 215.919 -3.272 0.733
0.0139 217316 -3.495 1.017
0.01786 218.651 -3.648 1.281
0.02275 220341 -3.737 1.527
0.02872 222.006 -3.767 1.756
0.03593 223.97 -3.741 1.971
0.04457 226.16 -3.665 2.172
0.0548 228.606 -3.544 2.36
0.06681 231.346 -3.383 2.537
0.08076 234.421 -3.185 2.703
0.0968 237.88 -2.956 2.857
0.11507 241.782 -2.699 3
0.13567 246.192 -2.419 3.129
0.15866 251.191 -2.121 3.246
0.18406 256.871 -1.808 3.347
0.21186 263.343 -1.484 3.431
0.24196 270.738 -1.155 3.497
0.27425 279.209 -0.823 3.54
0.30854 288.943 -0.493 3.559
034458 300.16 -0.169 3.55
038209 313.126 0.146 3.508
0.42074 328.16 0.447 3.428
0.46017 345.648 0.732 3.306
0.5 366.057 0.997 3.135
0.53983 389.955 1.24 2.908
0.57926 418.036 1.458 2.617
0.61791 451.148 1.65 2.254
0.65542 490.335 1.812 1.809
0.69146 536.885 1.944 1.27
0.72575 592.393 2.047 0.626
0.75804 658.843 2.118 -0.136
0.78814 738.714 2.16 -1.03
0.81594 835.113 2.172 -2.074
0.84134 951.956 2.157 -3.282
0.86433 1094.196 2.117 -4.675
0.88493 1268.128 2.054 -6.27
0.9032 1481.789 1.971 -8.09
0.91924 1745.493 1.872 -10.155
0.93319 2072.535 1.76 -12.489
2 2 3
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LFPR W
cnonn(z)w(z) -p t EA(z) Ec(z)
0.00135 209.605 0 1.37
0.00187 210.28 0.174 0.441
0.00256 211.017 -0.032 -0.018
0.00347 211.823 -0.441 -0.188
0.00466 212.707 -0.94 -0.182
0.00621 213.677 -1.461 -0.07
0.0082 214.744 -1.964 0.103
0.01072 215.919 -2.424 0.312
0.0139 217.216 -2827 0.538
0.01786 218.651 -3.166 0.774
0.02275 220.241 -3.439 1.011
0.02872 222.006 -3.645 1.247
0.03593 223.97 -3.786 1.48
0.04457 226.16 -3.865 1.709
0.0548 228.606 -3.885 1.932
0.06681 231.346 -3.85 2.149
0.08076 234.421 -3.763 2359
0.0968 237.88 -3.63 2.561
0.11507 241.782 -3.455 2756
0.13567 246.192 -3.242 2.941
0.15866 251.191 -2.997 3.115
0.18406 256.871 -2723 3.277
0.21186 263.343 -2.427 3.424
0.24196 270.738 -2112 3.555
0.27425 279.209 -1.784 3.666
0.30854 288.943 -1.448 3.755
0.34458 300.16 -1.108 3.817
0.38209 313.126 -0.769 3.848
0.42074 328.16 -0.435 3.844
0.46017 345.648 -0.112 3.798
0.5 366.057 0.197 3.705
0.53983 389.955 0.488 3.556
0.57926 418.036 0.758 3.344
0.61791 451.148 1.003 3.06
0.65542 490.335 1.221 2.692
0.69146 536.885 1.41 2.23
0.72575 592.393 1.568 1.66
0.75804 658.843 1.694 0.968
0.78814 738.714 1.789 0.138
0.81594 835.113 1.852 -0.846
0.84134 951.956 1.885 -2.003
0.86433 1094.196 1.889 -3.354
0.88493 1268.128 1.867 -4.919
0.9032 1481.789 1.82 -6.722
0.91924 1745.493 1.754 -8.788
0.93319 2072.535 1.67 -11.141
2 2 4
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CHAPTER V
A FLEXIBLE-PRICE MODEL WITH NON-NEUTRAL MONEY,
COUNTERCYCLICAL MARKDOWNS AND ACYCLICAL REAL WAGES.
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I derive the implications of the labor 
supply* model of Chapter IV for the behavior of markups and the 
real wage. This is done in two stages; (1) a partial equilib­
rium. analysis, which extends the analysis in Chapter IV to the 
real wage, and (2) a general equilibrium analysis, utilizing 
the flexible-price model of Chapter II.
Neither approach leads to a satisfactory conclusion. The 
partial equilibrium method excludes feedback from other 
markets in the determination of the real wage, and the results 
are somewhat sensitive to the magnitudes of parameters. The 
comparative static employed in Chapter II captures the inter­
market relationships, albeit in a static framework, but yields 
ambiguous results for the real wage because it abstracts from 
magnitudes. These limitations suggest that a different 
modeling technique, e. g., computer simulation, which can 
combine the best features of the two methods, might be a more 
useful methodology for analyzing this problem.
225
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5.2 A Partial Ecrui 1 i b r i u m  Analysis
226
With the model of Chapter IV in hand, it is time to 
return to the question originally posed in Chapter I and 
elaborated in Chapter III: Is monopsony power in this model 
sufficiently countercyclical to cause the real wage to be 
acyclical or weakly procyclical? Equivalently, is the 
markdown of the real wage in the labor market sufficiently 
countercyclical to offset the assumed negative elasticity of 
the marginal productivity of labor?
The fundamental relationship is the first-order condi­
tion for profit maximization by a monopsonistic firm::
w[l + 1/e] = we = Fz (5.1)
where (e - 1) is the degree of monopsony power and 1/e is the 
markdown factor applied to Fz. The amount of the markdown is 
w/e. I will denote the real wage which satisfies this 
condition as w*, and write as an identity w*e s fz. This may 
be expressed in terms of elasticities with respect to money 
as:
^m Cw *] + rM[e] = ^[F*] (5.2)
from which 2^[w*] can be derived.
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It is straightforward to show that:
227
(5.3)
The expression for ^ [e] as a function of the equilibrium real 
wage was derived in Chapter IV, and the function was plotted 
for various cases. Also:
The first term in brackets is the elasticity of the marginal 
product of labor with respect to employment, which is the 
reciprocal of x\, the total elasticity of labor demand in a 
perfectly competitive labor market when output is variable. 
This elasticity has been estimated at the industry level by 




Symons and Layard (1984) 




Nickell and Symons (1990) -1.92
Average -1.65
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These estimates are based on quarterly data for manufacturing 
industries in the U. S. and Britain. Estimates based on 
annual data fell in the range of -0.50 to -0.95, as reported 
by Hammermesh. I will assume the value of -1.0, which is the 
theoretical value for a Cobb-Douglas output technology, and is 
conservative here. Thus, in Equation 5.2 the first term in 
brackets will be -1.
The second term in brackets is the elasticity of profit- 
maximizing employment I* with respect to a change in money. 
For a given optimum real wage w*, monopsony employment is 
determined on the labor supply curve A(w*,n,o2), so this 
elasticity is £^[A], which was also derived and computed in 
Chapter IV. Thus, in terms of functions for which numerical 
values can be computed, Equation 5.2 becomes:
(5.5)
*i«tO - -*k [A] -*„[«]
(♦) (-)
The intuitive interpretation of Equation 5.5 is that a 
one-time change in money shifts the labor supply curve and 
also changes its elasticity at the equilibrium real wage, in 
the same direction as the shift (i. e., procyclically.) In the 
monopsony case, this changes both monopsony power and the size 
of the markdown in the opposite direction (countercyclically) . 
To the extent that the money-elasticity of monopsony power
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exceeds the absolute value of the money-elasticity of the 
marginal product curve, the real wage will be procyclical.
If the elasticities on the right-hand side of Equation 5.5 are 
exactly offsetting, the real wage will be acyclical. For a 
perfectly competitive labor market, £^[e] =0, and ^M[w*] has 
the negative elasticity of the marginal product curve where it 
intersects the labor supply curve.
Equation 5.5 was computed for several of the cases in 
chapter IV. The computations are shown in Exhibits 5-1 
through 5-7 at the end of this chapter. The results are 
summarized in Table 5-1.
Computed values of the money-elasticity of the equilib­
rium real wage are shown in the last column of Table 5-1.
In the homothetic Case H-l, the negative elasticity of e adds 
to the negative elasticity of F£ to make the elasticity of the 
real wage -1.0, which is more countercyclical that it would be 
under perfect competition (-0.7) . This is consistent with the 
conclusion in Chapter III that that monopsony with homothetic 
preferences would make the real wage more countercyclical.
In Case NH-8, corresponding to the benchmark case of Figure 4- 
9 in Chapter IV, the real wage is weakly countercyclical with 
an elasticity of -0.44. This is less countercyclical than it 
would be for a perfectly competitive labor market.
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Table 5—1. Partial Equilibrium Analysis of 
Real Wage Behavior
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PARAMETERS _____ COMPUTED ELASTICITIES
EXHIBIT/CASE EMP ERM -*kCA]a
5-1 H—1 .8 -.15 - 0.5 - 0.30 - 0.7 - 1.0
5-2 NH-8 .8 -.15 + 3.0 + 1.82 - 2.26 - 0.44
5-3 NH-10 .5 -.15 + 3.4 + 2.06 - 2.1 - 0.04
5-4 NH-11 .8 -.10 + 4.5 + 2.7 - 3.0 - 0.27
5-5 NH-15 .1 -.15 + 3.9 + 2.36 - 1.92 + 0.44
5-6 L q  —•70 .3 -.10 + 5.5 + 3.2 - 2.7 + 0.50
5-7 L q  =.74 .3 -.10 + 3.3 + 2.0 - 1.8 + 0.20
EMP = £^[P], ERM = #r[M] . Lq is Che Gini coefficient: of 
the distribution of wealth.
All computed elasticities are valued at the mean reservation wage of 
$500, where e - 0.65 and the labor-force participation rate is 66%.
The total elasticity of aggregate labor demand is assumed to be -1.
Although the benchmark case of Chapter IV had large 
positive elasticities for e and A, the magnitude of ^[e] was 
not quite large enough to offset an assumed value of -1 for r|. 
If the average of -1.65 for estimated values of ti were used, 
the elasticity of the real wage would be + 0.45. Thus, the 
elasticity of w* in the model is sensitive to the value 
assumed for ti.
The implied elasticity of the real wage is also sensitive 
to the values assumed for the monetary elasticities. In Case 
NH-10, reducing EMP from 0.8 in the benchmark case to 0.5
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makes the real wage acyclical at an elasticity of -.04. This 
corresponds to a weaker short-run effect of money on the price 
level (i. e., sticky prices1.) and a stronger effect on real 
labor supply, employment and output. Case NH-11 shows the 
effect of assuming a lower interest-elasticity of money demand 
(—.10). The real wage is less countercyclical than the 
benchmark case.
Case NH-15, with EMP = 0.1, corresponds to a very sticky 
price level in the short-run, which makes the real wage 
moderately procyclical at an elasticity of +0.44. This is not 
surprising, since sticky prices with flexible nominal wages 
can produce a strongly procyclical real wage in a perfectly 
competitive labor market (Romer, 1996) . However, that case is 
a model of imperfect competition in the goods market, in which 
the effective labor demand curve is vertical and shifts 
against an inelastic labor supply curve. In the present model, 
sticky prices would augment the procyclical elasticity of a 
shifting labor supply curve. As pointed out in Chapter I, one 
of the criticisms of the New Keynesian imperfect competition 
models is that they tend to predict strongly procyclical real 
wages. There is an indication here that incorporating sticky 
prices in this model would result in a real wage that is only
1 Again, sticky prices imply sluggish adjustment in a dynamic setting. Some 
degree of price or wage stickiness may be necessary to justify a strong and per­
sistent money-output connection. The static flexible-price model of Chapter II 
may be deficient in this respect.
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weakly procyclical, which is more consistent with the stylized 
facts.
Exhibits 5-6 and 5-7 show that combinations of moderately 
lower values for EMP and ERM than the benchmark case can gen­
erate a weakly procyclical real wage, for Gini coefficients of 
wealth of 0.70 and 0.74.
The conclusion from the foregoing analysis is this model 
is capable of exhibiting a real wage that is weakly counter­
cyclical, acyclical or weakly procyclical, with the outcome 
being parameter-dependent. In the particular calibration of 
of the model shown here, the cyclicality of the real wage was 
somewhat sensitive to the assumed values of the monetary 
elasticities ^ j[P] and £*r[M], and the elasticity of aggregate 
labor demand, These elasticities are not precisely known, 
and may vary over time.
This conclusion is qualified by the fact that it is based 
on a partial equilibrium framework, where any possible 
influences on the real wage from the goods and money markets 
have been excluded. That issue is addressed in the next 
section.
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5 - 3  A  static General E q u i l i b r i u m  F r-a m e w n rlc
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In this section the aggregate labor supply function of 
Chapter IV is incorporated into the flexible-price static 
general equilibrium model of Chapter II, and the implications 
for the behavior of the real wage under monopsony are investi­
gated. The method of comparative statics is employed; this 
involves re-specifying and signing the excess demand func­
tions of the model, and deriving comparative static deriva­
tives, as was done in Chapter II. Appendix B to Chapter II 
will be referenced in order to minimize duplication here.
5.3.1 Excess Demand Functions
The revised excess demand functions of the model are:
EDG = cd(z,fl) + id(r,y) + g - y8(w) = 0
EDM * yPrYn1+P - M/P = 0, (3 > 0, y < 0, 0 < p < 1 (5.6)
EDL = fd(ew) - A(w,/x,a2) = 0
where ya(w) is output, z is disposable income, n is wealth, y 
is total income, r is the interest rate, w = W/P, M is the
money stock and P is the price level, all as defined in
Chapter II. The definition of household wealth in this chapter 
includes the present value of transfer payments T/rP, (e. g., 
unemployment compensation, Social Security, unearned income
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credits and welfare assistance) which establishes a minimum 
floor on nonlabor income and corresponding wealth. Thus:
n = M + KB+T + IT 0 <k< 0 (5.7)
P rP r
Monopsony power is incorporated in the labor market by 
specifying the labor demand function as £d(ew) , where 
e = (1 +■ 1/e). This follows directly from the inverse of the 
first-order condition for profit maximization, Equation 5.1. 
Aggregate labor supply is the Lognormal distribution form 
developed in Chapter IV. The dimensionality of flows in the 
model is per capita per week, so that A is the proportion of 
the labor force that is willing to work a 40-hour week at the 
real wage w. I have also defined a more specific aggregate 
money demand function with wealth elasticity 1+p, which is 
consistent with the specification of increasing relative risk 
aversion in Chapter IV2.
5.3.2 Partial Derivatives
Equilibrium profits in the monopsony case are: 
ir* = ys(£d(ew),k) - w£d(ew) = ?r*(ew).
Increasing relative risk aversion could also be specified in the goods 
market. This would effect the results obtained here only if imperfect competition 
were also assumed in the goods market, in which case the elasticity of demand 
would be a function of the level of income or wealth. Since I have assumed 
perfect competition in the goods market in order to focus on the labor market, 
I employ a standard Keynesian consumption function here. Imperfect competition 
with IRRA in both goods and labor markets would be an interesting extension.
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Differentiating it* with respect to P, W and r , with subscripts 






Here I have used the fact that in monopsony, [y*8 - w] = w/e, 
the amount of the markdown. The signs of these three partial 
derivatives follow from the fact that £ewd < 0 and ep, ew and 
er have the opposite signs of ep < 0, ew < 0 and er < 0, which
e - Pep is not obvious, but this expression was evaluated 
numerically for Case NH-8 and found to be unconditionally 
positive, with a value of +5 at the mean reservation wage. 
Thus, the effect of an increase in the price level is to 
increase the conditional demand for labor. The only diff-
3These signs hold over a relevant range of reservation wages, which 
for the benchmark Case NH-8 of Chapter IV, includes wages up to $694 per week 
at a labor-force participation rate of 77%.
are known from the analysis in Chapter IV3 The sign of
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erence from Chapter II thus far is that for the monopsonistic 
labor market nr* < 0, whereas in the perfectly competitive 
labor market of Chapter II, nr* = 0.
These signs enable the partial derivatives of 12, which 
contains w/r, to be determined.
0 1 f W . kB + T Wld 1 W w.dT _ 1 . n .
- d p  * ~r?~ - -rFl -^p2-il^\e -Pep\ >0 (5.11)
The sign here follows from the sign of ttp* and the reasoning 
in Chapter II that the real wage bill w£d is much greater than 
nonlabor income from equities, bonds and transfer payments.
Clw = <0 (5.12)
r
< 0  ( 5 • 1 3 ,
All of the psurtial derivatives of a have the same sign as in 
Chapter II.
With these facts established, it is possible to sign the 
partial derivatives of the excess demand functions and examine 
the 3 x 3  matrix of partial derivatives, A, of Chapter II and 
Appendix B. Since the excess demand functions for the goods 
market are the same as in Chapter II, there will no change 
there, and:
EDGp <0, EDGr < 0, and E D ^  > 0.
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Inspection of the money demand function reveals that 
®yd = Pyp-1B >0, P > o ,  B > o.
via* -  (i+pjn^c > o ,  o < p < l, c > o
m ^  = y r ^ D  <0, y < 0, D > 0 .
These are the same signs as in Chapter II, so the signs of the 
partial derivatives of EDM are also unchanged.
However, conditions in the labor market are different.
The sign here appears to be ambiguous, but evaluating the 
expression numerically for the benchmark case NH-8 (Exhibit 
4—9 in Chapter IV) revealed that EDLp is positive up to an 
equilibrium real wage of $600, or a labor-force participation 
rate of 73%.
Here again, the sign appears to be ambiguous, but a numerical 
evaluation for case NH-8 of Chapter IV revealed that EDLr is 
negative for a real wage above $300.
EDMp > 0, EDMj. < 0, EDM„ < 0.
EDL = £d(ew) - A(w,H,o2)
EDLr vr+T > 300 (5.15)
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(5.16)
Thus, for the benchmark case NH-8, the partial deriva­
tives of EDL have the same sign as in Chapter IX for an 
equilibrium real wage in the range of $300 to $600 per week 
(Labor-force participation rates of 34% to 73% in the model.) 
Since none of the elements of the A matrix change sign over 
that range, most of the comparative static results of Chapter 
II also hold over that range, including the stability condi­
tions and, more importantly, the signs of
5.3.3 Comparative Static Derivatives
The derivative of primary interest here is dw/dM,
To derive the sign of this it is necessary to expand 
dP/dM and dW/dM and recombine them in the above expression, as 
was done in Chapter II. I will do this for the benchmark case 
NH-8 in Chapter IV, and the case of no Ricardian equivalence, 
i. e. k = l.
(5.17)
L pi 1 dW W dP
dM P dM P dM
(5.18)
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For k = 1, we have from Appendix B to Chapter II: 
(5.19) ^  = j^jEDGp-EDLr- EDLp-EDG^
Substituting the partial derivatives for each component:
W  ‘ pflr{[-(1-C*'ir,4 - ^ ] * CaC,n4 <!»[,lrer]-Ar]
^  C+-) c-)
~[^[£ew[e “•Pep]~*] + p Am][CQ^*’ + ^ rjl (5.20
Similarly, for dP/dM we have:
jp r O’) Cr> (r) O')
m  = p]i\\.EDGr 'EDLw - EDLr 'EDGw\ (5.2D
C-)
which upon substitution becomes:
m  " pJXf {Conr ][«e»[e‘' * i
^ ] [ '  (1 ' c * + cn°v]} (5 -22)
Upon subtracting W/P times Equation 5-22 from Equation 5-20, 
several terms cancel, and after some reduction I obtain4:
A
The trick here is to collect terms on EDLp and EDGp and recognize 
Qp + W ^  as a common factor.










C+). <=) H  
EDGr = cQnr + ir < 0
r ®  i c+)EDLr = l%w[wer\ - Ar < 0
The sign of dw/dM is ambiguous. This is disappointing, but 
not surprising because even in the partial equilibrium setup 
the sign of the elasticity of the real wage depends on 
magnitudes. In Chapter II, the real wage was unambiguously 
countercyclical; here, it is ambiguous, which allows for the 
possibility that it could be acyclical or procyclical, 
depending on magnitudes.
In Equation 5.23, the effect on dw/dM of er in EDLr is 
positive, and is channeled through a wealth effect on consump­
tion, cQd[flp + wfl^, which is diminished by the increase in P 
and W. The effects of ew and ep on dw/dM are negative, and 
are channeled through the interest-rate effect on demand, 
(cQdnr + ird). The real wage is more likely to be acyclical 
or weakly procyclical if the interest-elasticity of monopsony 
power is large relative to the interest-elasticity of demand.
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The general equilibrium approach reveals interactions 
between the goods market and the labor market in the determi­
nation of the real wage, which could not be taken into account 
in the partial equilibrium analysis. The connection is 
through the interest rate. A one-time increase in money 
raises the price level and the nominal wage, and lowers the 
interest rate. This causes a decline in wealth, which has a 
negative effect on consumption and a positive effect on labor 
supply. With monopsony, effective labor demand and labor 
supply are linked via the elasticity of labor supply in 
marginal cost, ew. The new equilibrium in the labor market is 
determined by the M-elasticity of ew as the labor supply curve 
shifts out. With homothetic preferences er *= 0, and w and 
e = [1 + 1/e] are functions of W and P only. Equation 5.23 
shows that in this case dw/dM < 0, and in fact, due to the 
presence of the term [-we,, - ep] it is more negative than 
under perfect competition. With increasing relative risk 
aversion, however, er is positive over a relevant range of w, 
and this brings the positive term cnd[np + wf^] *EDLr into play. 
The net effect on dw/dM will depend on relative magnitudes of 
the two terms in Equation 5.23.
The method of comparative statics is less revealing when 
the signs of total derivatives depend on magnitudes, as is the 
case here.
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A Keynesian model with monopsony power in the labor 
market, wealth effects in all markets, and increasing 
relative risk aversion in consumer preferences, will have a 
causal connection between money and output and exhibit 
countercyclical markdowns. The behavior of the real wage will 
be weakly countercyclical, acyclical, or weakly procyclical, 
depending on the strength of the wealth effect in the labor 
market, and the values of monetary elasticities which are 
parameters of the model. These results are broadly consistent 
with the stylized facts introduced in Chapter I.
The results are somewhat sensitive to values assumed for 
the interest-elasticity and wealth-elasticity of the money 
demand function, and the short-run elasticity of the price 
level with respect to innovations in money. They are also 
conditional upon assumed Gini coefficients of 0.45 for the 
distribution of nonlabor income in the workforce, and 0.70 for 
the distribution of financial wealth in the workforce, values 
which have been crudely estimated here.
The model presented in this thesis has not been tested 
empirically. Rejection of any of the following hypotheses 
could be considered a rejection of the model as constructed 
and described here:
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(a) In the aggregate, firms have significant market power to 
set wages in their industries.
(b) The wealth-elasticity of the demand for real money 
balances among members of the labor force is greater than 
unity. Alternatively, the wealth-elasticity of the demand for 
earning assets (stocks and bonds) is less than unity.
(c) The Gini coefficient for the distribution of financial 
wealth in the workforce is less than 0.80.
(d) The Gini coefficient for the distribution of nonlabor 
income in the workforce is greater than 0.4 and less than 0.60
(e) The distribution of nonlabor income in the workforce 
follows a Lognormal distribution.
(d) The distribution of financial wealth in the workforce 
follows a Lognormal distribution.
(e) The distribution of nonlabor income (or financial wealth) 
in the workforce becomes more unequal during contractions and 
less unequal during expansions of the business cycle.
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A final note on the methodology employed in this thesis: 
When representative agent aggregation is not valid, the 
distributions of heterogeneous agent characteristics matter 
for the behavior of aggregates. The method of aggregation 
must then incorporate information about those distributions in 
the form of sufficient statistics. In the model presented 
here, the sufficient statistics were: The parameters of the 
Lognormal distribution of nonlabor income; the wealth elastic­
ity of the demand for money; and the wealth-elasticity of the 
demand for leisure. Statistical estimates of these parameters 
have seldom, if ever, been made. One impediment to more 
widespread modeling of heterogeneity in economics may be that 
we lack the empirical knowledge to do it well. On the other 
hand, econometricians usually try to measure things that their 
colleagues regard as important. The research program on 
heterogeneous agents is in the early stage of its life-cycle, 
and promises to reveal more about what we really need to know 
about heterogeneity and the distributions of agent character­
istics .
The method of comparative statics which served well in 
Chapter II was not very revealing in this chapter. This is 
not a very powerful way to evaluate a model in which the 
magnitudes of elasticities of second order are important. A 
computer simulation or Computable General Equilibrium model 
might be more useful in future research of this nature.
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LFPR W
cnorm(z)w(z) ♦ tEA(z) Hs(z) Ew (z)
2 4 5
EXHIBIT S-1 HOMOTHET1C CASE
0.00135 216.673 0 -2.622 -0.536
0.00187 218.142 -0.68 -1.634 0.338
0.00256 219.74 -1.079 -0.94 0.877
0.00347 221.48 -1.287 -0.451 1.188
0.00466 223373 -1.367 -0.104 1.343
0.00621 225.432 -1.36 0.142 1.392
0.0082 227.673 -1.295 0.317 1.369
0.01072 230.111 -1.192 0.441 1.299
0.0139 232.765 -1.066 0.527 1.197
0.01786 235.652 -0.926 0.586 1.075
0.02275 238.793 -0.779 0.625 0.943
0.02872 242.212 -0.631 0.648 0.805
0.03593 245.931 -0.484 0.659 0.667
0.04457 249.979 -0.342 0.661 0.531
0.0548 254.382 -0.205 0.656 0.398
0.06681 259.174 -0.077 0.644 0.272
0.08076 264.389 0.044 0.627 0.152
0.0968 270.062 0.156 0.605 0.04
0.11507 276.236 0.258 0.578 -0.065
0.13567 282.954 0.351 0.548 -0.162
0.15866 290.263 0.434 0.513 -0.251
0.18406 298.217 0.507 0.475 -0.332
0.21186 306.871 0.571 0.432 -0.406
0.24196 316.288 0.626 0.386 -0.473
0.27425 326.535 0.671 0.335 -0.534
0.30854 337.685 0.707 0.279 -0.589
0.34458 349.817 0.735 0318 -0.638
0.38209 363.019 0.754 0.152 -0.684
0.42074 377.383 0.765 0.08 -0.727
0.46017 393.014 0.769 0.002 -0.768
0.5 410.021 0.766 -0.083 -0.808
0.53983 428.528 0.756 -0.174 -0.849
0.57926 448.665 0.74 -0.274 -0.892
0.61791 470.576 0.719 -0.382 -0.94
0.65542 494.418 0.693 -0.498 -0.993
0.69146 520.361 0.663 -0.625 -1.053
0.72575 548.59 0.63 -0.761 -1.123
0.7S804 579J07 0.594 -0.908 -1.204
0.78814 612.73 0.555 -1.067 -1.299
0.81594 649.098 0.515 -1.238 -1.409
0.84134 688.671 0.475 -1.422 -1.535
0.86433 731.731 0.434 -1.619 -1.681
0.88493 778.585 0.393 -1.831 -1.846
0.9032 829.568 0.354 -2.056 -2.033
0.91924 885.043 0.315 -2.297 -2.241
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200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 110(1200













200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 110(1200
v<z)+t
ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
znormOb.mcd




ELASTICITY OF ELASTICITY COMPUTATIONS 
LOGNORMAL LABOR SUPPLY FUNCTION
LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION CALIBRATION




at 2202 = a  y 
It = ln(a) -  .5-cr2
02 =9.364* 104 y = l.02 a =0.844 a =0.713
H = 5.347 
L =0.45 p = .424
L = 2-cnonn|-^r] -  I
W21
Calibrate Mean Reservation Wage 
For Nonhomo the tic Function
MONETARY CALIBRATION
M2 = 3.439 F = 5.035 A  =
n(z) =z £2(z) =(z2 -  l)  Cl -P )22 2 p a
Nonhomothetic Reservation Wage Function
5 = 5v*
EMP = .8 
ERM =-.13
M2 r  F 
A =0.594
EQM(z) .= 5-In(w(z) r  I)
>|/ = exp(vS) -  I g(.w) = ln(w  - I)
w (z) = exp(exp(5(p r  z-o ))) -  1
Mean = exp[exp[s-(|t r  ,5-<j2) ] ]  -  I r  t  
Mean = 500
Median = exp(exp(8-p )) - I r  t  
Median =366.057




X(z) =• -exp ■[(«)’













G(z). » *(__!_) 
V 2 I \cnoim(z)/
e(z) = X(z)~ w(z)
cnorm(z)
EMA(z) w - ELASTICITY OF 
AGGREGATE LABOR SUPPLY
EA(z) •= K l(z) r  K2(z) (Equation D5.11) M-ELASTICITY OF AGGREGATE LABOR SUPPLY
Ee(z) := -EA(z) fl(z )-EMP r  C (z) EMA(z) (Equation D6.11)
M -  ELASTICITY OF THE ELASTICITY OF 
AGGREGATE LABOR SUPPLY
Ew(z) = Ee(2) - EA(z) 
e(z) r  I
MONEY - ELASTICITY OF 
THE REAL WAGE
znorm7AAjncd




EXHIBIT 5-2(b) NONHOMOTHETIC CASE VUi
Ee(z) Ew(z)
0.00135 209.605 0 4.326 0.885
0.00187 210.28 0.886 2.259 -0.413
0.00256 211.017 1.008 1.086 -0.775
0.00347 211.823 0.692 0.478 -0.588
0.00466 212.707 0.145 0.227 -0.094
0.00621 213.677 0.505 0.2 0.551 £
0.0082 214.744 1.177 0.313 1.251 o
0.01072 215.919 1.821 0.512 1.945
0.0139 217.216 2.408 0.762 2.597
0.01786 218.651 2.919 1.044 3.185
0.02275 220.241 3.345 1.341 3.697
0.02872 222.006 3.684 1.646 4.128
0.03593 223.97 3.934 1.954 4.477
0.04457 226.16 4.098 2.259 4.744
0.0548 228.606 -4.18 2.56 4.933
0.06681 231.346 4.183 2.855 5.049
0.08076 234.421 4.113 3.142 5.096
0.0968 237.88 3.976 3.419 5.08
0.11507 241.782 3.778 3.684 5.007
0.13567 246.192 3.525 3.936 4.882
0.15866 251.191 3.225 4.172 4.712
0.18406 256.871 2.884 4.39 4.502
0.21186 263.343 2.508 4.587 4.259
0.24196 270.738 2.105 4.758 3.987
0.27425 279.209 1.682 4.9 3.691
0.30854 288.943 1.246 5.008 3.376
0.34458 300.16 0.803 5.076 3.044
0.38209 313.126 0.361 5.099 2.697
0.42074 328.16 0.075 5.067 2.338
0.46017 345.648 0.497 4.974 1.964
0.5 366.057 0.899 4.81 1.574
0.53983 389.955 1.277 4.563 1.162
0.57926 418.036 1.626 4.222 0.72
0.61791 451.148 1.94 3.772 0.24
0.65542 490.335 2.216 3.199 -0.295
0.69146 536.885 2.452 2.486 -0.901
0.72575 592.393 2.645 1.613 - 1.6
0.75804 658.843 2.793 0.559 -2.417
0.78814 738.714 2.897 -0.697 -3.383
0.81S94 835.113 2.958 -2.183 -4.533
0.84134 951.956 2.976 -3.924 -5.903
0.86433 1094.196 2.955 -5.949 -7.537
0.88493 1268.128 2.897 -8.292 -9.478
0.9032 1481.789 2.806 -10.984 -11.775
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0.00135 209.605 0 3.26 0.667
0.00187 210.28 0.597 1.518 0.279
0.00256 211.017 0.524 0.575 -0.4
0.00347 211.823 0.079 0.133 -0.05
0.00466 212.707 -0.553 0.001 0.553
0.00621 213.677 -1.255 0.061 1.269
0.0082 214.744 -1.956 0.239 2.012
0.01072 215.919 -2.613 0.486 2.731
0.0139 217.216 -3.201 0.774 3.393
0.01786 218.651 -3.705 1.084 3.982
0.02275 220.241 -4.119 1.405 4.488
0.02872 222.006 -4.441 1.728 4.907
0.03593 223.97 -4.671 2.051 5.24
0.04457 226.16 -4.813 2.37 5.49
0.0S48 228.606 -4.87 2.682 5.659
0.06681 231.346 -4.848 2.987 5.754
0.08076 234.421 -4.752 3.284 5.779
0.0968 237.88 -4.588 3.57 5.741
0.11507 241.782 -4.364 3.844 5.646
0.13567 246.192 -4.084 4.104 5.499
0.15866 251.191 -3.757 4.349 5.307
0.18406 256.871 -3.389 4.575 5.076
0.21186 263.343 -2.986 4.781 4.811
0.24196 270.738 -2.557 4.961 4.519
0.27425 279.209 -2.108 5.113 4.204
0.30854 288.943 -1.646 5.231 3.871
0.34458 300.16 -1.178 5.309 3.522
0.38209 313.126 -0.711 5.343 3.16
0.42074 328.16 -0.252 5.323 2.786
0.46017 345.648 0.194 5.242 2.4
0 J 366.057 0.619 5.09 1.998
0.53983 389.955 1.019 4.857 1.577
0.57926 418.036 1.388 4.53 1.129
0.61791 451.148 1.723 4.095 0.643
0.65542 490.335 2.019 3.538 0.106
0.69146 536.885 2.273 2.842 -0.5
0.72S75 592.393 2.484 1.987 1.197
0.75804 658.843 2.649 0.952 2.009
0.78814 738.714 2.769 -0.285 2.967
0.81594 835.113 2.844 -1.749 4.106
0.84134 951.956 2.876 -3.468 5.463
0.86433 1094.196 2.867 -5.471 -7.08
0.88493 1268.128 2.821 -7.789 9.003
0.9032 1481.789 2.741 -10.457 11.279
0.91924 1745.493 2.632 -13.509 13.956
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cnorm(z)w(z) *  tEA(z}£e(z) Ew(z)
EXHIBIT 5 -4  NONHOMOTHETIC CASE XI
O.OOI3S 209.6 0 12.14 2.48
0.00187 210.28 2.82 7.07 -1.34
0.00256 211.02 3.93 3.93 -3.09
0.00347 211.82 4 2.03 -3.56
0.00466 212.71 3.46 0.95 -3.25
0.00621 213.68 2.59 0.41 -2.49
0.0082 214.74 1.56 0.22 -1.51
0.01072 215.92 0.49 0.25 -0.42
0.0139 217.22 -0.55 0.44 0.66
0.01786 218.65 -1.51 0.72 1.7
0.02275 220.24 -2.37 1.07 2.65
0.02872 222.0 ! -3.11 1.46 3.5
0.03593 223.97 -3.72 1.87 4.23
0.04457 226.16 -4.19 2.3 4.85
0.0548 228.61 -4.54 2.73 5.35
0.06681 231.35 -4.77 3.17 5.73
0.08076 234.42 -4.87 3.6 6
0.0968 237.88 -4.87 4.03 6.17
0.11507 241.78 -4.76 4.44 6.24
0.13567 246.19 -4.56 4.84 6.23
0.15866 251.19 -4.27 5.22 6.13
0.18406 256.87 -3.91 5.58 5.97
0.21186 263.34 -3.49 5.91 5.74
0.24196 270.74 -3.01 6.21 5.47
0.27425 279.21 -2.49 6.47 5.14
0.30854 288.94 -1.94 6.68 4.78
0.34458 300.16 -1.36 6.84 4.38
0.38209 313.13 -0.77 6.94 3.95
0.42074 328.16 -0.19 6.96 3.5
0.46017 345.65 0.39 6.89 3.02
0.5 366.06 0.95 6.73 2.51
0.53983 389.96 1.48 6.45 1.96
0.57926 418.04 1.98 6.03 1.37
0.61791 451.15 2.44 5.47 0.72
0.65542 490.33 2.84 4.73 -0.01
0.69146 536.88 3.2 3.78 -0.84
0.72575 592.39 3.49 2.61 - 1.8
0.75804 658.84 3.73 1.18 -2.93
0.78814 738.71 3.9 -0.54 -4.28
0.81594 835.11 4.01 -2.59 -5.88
0.84134 951.96 4.06 -5.01 -7.8
0.86433 1094.2 4.06 -7.84 - 10.1
0.88493 1268.13 4 -11.13 -12.83
0.9032 1481.79 3.89 -14.93 -16.08
0.91924 1745.49 3.74 -19.29 -19.92
0 93319 2072.53 3.56 -24.27 -24.4
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EXHIBIT 5 -5  NONHOMOTHETIC CASE XV
0.00135 209.6 0 1.84 0.38
0.00187 210.28 0.21 0.53 -0.1
0.00256 211.02 -0.12 -0.11 0.1
0.00347 211.82 -0.74 -0.33 0.67
0.00466 212.71 -1.48 -0.3 1.41
0.00621 213.68 -2.25 -0.12 2.23
0.0082 214.74 -2.99 0.14 3.03
0.01072 215.92 -3.67 0.45 3.78
0.0139 217.22 -4.26 0.79 4.45
0.01786 218.65 -4.75 1.14 5.04
0.02275 220.24 -5.15 1.49 5.54
0.02872 222.01 -5.45 1.84 5.95
0.03593 223.97 -5.65 2.18 6.26
0.04457 226.16 -5.77 2.52 6.48
0.0548 228.61 -5.79 2.84 6.63
0.06681 231.35 -5.73 3.16 6.69
0.08076 234.42 -5.6 3.47 6.69
0.0968 237.88 -5.41 3.77 6.62
0.11507 241.78 -5.14 4.06 6.5
0.13567 246.19 -4.83 4.33 6J2
0.15866 251.19 -4.47 4.58 6.1
0.18406 256.87 -4.06 4.82 5.84
0.21186 263.34 -3.62 5.04 5.55
0.24196 270.74 -3.16 5.23 5.23
0.27425 279.21 - 2.68 5.4 4.89
0.30854 288.94 -2.18 5.53 4.53
0.34458 300.16 - 1.68 5.62 4.16
0.38209 313.13 -1.18 5.67 3.78
0.42074 328.16 -0.69 5.66 3.38
0.46017 345.65 -0.21 5.6 2.98
0.5 366.06 0.25 5.46 2.56
0.53983 389.96 0.67 5.25 2.13
0.57926 418.04 1.07 4.94 1.67
0.617S1 451.15 1.43 4.53 1.18
0.65542 490.33 1.76 3.99 0.64
0.69146 536.88 2.04 3.32 0.03
0.72575 592.39 2.27 2.49 - 0.66
0.75804 658.84 2.46 1.48 -1.46
0.78814 738.71 2.6 0.27 -2.41
0.81594 835.11 2.69 -1.17 -3.54
0.84134 951.96 2.74 - 2.86 -4.88
0.86433 1094.2 2.75 -4.83 -6.47
0.88493 1268.13 2.72 -7.12 -8.37
0.9032 1481.79 2.65 -9.75 -10.62
0.91924 1745.49 2.56 -12.77 -13.26










200 300 400 300 600 700 800 900 1000 1101200
«<*)*-*
M-ELASTICITY OF THE REAL WAGE
li=5.35  
2
Median = 366.06 a  = 300 L = 0.45
a =0.71 Mean =500 p2 =2.601-10* y=1.02 
p =0.42 8=0.31 Lq = .70









200 300 400 300 600 700 800 900 1000 1101200
«<*)*-1















200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1101200 
«<*) + *
ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
znorm11Bjncd


















































































































200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1101200
M-ELASTICITY OF THE REAL WAGE




a =300 L =0.45
P2 =2.601-I03 7 = 1.02
Median = 366.06 
Mean =500 
8=0.31 Lq = .70 










200 300 400 300 600 700 800 900 1000 1101200
w(z)-t













200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 U0<1200
w (z)f t
ELASTICITY OF LABOR SUPPLY
znormUDjncd




EXHIBIT 5 -7  NONHOMOTHETIC CASE XVII
Ew(z)
0.00135 209.6 0 7.42 1.52
0.00187 210.28 1.69 4.22 -0.81
0.00256 211.02 2.29 2.26 -1.81
0.00347 211.82 2.23 1.1 -1.99
0.00466 212.71 1.79 0.47 -1.69
0.00621 213.68 1.15 0.17 - 1.11
0.0082 214.74 0.42 0.09 -0.4
0.01072 215.92 -0.32 0.15 0.36
0.0139 217.22 -1.03 0.31 1.11
0.01786 218.65 - 1.68 0.53 1.82
0.02275 220.24 -126 0.78 146
0.02872 222.01 -2.75 1.06 3.03
0.03593 223.97 -3.15 1.36 3.52
0.04457 226.16 -3.45 1.66 3.93
0.0548 228.61 -3.67 1.97 4.25
0.06681 231.35 -3.81 2.28 4.5
0.08076 234.42 -3.86 2.58 4.66
0.0968 237.88 -3.83 188 4.76
0.11507 241.78 -3.74 3.17 4.79
0.13567 246.19 -3.58 3.45 4.76
0.15866 251.19 -3.36 3.71 4.68
0.18406 256.87 -3.09 3.97 4.55
0.21186 263.34 -2.78 4.2 4.38
0.24196 270.74 -2.43 4.41 4.17
0.27425 279.21 -2.05 4.6 3.94
0.30854 288.94 -1.65 4.75 3.67
0.34458 300.16 -1.24 4.87 3.39
0.38209 313.13 -0.82 4.94 3.08
0.42074 328.16 -0.4 4.97 176
0.46017 345.65 0.02 4.93 2.42
0.5 366.06 0.42 4.83 106
0.53983 389.96 0.8 4.65 1.68
0.57926 418.04 1.16 4.38 1.27
0.61791 451.15 1.49 4 0.82
0.65542 490.33 1.78 3.51 0.32
0.69146 536.88 2.04 2.88 -0.24
0.72575 592.39 2.25 109 -0.9
0.75804 658.84 2.43 1.13 -1.67
0.78814 738.71 2.56 -0.03 -158
0.81594 835.11 2.65 -1.41 -3.67
0.84134 951.96 2.69 -3.05 -4.97
0.86433 1094.2 2.7 -4.97 -6.53
0.88493 1268.13 167 -7.2 -8.38
0.9032 1481.79 2.61 -9.77 -10.59
0.91924 1745.49 2.51 -12.73 -13.19
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF MATHEMATICAL SYMBOLS
NOTE: Partial derivatives are generally denoted by subscripts
A Jacobian matrix of excess demand functions (Chapters II 
and V)
[A[ determinant of A (Chapters II and V; Appendix B)
A proportion of aggregate wealth held in bonds and equities 
(Chapter IV and Appendix D)
proportion of wealth that an individual worker prefers to 
hold in bonds and equities.
a Mean reservation wage; mean of the Lognormal distribution
B quantity of government bonds held by the private sector; 
each paying annual interest of $1 in perpetuity.
variance of the Lognormal distribution
cd consumption flow demand
6 calibration parameter; elasticity of $
EDX excess demand function for market X; X = G, M, L
e» e£w teal wage-elasticity of aggregate labor supply
E - [l + 1/e]"1 = l/e
e = [1 + l/e]
rx[y] elasticity operator; elasticity of y with respect to x. 
fd stock demand for real asset holdings
fs stock supply of real assets
*(w) cumulative distribution function for reservation wages 
9 (z) standardized Normal density function 
g(w) inverse reservation wage function = f-1(v) = v 
y coefficient of variation of the Lognormal distribution
254
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li fixed hours in a work week (40)
H(f, m) subutility function for stock holdings of real money 
balances and risky financial assets
t| elasticity of demand (labor demand in Chapters IV & V)
tl£ elasticity of demand for leisure (Chapter III and IV)
id investment flow demand = Kd
k fraction of government bond holdings perceived as net 
financial wealth by households.
K fixed stock of physical capital 
demand for labor services 
Is supply of labor services
A(*) Lognormal cumulative distribution function 
1(*) Lognormal probability density function 
L Lorenz (Gini) coefficient of concentration.
M nominal outside money stock
m - M
P
TtLd = (‘p)rf stock demand for real money balances
It log median of A 
e reservation wage
a Total wealth; financial and transfer wealth.
P aggregate price level for goods 
*■ flow of real profits on capital
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f(v) reservation wage function
r interest rate on earning assets
Measure of absolute risk aversion = U"/U'
Rr Measure of relative risk aversion = e u " / u '
p wealth-elasticity of relative risk aversion, R:
a2 dispersion parameter for A; variance of log w
T transfer payments to households
ra base tax rate on income (exogenous)
p
r endogenous tax rate on income (Chapter II)
minimum reservation wage (Chapter IV & V)
U(c,£) subutility function for consumption and leisure
v real nonlabor income = V/P
W nominal aggregate wage rate
v -  £
p
C elasticity of tjr(v)
y aggregate real income
y® aggregate real output (supply)
z = y - r, disposable real income (Chapter II)
= (In w - fi)/o (Chapter IV and V)
p
0 = i: ratio of bonds to outside money
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APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER II 
B.l Differentiation of Excess Demand Functions
(All symbols are defined in Appendix A)
The excess demand functions of the model are:
EDG = c d(z, Q) + i d(r, y) + g - y s(w) =0
EDM = m d{y3(w) , z, Q) - m a = 0
EDL = id(w) -la (w, Q) =0
D
where household real disposable income is z = y s{w) +
B Wand x — x + —  , and w = —  .o p  p
Household real wealth is Q = -^ + + —  , OiKil
P rP i
Firm Profits are it* -y s(ld(.w) , k) - wtd(w) =x*(w) .
With subscripts denoting partial derivatives:
Then Q F = -
Q
257
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I also make the standard behavioral assumptions that 
0<c/+i/<l, Cq > 0 ; 0 <nty<l, itird<0, ntQ>0; «d<0, 0, «q<0
Differentiating the model:
CO c-) / v °-)
EDGP = - (l-c/-i/)y/ ("71 I + C«Q * < 0
dCJ> C_>dEDGZ = cQd Q r + ir <0
^  . fc-> i <--)
EDGff = - ( l  -cf-iy)y£  + Co Q „  > 0
To sign EDGp and EDGy, assume (l -cf-iy) > 0 and that direct
effects of P and W are greater than the indirect effects via
Q . Then EDGp < 0 ,  EDGy > 0 .
EDMP = m/y/• I — ^  I + fl<■+7 3- >0
£Z?Afr = /nr + hiqQ  z < 0
■, t+). to
EEM*. = m/y/ + tnQ Q „ <0
<--) / „ \ C-)
M «
£DLr = -{q Q j <0
Cr) M  C-)
EDLIir=^(^-«e) -«q Q„ < 0
EDGXo = -c/, EDMto = EDLXo = 0
.EDG_ = +1, EDMa = E D L=0
EDGH=±c,f. EDMx=(m<?-l)±, BDLh * - ± Y s
BDe» ' " ^ C°‘,; ; EDLB.--2Y%
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Assume that the trajectories of the endogenous vari­
ables P, r, W in the neighborhood of an equilibrium point 
P*, r*t W* cure governed by:
P = k^EDG ( P, r. W) 
i - k^EDMiP, r, W)
W= k2 EDL (P, r, W)
where k1r k2, k3 > 0 are arbitrary constants. Linearizing the 
system (Al) in the neighborhood, I obtain:
P =
CO CO















* 2 3 23
ka*3 33
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the system to be 
stable in the neighborhood of (P*, r*, W*) are: (Routh- 
Hurwicz)










^1 ^3 * 2 * 3
CO CO
IPI12 IPI13
a 2 2  a 23
a 32  a 33
<--) Gr)
I P I 2 3
> 0 for all 1^ , k2,k
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where |P12|>0 is satisfied by signs already assumed.
|/Si2[ - (EDGP-EDMZ- EDMP‘EDGZ) > 0 implies
-^1 Iy*-ym <
CO £+)
fpx3 f > 0 if (EDG pEDLff-EDLp' EDG„) >0. We are free to impose 
this condition on magnitudes, and it implies
dW , s dW 1
4P Ir*~ym ap I*"-**
t+) CO
|P23|>0 if (EDMr E D Lff-E D LZ ' EDMV) >0. Imposing this condition 
an magnitudes implies
dW , N dW
dr 1,d-<' dr
co e)
3 * , IPl<0 <0 Cr> <0 CO CO CO CO CO &•)
IP I = kj^k^ [(£DGp• EDMZ •EDLW) + (EDLp'EDGr'EDM„) + (EDMp'EDLr 'EDG„\ 1 
A B C .
, ,  .  to  c=0 c+) CO C-> CO CO C-) Cr\
-klk2k2[(EDLp'EDMT'EDGtf)+(EDMp'EDGz'EDL„) + (EDGp-EDLz'EDMU) ]
D  £  F
The signs B>0, D<0 and F<0 pose a potential problem. Stab­
ility requires that the contributions of these terms to j P| 
be offset by other terms. B and E have EDGr in common.
B-E < 0 iff:
CO CO CO to








C and F have EDLr in common, and C -F  < 0 iff: 
to (*) 0) C-) C-)
EDLr [ EDMp* EDGy -  EDGP*EDMy] < 0
which implies
dWi . d W |
? ’tfp\yd-y‘
CO <*)
Finally, A and D have EDMr in common, and it follows from 
the previous stability requirement |B13| > 0 that A -D  < 0.
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Alternatively, it follows from | *231 > 0 that A-F < 0, and 
if B-E <0 it must also hold for stability that C-D < 0, or:
£*) «  c-> c+) c-)
EDG„[EDMp'EDLr - EDLp-EDMr] < 0
EDMP  ^ EDLP
EDM' EDL.
C-> r  C-} r
°r "h ! > "il
«  ft)
In addition, it easy to show that -^ ply<*.y' < 0 uncondit­
ionally. With these sign conditions, |*|< 0 and the third 
Routh-Hurwicz condition is met.
To summarize the stability conditions:
cu » < - f  l.«. < - f  I < - f  U . .
(A Cf) (t)
In W-P space (dr=0) the slope of the money market equilib­
rium locus is greater than the slope of the goods market 
locus, which in turn is greater than the slope of the labor 





In W-r space (dP=0) the slope of the labor market equilib­
rium locus is greater than the slope of the money market 
equilibrium locus. Both slopes are negative.
(See Figure B-l(b)). It is also true that:
dW, - dW |
c-)
but it is not an imposed stability condition.
(iii) <
C+) C+>
In r-P space (dW=0) the slope of the labor market equilib­
rium locus is less than the slope of the money market locus. 
Both slopes are positive. (See Figure B-l(c)). The following 
also holds but is not an imposed stability condition:
dr i dr ,
~dP < ~[p \H<lf
^  (*)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
262
W
Figure B-l. Equilibrium Locii for the three markets: 
Goods, Honey and Labor
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These three conditions, along with the conventional 
assumption that 0 < (c/ + iy) < 1 and EDGp < 0, EDGy > 0, are 
sufficient for stability of the linearized system (Al) .
B.3 Comparative Static Analysis of Ooen-Market Operations
A one-time purchase of bonds for outside money is
specified by: dM = - ,  dt0 = dg= 0. Applying Cramer's Rule
to (Al) and using the co-factor expansion of the determinant 
along the substituted column vector, I obtain:
(a)
- caf (1-K) [ EDMr •EDLW-EDLr •EDM„] +
(A2)
r i / d vi c** ^  00- I  ( l - K ) )  [ EDGz 'EDLw-E D L z ‘EDGtr]
r i - i <--■> <--) C-> &)
*  -p Cq (!-K) [EDGr 'EDMff-EDMZ•EDG„]
Stability condition (i) guarantees that (a) > 0, and so
> 0 unconditionally. It is evident that is a
dM dM
minimum when k — l, a maximum when k — 0.
dr 1 \ r l d ®  ^ ^
"  13T U t Cq (1'k) [B0Sfi>-E“v--EDi.-ECW*] *
r 1 / \ 1  ^  ^(r) ^
+ - ^ ( i - J B f d - K ) )  [ EDGp 'EDLU-  EDLP • EDGW ]
(d)
r i _ i m  &■) w  /
-  Cq ( ! -X )  [ EDGP'EDMff-EDMp 'EDG„] V
(A3)
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Stability condition (i) guarantees that (b) > 0, (c) > 0, 
and also implies (d) <0, so it appears that the sign of
—  might depend on the value of k. For k =1, < 0.
CtM u M
Expansion of (A3) and cancellation of terms produces the 
result that for 0 _lic.il:
%  ■ <0
dW _ 1
dM ~ "|a[ j 
cr)
^  o) c-)
- -± cQd ( 1-k) [ EDMP •EDLr - EDLP •EDMr ] +
(£)
C-) <r) 0) C-)
- (1-K>) [ EDGp‘EDLZ - EDLP ‘EDGZ ] +
(flO
r 1 * l c~> c~> &) c--> /
+ [ EDGp 'EDMX - EDMp 'EDGZ ] >
^ CA4)
(e) < 0 from stability condition (iii) and this results in a
dWnegative contribution to — . Terms (f) and (g) are unam-
dM
biguously > 0 and make a positive contribution to -§r- •
dM
If k -  1, only (f) has an effect on and > 0 .
dM dM
For k -1 , > 0 .
dM
Expanding (A4) and cancelling terms produces the 
result:
= ] [ - ca( 8, ■'V < 1 -K)) - i ^ l 1 '"’o' <1 -*>
1 C~)
-«o[Qr-»-in/(l-K) ] EDGp
«  (r) Q-)
+ (1-K) EDMpt > 0, OiKil




d P vft dx , n dw ^ n Q( p) _ _1
dM P dM
Expanding and , it can be shown that, if k =  1, 
dM dM
d(—  \ <~) <--) 6-1
because Q p + —  Q = -  Ji f 1 < o.p p if p[ p rP J
The real wage declines, i.e., - ^  < By subtracting
W P  dM
W dPfrom —  within each corresponding co-factor expansion,
d' J L oit can be proven that — < 0 for 0 < Ki 1 unambiguously,
provided that -^|ydmy, s L«.m* i. e., the wealth
effect in the money market is not less than the wealth 
effect in the goods market.
Real Wealth
to C-) &  6-) ^
Frtr. „ _ , d Q _ Q  d P . Q  dr q  dW , n
HQThe sign of -=p- is not obvious even for k = 1, but by 
dM
expanding the derivatives and collecting terms one obtains 
the result that Q i 
for the case k -  1:
P4 r + Q r-x<0, which makes < 0 and,
dM dM dM
HQ
The sign of — ^  depends only 
dM
Since Q P + -|Q„=--|[^ + ^ L  
p p  w  p [ p rP
on the basic behavioral assumptions i/<0,{£<0,{*>0 and 
the stability conditions which guarantee that |A| < 0 .
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s
Finally , *  .
Expanding this expression, collecting and cancelling terms, 
X find that
(?)
labor supply increases due to the wealth effect, even though
—  has declined. Since the labor market always clears in
this model, id=ts and the new equilibrium is at a higher 
level of employment and output. A causal connection between 
money and output is established via a wealth effect on labor 
supply.
> 0
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APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER III
Cl. Monopsonistic Labor Markets in Search Equilibrium
The search theory of labor markets differs from the 
static supply-demand model in two fundamental ways: (1) an
emphasis on matching workers to job vacancies, implying that 
the relevant labor supply to a firm is the number of workers 
rather than worker-hours, with individual labor supply assumed 
to be fixed; (2) the assumption that firms set wages (or make 
wage offers) which workers either take or reject1. This 
literature also deals with markets which are in a state of 
adjustment in which disequilibrium trading takes place. Arrow 
(1958) pointed out that, in the absence of an auctioneer, 
price-setting necessarily defaults to agents and price-setting 
is the de facto exercise of market power. Thus, dynamic 
monopsony power is implicit in most disequilibrium search 
models of the labor market.
The sources of monopsony power in these models are 
typically asymmetric information and unequal trading costs. 
Participants in the labor force have imperfect information 
about the existence and location of job vacancies and/or the
1Howitt and McAfee [1987] and Howitt [1988] describe search models in which 
wages are determined by bargaining between workers and firms. The equilibrium 
solution of the bilateral monopoly is indeterminate unless an arbitrary surplus- 
sharing rule is introduced (McDonald and Solow [1981]. The monopsony model 
investigated, here could be generalized by introducing a sharing rule that is 
endogenous and procyclical with respect to labor's share.
267
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distribution of wage offers by firms. Trading opportunities 
can be improved through search, at a cost of household 
resources, including time and foregone wages.
The existence of a marginal cost-benefit tradeoff in 
search models implies an optimum search or stopping rule. 
Prospective hires are imperfectly informed and will turn down 
wage offers that cure too low relative to their expectations. 
Individual firms seeking to expand employment find that they 
cam. increase the rate of new hires by raising their wage 
offers, i. e., in these models, firms have dynamic monopsony 
power over the flow of net hires during the employment 
adjustment process. Thus, firms are able to regulate the 
flow of new hires and quits, and consequently the level of 
equilibrium employment, by raising or lowering their nominal 
wage offers. The supply-side response is determined by the 
wage-elasticity of labor supply, in or out of equilibrium.
In Mortensen's (1970) seminal model, the long-run labor 
supply curve is perfectly elastic, but the equilibrium real 
wage is less than the marginal product of labor by the cost to 
the firm of financing the marginal cost of hiring one more 
worker. Thus Mortensen's model retains a markdown in equilib­
rium, but one that is smaller than in the static monopsony 
case2.
2
In a timeless static model, financing the marginal labor cost is out of 
the question so it must be included in current expenditure flow, i. e., the 
incremental higher wage is paid to all employed workers in the absence of wage 
discrimination.
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Diamond [1971] showed in a consumer random search model 
that if profit-maximizing sellers fully exploit their informa­
tional advantage against consumers, the optimum price for all 
sellers in equilibrium is the static monopoly price. Although 
this model deals with monopoly power, the equilibrium result 
can be carried over to the case of pure monopsony by a 
symmetrical construction in which firms as buyers of labor 
services have more information or lower trading costs than 
workers.
Baily [1975] showed that the stationary solution to the 
intertemporal optimization problem of the representative firm 
with dynamic monopsony power is similar to the static monopso­
ny equilibrium, with a markdown W/ed where W is the stationary 
wage and ed is the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply to 
the firm3. In fact, countercyclical monopsony power is 
implicit in Baily's model, although Baily did not point out 
this feature. The operative assumptions of Baily's model are: 
(a) the firm is a price-taker in both the goods and capital 
markets ; (b) the firm can increase its flow supply of labor 
services by raising its relative wage offer according to a 
recruiting function (dL®/dt)/L8 = g(W) , g' > 0; (c) there are 
decreasing returns to successive wage increases in recruiting 
labor, i. e. g" < 0; and (d) firms maximize profits.
3This result was- confirmed by Pissarides [1976, Chap. 4, p. 56].
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Baily derives the optimum dynamic wage-setting path as: 
PF* = W[1 + 1/ed] (Cl.l)
Here PF^ is the marginal revenue product of labor, W is the 
money wage, ed = Wg'/(r-g) is the dynamic elasticity of labor 
supply, g is the recruiting function and r is the intertemp­
oral discount rate. Along the adjustment path the markdown 
is W/ed and the corresponding measure of dynamic monopsony 
power is l/ed.
In Baily's model, monopsony power varies with employment 
due to the properties of the recruiting function g(W) . since 
the value of g is positive in expansions, negative in contrac­
tions and zero in steady-state employment, countercyclical 
monopsony power is possible in Baily's model, with steady- 
state output and employment, g = 0, and the elasticity of 
labor supply in steady-state equilibrium is:4
€ss * W*g'(W*)/r (Cl.2 )
It is straightforward to show in Baily's model that 
&(ed) r the elasticity of ed with respect to the wage, will be 
positive along the optimum adjustment path from one steady- 
state equilibrium to another, if and only if:
^wCg'] = |Wg"/g'| < (1 + ed) (Cl.3)
This result holds also at the equilibrium wage W* where 
g(W*) = 0 .  Thus, a second-order constraint on the recruiting 
function g(W), restricting the rate of diminishing returns, is
4
Baily*8 steady-state solution to (Cl.l) is identical to that of Mortenson, 
with the implicit steady-state elasticity of labor supply equal to W*g'(W*)/r, 
where K is the steady-state wage.
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required to ensure procyclical elasticity of labor supply in 
equilibrium5. The important conclusion from Baily's paper is 
that monopsony power, or a wage markdown, is retained in long- 
run equilibrium and monopsony power in equilibrium can be 
procyclical.
Another approach to making market power endogenous 
exploits externalities from trading in thin and thick markets. 
Diamond [1982a], Pissarides [1976, 1988] and Andolfatto [1996] 
developed search equilibrium models in which the returns from 
trade depend on the volume of trading, e. g, the number of job 
vacancies or the number of workers searching. The market 
coordinating mechanism is search and trading by agents in lieu 
of an auctioneer. The steady-state equilibrium level of 
employment is supported by an underlying search process.
These models can have multiple equilibria as a conse­
quence of increasing returns in the search technology, and 
typically have Keynesian features even though they are 
equilibrium models. The labor market is modeled as a bilater­
al monopoly, with bargaining power over wages shared between 
firms and workers in inverse proportion to their relative 
trading costs. Monopsony would be the case where workers have 
significantly higher trading costs than firms; monopsony power 
would be cyclical if the cost ratio depended on the labor
5These results were derived by the author from Baily*8 steady-state 
equations. They are mentioned here because similar relationships will be found 
in the heterogeneous reservation wage model presented in Chapter IV.
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force participation rate. This potential source of cyclical 
monopsony power is not utilized in this thesis.
C2. Elasticity of Labor Supply in the Standard Monopsony Model
The individual labor supply function is derived from the 
solution to the consumers' consumption-leisure choice prob­
lem6 s
Max U(c, £) subject to Pc + W£ < Y = V + WT (C2.1)
c > 0, 0 < £ < T, V > 0
where U is a quasi-concave utility function, c is the quantity 
of a composite consumption good with price index P, £ is 
leisure time with nominal wage price W, and Y is the sum of 
the individual's endowments of nominal nonlabor income V and 
the value of total time T in the period. The interior 
solution to (C2.1) yields Marshallian demand functions for 
consumption and leisure as functions of prices and income:
Cd = Cd(W, P, V) (C2.2)
£d = £d(W, P, V)
Because the budget constraint in (C2.1) is linear and continu­
ous , these demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in 
W r P and V. Euler's Theorem applied to leisure demand gives:
6Thls basic exposition follows Killingsworth (1983)
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(C2.3)
The homogeneity property also implies that only relative 
prices matter, and using the product price P as numeraire we 
may express the demand for leisure in real terms as:
where w = W/P and v = V/P. Without loss of generality, I will
nonmarket activities each period. Individual labor supply is 
then the mathematical complement to leisure demand:
With the behavioral assumptions made thus far and the 
functional form of U(c,£) unspecified, the signs of all 
partial derivatives of the demand equations in (C2.2) are 
ambiguous. If we assume, as is commonly done, that both 
consumption and leisure are normal goods and are gross 
substitutes, then
acd/a v  > o, a£d/av  > o, acd/aw > o, and e£d/ap > o.
If we make the additional assumption, also commonly done, that 
substitution effects dominate income effects in both consump­
tion and leisure, then it follows from the Slutsky equation 
that
a*d/aw < o, a*d/ap > o, acd/aw > o, and acd/ap < o.
These additional assumptions imply a negative sign for the 
wage-elasticity of leisure demand:
£d = £d(w, 1, v) = £d(w, v) (C2.4)
set T = 1 and interpret £d as the fraction of time spent in
£s(w, v) = 1 - £d(w, v) (C2.5)
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Since labor supply is the mathematical complement of leisure 
demand, its corresponding first partial derivatives have 
opposite signs from leisure demand and its wage-elasticity is 
unambiguously positive: e£w > 0.
Without making additional specifications, the second 
partial derivatives of the demand functions are ambiguous. 
Ordinarily this is of little concern in the analysis of 
consumer demand and labor supply, but in the present instance 
we are interested in the direction of endogenous change in 
€jgwr which is a second order effect. If, however, we make 
the additional (and crucial) assumption of homothetic prefer­
ences, then the signs of all second partial derivatives can be 
determined.
First, a homothetic utility function U(c,£) implies a 
linear income expansion path and Engel curves that are rays 
through the origin, i. e., the income elasticities of leisure 
demand and consumption are unity. Second, the marginal rate 
of substitution Ujg/Uc = W/P is constant along any income 
expansion path; this in turn implies that the point elastici­
ties of the demand functions of (C2.2) are invariant with 
respect to changes in income alone. Thus, shifts in consump­
tion and leisure demand due to changes in real income alone, 
with relative price W/P constant, will be iso-elastic, i. e.,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
275
3(nv)/5v “ 3(i\g)/dv = 8(nc)/dv = 0 
This, however, will not be the case for labor supply, the 
mathematical complement of leisure demand. From (C2.5), the 
elasticity of labor supply is related to the elasticity of 
leisure demand as follows:
€Zw - [---— jrijg > 0 (C2.7)
(l-£d)
Partial differentiation of (C2.7) with respect to v gives the 
result:
dld
de = - -ld . 5*le _ *\z ~5V > Q (C2.8)
TTv (l-£d) (1 -ld) (1 -ld)
The positive sign follows from the homotheticity property 
which makes dr\/dv = 0, the assumption that r\z < 0, and that 
leisure is a normal good. This result can also be obtained by 
differentiating eZw directly7:
7The homotheticity assumption enables all second partial derivatives of the 
demand equations to be signed. Euler's and Young's theorems and the 
property of unit income elasticity can be used to derive for labor supply:
32£s/aw2 <0, dz2s/dvz a 0, 32£s/3v3w > 0
These signs, along with those of the first partials, can be used to obtain the 
result in (C2.9). The corresponding first partials of £d have the exact opposite 
signs.





ZE1ZE1 > o (C2.9)(€S)2
The positive sign is determined by the fact that 5£s/5v < 0 
and 82£8/3vdw >0.
The economic interpretation of de/dv > 0 is that an 
individual with high nonlabor income occupies a higher 
indifference curve and therefore has higher absolute demands 
for both consumption and leisure. With homothetic preferenc­
es, the wage-elasticity of leisure demand is constant along 
any income expansion path, but the wage-elasticity of labor 
supply increases with income because the total available time 
T in the period is fixed and the desired ratio of leisure time 
to work time increases with income.
In Equation (C2.7), r\2 is constant but the ratio 
ld/ (l - £d) increases with v, resulting in e2w increasing with 
v. Since v is the only shift variable in £a(w,v) and dla/dv 
< 0, a decrease in v is associated with an outward shift of 
the labor supply function and an increase in employment and 
output. Thus, in the standard setup with homothetic prefer­
ences, e2v is always countercyclical, implying that monopsony 
power will be procyclical and the real wage will be counter­
cyclical in the standard monopsony model.
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Dl. The Reservation Wage Function
The properties of the reservation wage function (v) are 
inherent in the utility function and the budget and hours con­
straints of the consumer's problem. Since consumers are 
assumed to differ only in their endowments, they share the 
same reservation wage function. The function V in Equation 
(4.2)) is continuous and twice differentiable in (v, o») due to 
the standard assumptions about U0 = U(v, 1) and Ui = U(v -t- &>h, 
1-h) . Also, note that dV/do> = ^ 0. Thus the
implicit function theorem applies, and the implicit function 
for the reservation wage a = ^(v) can be investigated. 
Differentiating Equation (4.2) (and dropping the terms with 
arguments h and 1-h which are constants) yields the result:
The inequality in (D1.2) follows from the fact that U0 
and Uj are strictly concave and (v + ah) > v for a > 0.
(Dl.l)
and solving (Dl.l) for da/dv:
1 > 0
dv ~ h [ W J" (D1.2)
277
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Equation (D1.2) also follows from the fact that U„ and U, are 
concave and therefore have decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(Hall, Lippman & McCall [1979], Ch. 7). It has been long 
established in the labor market search literature that if the 
individual utility function has decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA), the reservation wage increases monotonically 
with nonlabor income v or wealth 0 (Danforth, 1979)1.
The derivable properties of if are functions of the first 
and second partial derivatives of U0 and ty. The elasticity 
of ^ is:
Since ifr is monotonic, it has an inverse function if'' = g(u) 
with elasticity ^,[g(«) ] = l/£. It is evident from Equation
(4.6) in Chapter IV that elu and £ will be inversely related. 
If d£/dv > 0, then de/dv < 0 and a decline in v, which is 
necessary for the labor supply curve to shift out, will 
increase which will then be procyclical.
In a context of job search with uncertainty, a utility function with 
DARA implies a declining absolute risk premium for the choice of an 
uncertain income stream from job search as nonlabor income or wealth 
increases. Although uncertainty and search dynamics are not being modeled 
here, the relative risk aversion, or concavity, of U(c,£) plays a role in
dU0
> 0 (Dl.3)
determining de&j/dv; see below.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The first derivative of the elasticity £ is:
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(Dl.4)
from which it can be seen that the sign of \p" is pivotal to 
the sign of £*. Differentiating Equation (D1.2) yields:
=
dU'  r d2U° ,  _  dU<> r 3 2 u 1 ,








then (D1.5) can be written:
(Dl.6)
Equation (D1.6) can be rearranged to yield the following rela­
tionship :
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(f ) ^ (C7i) " Rk(Uo)
1 U S
r  = < > 0 ( D 1 . 7 )
where R* (U) = -U"/U' is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute 
risk aversion. The sign of Equation (D1.7) depends on 
cardinal utility measure and is ambiguous without specifica­
tion of a functional form for U(c, I).
For a general concave utility function with decreasing 
relative risk aversion (DARA), the most that can be said about 
0(v) is that it is positive and monotonically increasing with 
v. For the class of homothetic utility functions it is easy 
to show that — t/v, f — 1, ^(v) = kv where k is an 
arbitrary constant, and 0" = 0; in that case it can be 
verified from Equation (D1.4) that £' =0. Thus, the assump­
tion of homothetic preferences implies a linear reservation 
wage function \j/ with constant elasticity £ everywhere.
Inspection of Equations (D1.4) and (D1.7) reveals that 
utility functions that are more concave than homothetic 
functions will have \pu > 0 and £1 > 0 ,  with opposite signs 
prevailing for utility functions that are less concave. If 
0, then the elasticity of 0(v) will be changing with v, 
and will have an effect on e*H via £J,[g] that will be due only 
to nonhomothetic preferences.
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D2. Non-homothetic Preferences and Relative Risk Aversion
A closely related measure of concavity is the relative 
risk aversion Rr(U) = U"v/U'= vR*. which is also the elasticity 
of the marginal utility of income. In terms of relative risk 
aversion. Equation D1.7 becomes:
For a homothetic utility function Rr is constant for all 
values of c and I, i.e., the elasticity of marginal utility is 
constant everywhere. In the special case of log utility,
R* = 1 and it can be shown by substitution in Equation (D2.1) 
that - 0, and also from Equations (D1.3) and (D1.4) that 
£ = 1 and therefore £' =0. This corresponds to the reserv­
ation wage function fa in Figure 4-2, which is representative 
of all homothetic utility functions. Thus, the assumption of 
homothetic preferences rules out any dynamic effect of £, the 
elasticity of the reservation wage function, on e, the 
elasticity of labor supply. This result is consistent with 
the conclusions of Chapter III.
If the utility function is not homothetic, then Rr will 
be either increasing or decreasing with v, and from Equations
(02.1) and (01.4) , and £' will be correspondingly positive 
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corresponding effect on e£w. Thus, the operative implications 
of nonhomothetic preferences for the elasticity of the 
reservation wage function can be reduced to the assumption of 
whether Rr is increasing or decreasing with income in the 
worker population2.
D3. Relative Risk Aversion and Procyclical cJu
Arrow (1970) showed that a utility function must be 
bounded from above and from below in order for lotteries to be 
consistently ranked according to their Expected Utility, and 
for a bounded utility function:3
lim Rr (U(x )) < 1 and lim Rr (U(x )) > 1 (D3.1)
X -* 0 X  •  00
Equation (D3.1) implies that only two possibilities are 
consistent with the Expected Utility Theorem: constant or 
increasing Rr. The constant case is homotheticity with 
f" = 0 which has already been considered. If utility is 
assumed to be nonhomothetic with increasing Rr, then it is 
evident from Equations D2.1 and D1.4 that tjr" > 0 and >0.
2
Preferences could be heterogeneous across workers, or all workers 
could have identical nonhomothetic preferences. The relevant heteroge­
neous property which determines the sign of is relative, or proportion­
al., risk aversion.
3A bounded utility function precludes an infinite utility measure 
far arbitrarily large lottery payoffs, which would invalidate the Expected 
Utility Theorem. See Arrow (1970).
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Since g' [g(o>) ] = l/£r it then follows from Equation (4.6) in 
Chapter IV that de/dv < 0f and a decline in v which causes the 
labor supply curve to shift out will also be accompanied by an 
increase in the elasticity of labor supply. This case 
corresponds to reservation wage function fa with £' > 0 in
Figure 4-2. Arrow points out that increasing Rr is consistent 
with empirical findings that the wealth elasticity of the 
demand for money balances is at least unity.
Thus, one possible source of procyclical elasticity of 
labor supply would be nonhomothetic preferences with increas­
ing relative risk aversion (IRRA). With increasing R*, the 
risk premium component of the reservation wage function 
decreases more than proportionally with nonlabor income, 
causing the elasticity of aggregate labor supply to increase 
as the labor supply curve shifts out.
The remaining possibility, decreasing relative risk 
aversion, corresponding to reservation wage function fa i-n 
Figure 4-2, can be eliminated on the basis of (D3.1), and the 
empirical estimates that the wealth-elasticity of the demand 
for money balances is not less than unity.
D4. Conditions on Preferences for Procyclical e»H
By differentiating the expressions for RA and R*, it is 
straightforward to show a that a utility function U(x) which
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has decreasing R* and increasing R* must: satisfy the double 
inequality:
(D4.1)
or, in elasticity terms:
0 < [rx[C7"] - rx[t7']] < i (D4.2)
The set of utility functions {U(x)> which satisfy (D4.1) and
(04.2) will have monotonically increasing reservation wage 
functions with elasticities that increase with nonlabor income 
v r creating a procyclical influence on the elasticity of labor 
supply in Equation (D4.6)4. An example of such a utility 
function, due to Pratt (1964), is:
U(x) - -expf-p*1 (x + 0)p], 0 < p < l, 0 > 0  (D4.3)
For the case 0 = 0, RA = [ x p + (l-p)]x‘1 which is decreasing in 
Rr = [3CP + (1-p) ] which is increasing in x, with nearly 
constant elasticity p when x is large.
Sfith increasing Rr , the income-elasticity of the demand for leisure 
(and consumption) increases with income; thus the income-elasticity of 
labor supply, the complement of leisure demand, decreases with income, and 
conversely. Thus with increasing R r , a decline in nonlabor income 
increases the elasticity of labor supply.
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5. Shift of the Aggregate Labor Supply Function
The Lognormal labor supply function is: 
Partial differentiation under the integral sign:
(D5.1)
W
-ijzX(wjdw <0 because £z^(z)dz=0 (D5.2)
W
A„z = —ij.|[z2 - l]X(hr)dw (D5.3)
= 2^I[Z2'1]^ (Z)dZ { < o \ z i o (DS-4)
Here I employ the transformation z = (In w - n)/a which 
enables the substitution of the standardized normal density 
<p(z) for X(w) . This convention will be maintained throughout.
An increase in P due to an open-market purchase reduces 
ft but not a2. (See Section 4.4.2) However, an open-market 
operation necessarily reduces A, the proportion of total 
wealth held in the risky asset (bonds) and this reduces o2 
through the nonhomogeneous portfolio adjustment process 
described in Section 4.4.3 and Appendix Section 07 below.
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It also follows from the portfolio balance relationship that
Thus Pf directly through dp/dP, and r, indirectly through 
(da2/dA) (dA/dr) , will shift and compress the aggregate labor 
supply curve.
The partial elasticities £p[A] and [A] of A are derived 
below.
An increase in P increases aggregate labor supply at all 
reservation wages.
The interest-elasticity works through A and a2:
For the Pratt IRRA utility function in Equation D4.3, the 
elasticity ^[o2] was found previously to be +2 (l-p)2/p2or2.
SU*2] > 0, so a decline in r reduces A and thereby a2.
(D5.5)
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*r[A] is the interest-elasticity of A in the portfolio 
balance relationship, and is related to the interest-elastici­
ty and wealth-elasticity of the money demand function, as will 
be shown in the following development.
dA r _ r 
~5r ~A Ali
F? + Or(Fo-A) (D5.8)
where F*1 and M*1 represent the demand for risky financial assets 
and money balances, respectively. Here I maintain consistency 
with the specifications of money and asset demand in Chapter 
II, Section 2.1, i. e., M*1 = Md(y,r, Q) and
F*1 = Fd(y,r,Q,..), so that there are wealth effects in both 
demand functions. Note that changes in r can affect A in two 
ways: a substitution effect Frd, and a wealth effect 
Qr(Ffld - A) . The following identities also apply:
AO=Fd, Fd=-M?, F£=l-/f2, = -(±~A) , J^r = -A
Substituting these identities and rearranging terms results in 
the following expression for [A]:
= ( ^ ) [ ~ ^ CWd]+A
r0[Md] -1 > 0 (D5.9)
Thus £*r[A] can be expressed exclusively in terms of the 
interest- and wealth-elasticities of money demand. £v[A] can 
be evaluated numerically for given values of A and these two 
elasticities. Note, however, that if preferences are homo- 
thetic, ^qCM*] = - 1, i. e.,asset demand elasticities
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are constant with respect to scale. In that case, there is no 
wealth effect on A, and:
grr[A] = M d] (D5.10)
the magnitude of which is considerably less than one.
The macro variables P and r are affected by changes in 
the stock of money. In the model of Chapter II, it was found 
that dP/dM > 0 and dr/dM < o unambiguously, and that an open- 
market purchase of bonds was non-neutral. If the aggregate 
labor supply function A were to be imbedded in that model, 








\BA r 1 dr M
/3Fa JwdM r.
This expression can be evaluated numerically for given values 
of pr <r, and the elasticities on the right-hand side.
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D6. Endogenous Change in Labor Su p pIv  Elasticity
The real-wage elasticity of aggregate labor supply is:
e = = e( (D6.1)
which shows that the elasticity of A is equivalent to its 
relative density. The partial derivative of e with respect to 
one of its parameters x is:
d (Xw) dA
de _ dx c lx (D6.2)
ix " — a—  ' e~ r
For x = ftz












Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 9 0





( D 6 . 5 )
The sign of the right-hand side will depend on the value of z, 
and the expression will have to be evaluated numerically.
The change in elasticity due to an increase in P at a 
given wage is through ft only:
3e 3e / - 1 \








A reduction in fi due to an increase in P will reduce e 
unambiguously. There is no effect on the dispersion parameter 
a2 from P.
The price-elasticity of e is, from (06.6)
Z(p{z) dz
I
S’pCe] = a{~Z+ tf(z|0,l) } < 0
(D6.7)
Upon comparing Equations (D6.7) and (D5.6), it is evident
that:
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2>[e] =-«'P[A]-£ (D6.8)
Since [A] > 0, an increase in the price level alone 
will increase e only at large negative values of z, well below 
the median [i. There is, however, another channel through a2. 
The elasticity of the distribution will be increased in a 
region about the log median if the kurtosis of the density 
function X(w) is decreased by a change in the shift parame­
ters. The kurtosis of the Lognormal density function is an 
increasing function of o2 only5. Thus, a decline in the log 
variance a2 will increase the relative density of X(w) in the 
vicinity of fi, which will increase elasticity there. (The 
variance and skewness of X(w) will also decrease with a 
decline in o2.)
From Equation (D6.5):
K m  = -i (**-!> I1[z2-l]p(z)dzNTzT0,i) 2(1 -p)—^ 2 T dA r7 ?  1 dir A (D6.9)
and comparing this with Equation D5.7, it is evident that:
5The kurtosis yz * + 15“2 +• 16) where “2 = exp(a2) — 1.
A decline in o2 reduces the kurtosis of the Lognormal density function.
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^ r [6] = - g r [A j+  (1-^ ) 2 (z2- l ) g r CA3
Finally, the total money-elasticity of e, with respect to 
a one-time open-market purchase, is derived from Equations
(06.7) and (D6.9) as:
. 1
z  +• __
z<p(z)dz
N(z 10,1) *»[*]
X . 10,1) I * ™ ! * ™
(D6.10)
Like Equation (D5.ll), this expression can be evaluated for 
given values of the elasticities on the right-hand side.
Comparing Equation (D6.10) with Equation (D5.ll) reveals
that:
«HCe] =-^mCA]-f|^[P]] [A]
* _ s. ^ _ (l-p)z(zz~ l ) 
£z— W ^ ) —
(D6.ll)
For a non-neutral open-market operation the elasticity 
&m(PI is positive and less than one, most likely greater than
0.5. is the elasticity of proportional demand for
risky assets in Tobin's portfolio balance model of Keynesian 
liquidity preference (Tobin, 1958). (See Chapter IV, Section
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liquidity preference (Tobin, 1958). (See Chapter IV, Section 
4-4 and Figure 4-5) . This elasticity will be determined by 
the particular utility function assumed to represent prefer­
ences, but can be calculated from Equation (D5.9) given 
empirical estimates of the interest-elasticity and wealth- 
elasticity of money demand, and A, the share of risky assets 
in financial wealth. The third elasticity, (dr/dM) (M/r) is 
just the reciprocal of .
Given plausible values for these three elasticities, 
Equations (D5.ll) and (D6.10) or (D6.ll) can be evaluated 
numerically for calibrated parameters of A(w|n,a2) , the 
standard Normal density function <p(z) and distribution 
function N(z|0,l), and p, the elasticity of relative risk 
aversion. This is done in Chapter IV, Section 5.
D7- onfc-iimim Portfolio Balancing with Increasing Rr
This section follows the analysis and relies upon 
proofs in Arrow (1970) and Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) . It is 
included to provide a more rigorous support of the discussion 
in Section 4.4.3.
An individual with an endowment of wealth nQ at the 
beginning of a time period can hold it in either earning 
assets f which provide an uncertain periodic return R, or in 
riskless money balances m which provide no return. The return
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R = r + r/re -1
Here, 1/r is the current price of the risky asset and l/re is 
the expected price at the end of the period. Individual 
preferences for wealth and its components m and f are de­
scribed by a concave utility function H(Q) . It will be 
assumed here that H(Q) has decreasing absolute risk aversion 
[d/3G(H"/H') < 0] and increasing relative risk aversion
[3/3Q(HwG/H') > 0]. Thus, individuals are risk-averse and
prefer to diversify between f and m.
Since wealth at the end of the period is uncertain, the 
individual desires to choose a portfolio allocation between f 
and m that will maximize his/her expected utility from wealth 
at the end of the period. The consumer's problem in the asset 
market is:
Max ECHCQ,)] = E[H(l-a)0o + a(l+R)G0)] = E[H(0o(l + aR)) ] 
a
0 < a < 1
Where the expectation E is with respect to the uncertain 
return R. The only decision variable is a, and the constraint 
f +• m = 0o is incorporated in the substitution for . 
Differentiating E[H] twice with respect to a gives the first- 
and second-order conditions for a maximum:
F.O.C. E[H'(G0(l + aR)R0o] = 0
S.O.C. E[H"(0o(l + aR)R2G2] < 0
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The second order condition is satisfied by the concavity of H. 
The first order condition equates marginal utilities of f and 
m at the optimum; this occurs when the marginal rate of 
substitution between f and m equals their price ratio, which 
is (1 + R). The standard setup with indifference curves 
tangent to budget lines is shown in Figure 4-5 (a) and (b) in 
Section 4.4.3.
The first-order condition gives the optimum a* as an 
implicit function of no and R, and we may write a* = a(H,r) . 
(With static, regressive expectations, re = r = R) . Implicit 
differentiation of a* with respect to r in the first-order 
condition gives:
da- = _ E[H" > Q (D7>1)
dr E[Hn  [r2n2]
The denominator of D7.1 is the negative second-order condi­
tion. Arrow (1970; Appendix [4]) proved that the numerator is 
positive if H has decreasing absolute risk aversion (RA) , 
which has been assumed here. It follows that £*r[a*] > 0, and 
a reduction in r reduces a*, the optimum portfolio share of 
the risky asset.
Implicit differentiation of a* with respect to nQ gives:
da* E{Hn  [ m 0 + a*r2n2] ]
= ? (D7-2> dfl0 E[H,fr2nl]
The denominator of D7.2 is the negative second-order condi­
tion, and Arrow (op. cit., Appendix [5]) proved that the
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numerator is negative if H has increasing relative risk 
aversion (Rr) (which has also been assumed) , and zero if H has 
constant relative risk aversion, i. e., if H is homothetic. 
It follows that if H is homothetic, a* is independent of 
wealth and is the same for all wealth-holders, and since 
dza*/drdQ =0, portfolio share adjustments to changes in r will 
be homogeneous over wealth-holders. But with increasing Rr, 
2^[a*] < 0, and the optimum portfolio share a* will decline 
with am increase in 0 at a constant interest rate r. It can 
be shown that increasing R r implies that d2a*/dQ3r > 0 .  so that 
the marginal rate of substitution between f and m increases 
with wealth. Thus, portfolio adjustments in response to 
changes in r will not be homogeneous over wealth-holders.
In response to an open market operation, which reduces Q 
and r, bond-holders with increasing Rr will reduce their 
portfolio shares allocated to bonds proportionally to their 
wealth. Since wealthier bond-holders hold a lower percentage 
of their wealth in bonds to begin with, their portfolio 
rebalancing actions will reduce their bond income v more than 
proportionally. Relative nonlabor incomes will decline more 
than proportionally, compressing the dispersion of the 
distribution.
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Applying the elasticity operator ?Q to v = ra*ft, remem­
bering that a* = a(ft,r), yields the relationship:
= { ^ [ ^ ] [ l + ^ r [ a * ] ] }  + { ^ [ n ] [ l + ^ Q [ a * ] ] }  < 0  ( D 7 . 3 )
The first term on the right is the substitution effect of a 
change in r due to a change in aggregate M, and is always 
negative. The second term is the wealth effect of a change in 
aggregate M. If preferences are homothetic, [a*] = 0 and
the wealth effect is only the effect of a proportional 
reduction in earning assets, which is also negative on v, but 
homogeneous over bond-holders. With increasing relative risk 
aversion, [a*] will be negative but greater than -1; the net 
wealth effect on v will still be negative, but not as large, 
because a reduction in ft will increase a* somewhat. What is 
not apparent from this equation is that, with increasing 
relative risk aversion, the substitution effect will be much 
greater at higher values of ft and v due to the increasing 
concavity of the utility function, i. e. 2^[a*(ft,r)] is an 
increasing function of ft, and a* and v will decline more than 
proportionally, i. e., d2a*/dndr > 0. This causes the wealth 
expansion path to have a decreasing slope, as shown in Figure 
4-5(b), Section 4.4.3
Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) , following Arrow (1970) and 
Pratt (1964), proved the following:
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(1) The absolute value of risky asset holdings increases 
(decreases) with wealth if absolute risk aversion 
decreases (increases) with wealth.
i. e., 2o[f] > 0 if and only if H has decreasing RA
(2) The fraction of risky asset holdings increases 
(decreases) with wealth if relative risk aversion 
decreases (increases) with wealth.
i. e., £fc[a*] < 0 if and only if H has increasing R r .
As pointed out earlier in Sections D2 through D4 of this 
Appendix, a utility function with increasing relative risk 
aversion is nonhomothetic in a systematic way that has 
important implications for both the consumption-leisure and 
portfolio balance choices.
With increasing Rr, ^[a*] > 0 and ^[a*] < 0, A reduction 
in r, the (expected) rate of return on bonds, induced by an 
open-market operation will lower the reward/risk ratio for all 
bond-holders, but wealthier ones with higher relative risk 
aversion will reduce their bond allocations proportionally to 
their wealth. Since these wealthier investors hold a lower 
percentage of bonds in their portfolios, their actions will 
result in a reduction in v{ = ra,-Q{ that is more than propor­
tional to the value of v,- prior to the open-market operation. 
This will compress the distribution of v, reducing the 
variance of its logarithm, a2. The loss of bond income, which 
will be proportionally larger for wealthier workers, can be 
interpreted as a risk premium paid to reduce risk, one which 
increases with wealth.
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